v1.0.2 / chapter 2 of 2 / 01 apr 07 / greg goebel / public domain
* The Navy and Marines were happy with the Hornet, though it did have certain limitations, particularly with regards to range and combat load limits. The imminent obsolescence of other Navy aircraft with longer range and greater load capability led the Navy to initiate development of a scaled-up Hornet, which would emerge as the "F/A-18E/F Super Hornet".
The original Hornet had its critics, but the criticisms drawn by the Super Hornet have been downright scathing. Once again, however, it is going into service, like it or not, and the Navy is also working on an electronic countermeasures variant of the Super Hornet, the "EA-18G Growler".
* During the 1980s, the US Reagan Administration engaged in a massive defense buildup, with funding provided for a wide range of weapon systems. A joke made the rounds that US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger "never saw a weapons system he didn't like."
At the time, US Navy air power was based on the F-4 Phantom, A-7 SLUF, and A-6 Intruder, all of which were in the twilight of their operational lives; the newer F-14 Tomcat interceptor; and the very new F/A-18 Hornet fighter. Aircraft wear out, or become too old to survive in combat against more modern opponents and defenses even if they don't, and need to be replaced. The Navy had a number of programs in the pipeline for replacements, including a much improved "A-6F" Intruder and an "F-14D" Tomcat, as well as an advanced stealthy carrier-based strike aircraft, the McDonnell Douglas / General Dynamics "A-12" delta flying wing. There was also interest in developing an improved version of the Hornet to address some of the type's limitations.
Navy brass who believed that funding for such a large set of major programs could be sustained over the long run were living in a fool's paradise, and gradually programs began to get the axe. When push came to shove, the A-12 program had to be selected over the A-6F, and so the advanced Intruder variant was canned. Unfortunately, this ended up being a "double whammy": when the secret A-12 effort was finally revealed to the public, the program's problems also came to light. The A-12 was behind schedule and over budget, and it got the axe in early 1991, just before the beginning of OPERATION DESERT STORM, the effort to oust the Iraqis from Kuwait. Although the Navy participated in the air war, due to a combination of factors, including a lack of a leading-edge strike capability, the Navy embarrassingly only performed a little more than a fifth of the number of sorties of the Air Force. It was an intolerable loss of face for Navy brass.
The Navy was still planning to obtain an advanced attack aircraft, the "AX", but the AX wasn't to reach service until 2020. Something less ambitious was needed in the interim. The alternatives were a multirole version of the F-14D and the concepts being promoted for an improved Hornet, referred to here generally as the "Hornet II", although there were a number of different names, such as "Hornet 2000". The Hornet II faction, which significantly included US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, felt that they had the cheaper option, with the lower cost allowing the Navy to obtain enough fighters to keep their carrier air wings in operation until the AX arrived. A new long-range AAM, the "AIM-155", would permit the Hornet II to do the Tomcat's fleet air defense job.
The most direct thing to do was conduct a "fly-off" between the two proposals, but then politics intervened in the form of a scandal at the "Tailhook" convention of naval aviators in September 1991. There was a drunken bash that resulted in several female participants complaining that they had been muscled around and abused, and in the howling public scandal that followed a number of top Navy brass were accused of covering up the matter, leading to a series of resignations.
The Tailhook scandal was a messy issue and discussion of its details in a document on an aircraft is not relevant or useful. What is relevant was that the scandal threw the Navy command structure into confusion at a time when some important decisions had to be made. One of the significant consequences was that Navy Secretary Lawrence Garrett resigned, to be replaced by Sean O'Keefe, who was close to Cheney and in the Hornet II camp. The result was that the Hornet II faction won out, with the Navy committing to the development of the machine without a competitive flyoff.
A contract was awarded to McDonnell Douglas in June 1992 for seven Hornet II engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) machines. This was a major decision, and events quickly made it a completely irreversible one as well. The incoming Clinton Administration was focused on defense cuts, a not unreasonable attitude given the end of the Cold War -- though as it would turn out, peace hadn't quite broken out all over by any means. In any case, the AX, which had evolved by that time into the joint-service "A/F-X" project, was canned.
To be sure, defense programs have an odd way of rising from the dead, and the A/F-X concept would re-emerge as the "Joint Strike Fighter", resulting in the Lockheed Martin F-35. Navy brass didn't know that would happen at the time. If they wanted to have aircraft to fly off their carriers, there was only one game left in town -- the Hornet II.
Two variants were planned: a single-seater, the "F/A-18E", and a two-seater, the "F/A-18F". The F/A-18E/F was seen as a true multirole aircraft, replacing the F-14 Tomcat and the F/A-18A/C in the air superiority, strike, and reconnaissance roles; the Lockheed S-3B Viking in the tanker role; and (as it would turn out later) the EA-6B Prowler in the electronic warfare mode. In another irony of the situation, the AIM-155 long-range AAM was also given the axe, so the F/A-18E/F would have to rely on the AIM-120 AMRAAM for fleet defense. AMRAAM was certainly more modern than the big Phoenix AAMs used by the Tomcat, but AMRAAM's range was significantly shorter.
The first EMD machine, a single-seater, was rolled out in Saint Louis on 19 September 1995. The new aircraft was unimaginatively named the "Super Hornet".
* What the Navy wanted most of all from the Super Hornet was a parameter called "bring-back weight". The original F/A-18A/B/C/D Hornet -- here simply referred to as the "Hornet I" for convenience, though that's not an official designation in any way -- was overweight and could not land on a carrier carrying much more than AAMs and empty drop tanks. If it was carrying bombs or other air-to-ground munitions, it had to discard them before landing.
That hadn't been such a problem in the past, because in the 1980s the Navy still mostly relied on iron bombs, cluster munitions, and unguided rocket pods. Combat doctrine in those times usually assumed that such munitions could be dumped on a secondary target if the primary couldn't be hit, and since such munitions were inaccurate to begin with, they were dropped even if target visibility wasn't the best in hopes of inflicting some damage anyway. If worst came to worst and they had to be discarded, they weren't too expensive, with iron bombs described as being "as cheap as hamburger".
However, by the end of the decade precision-guided "smart munitions" had begun to predominate. Smart weapons allowed destruction of targets with high precision, allowing one relatively expensive munition to be used to destroy a target instead of several cheap iron bombs. Smart weapons also greatly reduced the risk of "collateral damage" to unintended civilian targets; with the rise of the "dirty little conflicts" of the 1990s, collateral damage became increasingly unacceptable, further reinforcing the usefulness of smart munitions.
Smart munitions were more expensive than iron bombs and couldn't be discarded so easily. Furthermore, the heightened concerns over collateral damage meant that such munitions weren't going to be dropped if there was a serious chance of them going astray or if there were uncertainties about the validity of a target. That meant in sum that an aircraft was likely to often come back to a carrier with unexpended munitions that cost too much to just dump. An improved Hornet simply had to have a greater bring-back load weight.
Increasing the bring-back weight meant giving the Hornet a larger wing. Since the Hornet I had suffered from wing flexing problems, the wing thickness had to be increased. The bigger wing meant more drag, so the sweepback was increased; and it also meant reduced maneuverability, so the LERX were redesigned. Ironically, the configuration of the LERX went back to something like that of the original Northrop Cobra concepts. It is tempting to call the Super Hornet the "Super Cobra", except that the Marines already had that name for their improved Bell AH-1 helicopter gunships.
* The Hornet I's lack of range was of course another high-priority issue, and so the fuselage was stretched to provide more internal fuel capacity. More internal space was reserved for future avionics growth, with provisions made for greater electrical power to drive avionics systems. All the increases meant more weight, with the Super Hornet eventually having an empty weight 25% greater than that of the Hornet I. In another irony of the Super Hornet saga, an aircraft that had started out as the YF-17 lightweight fighter was now only slightly smaller than an F-15 Eagle heavy fighter.
The greater weight demanded more engine power. GE came up with a new engine, the "F414", based on the F412 engine developed for the cancelled A-12, with the F414 providing 35% more power than the old F404s. The Super Hornet's engine inlets were changed from the D-shape of the Hornet I to a distinctive rectangular wedge shape that provided more airflow.
In addition, there had been improvements in stealth technology since the introduction of the Hornet I, and there was no reason not to take advantage of them. The geometry of the engine inlets was tweaked and more RAM was fitted; a baffle was developed by GE that was fitted in front of the F414 engines to eliminate reflections from the engine fan; and some airframe changes were made to eliminate radar traps.
However, a stealthy Super Hornet carrying ordinary external stores would still be highly visible to radar, and there were those who questioned that the efforts put into stealth were worth the bother. The reply was that there was never really any intention to make the Super Hornet a true "stealth fighter"; it was just that reducing the signature of the aircraft made its active countermeasures systems just that much more effective.
With all the changes the Super Hornet was basically a new aircraft, not a simple upgrade of the Hornet I, and in fact it only really retained the forward fuselage of the Hornet I's airframe. This was probably not a surprise to everyone, since it often happens when an aircraft update involves such things as new engines and major airframe changes. However, what was a bigger surprise was that the Super Hornet didn't meet its performance specifications, being distinctly inferior in speed, acceleration, and agility to late-build Hornet Is. A Hornet I pilot who took on the Super Hornet in air combat exercises was quoted as saying: "We outran them, we out-flew them, and we ran them out of gas. I felt embarrassed for these pilots."
It is hard to know how seriously to take such a remark, since combat pilots tend to have big egos and talk big accordingly, and there were plenty of Super Hornet-bashers willing to grab on to anything that came to hand to throw at it. The statement that the Hornet I ran the Super Hornet out of gas is particularly hard to swallow since the Super Hornet has a much bigger fuel supply.
* One way or another, the Navy had committed to the Super Hornet, and no alternatives were available. The Super Hornet passed its operational evaluation (OPEVAL) in early 2000, with the Navy then awarding Boeing a contract for 222 machines to be delivered from 2002 through 2006.
US Navy VFA-115, the first squadron of "Super Bugs" as the type was nicknamed, performed its first deployment in the summer of 2002 on board the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN. By the end of 2003, a total of 170 Super Hornets had been delivered, equipping a total of five squadrons. At that time, the Navy awarded Boeing a second contract for another batch of 210 Super Hornets, with these machines to be delivered from 2007 through 2012. The Navy is currently expecting to acquire a total of 552 Super Hornets. At present, the Marines have no plans to acquire the type.
The deficiencies of the Super Hornet have been mentioned, but of course the Navy did get benefits as well. The Super Hornet has 40% more range than the Hornet I, can carry a much larger warload, and can return to the carrier with unexpended weapons. It is a clear step up from the Hornet I in terms of manufacturing sophistication, with 42% fewer parts. It features a substantial proportion of carbon-fiber assemblies, replacing metal assemblies of the Hornet I.
The avionics suite was originally about the same as that of late-configuration F/A-18C/Ds, with the AN/APG-73 radar, and generally similar cockpit layout and avionics systems. The critics seized on the Super Hornet's avionics as "antiquated" because it was the same as the Hornet I's, but as mentioned in the previous chapter, a Hornet I with the latest upgrades is by no means behind the times. In addition, at least initially (and to no great surprise) the Super Hornet was not qualified for all the new stores that were planned for it. The SLAM-ER cruise missile was a significant omission, and the Super Hornets could not drop LGBs, though the Navy had other assets to perform those roles until the Super Hornet got up to speed.
The Super Hornet was also supposed to provide the reconnaissance capability that had been repeatedly fumbled on the Hornet I, but the "Shared Reconnaissance Pod" (SHARP) was not available initially. SHARP is a fully-digital reconnaissance system with electro-optical and infrared sensors for medium and high altitude reconnaissance, with a slant range of 83 kilometers (52 miles). It features a datalink for realtime relay of intelligence data. Raytheon developed the pod, which is derived from a 1,250 liter (330 gallon) centerline external fuel tank. It allowed the Super Hornet to replace the F-14 carrying the TARPS film reconnaissance pod.
The failure of the development program for the Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) system meant that initial production Super Hornets were fitted with less sophisticated AN/ALQ-165 Advanced Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) and the AN/ALE-50 towed decoy.
* Weapons qualifications went ahead, and enough Super Hornets were available by the spring of 2003 to allow the type to make a major contribution to the invasion of Iraq, with F/A-18Es of VFA-115 from the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN dropping hundreds of tonnes of bombs. Super Hornets often flew sorties with four 900 kilogram (2,000 pound) Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) GPS-guided bombs.
Two F/A-18Fs were ferried from the USS NIMITZ to join the operation, flying as "fast FACs". They used the JHMCS sight to spot targets and obtain coordinates, which were then relayed back to a strike platform. Two developmental SHARP pods were put into service as well, and the Super Hornet also flew large numbers of tanker sorties. The Navy appreciates the value of the Super Hornet as a tanker, because it can carry up to five external tanks, giving it a heavy fuel load; can match the performance of the aircraft it refuels; and can take care of itself if attacked, eliminating the need for an escort. There was no real air opposition to the invasion, and the Iraqis did not shoot down any Super Bugs.
* The initial production Super Hornet was an interim configuration, with improvements to be added in production as they became available. Following initial production, several improvements were introduced, including:
Following these initial improvements, the US Navy introduced the "Block 2" Super Hornet in 2005. The primary features of the Block 2 were the Raytheon AN/APG-79 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar system, plus a new rear cockpit scheme, the "Advanced Crew Station (ACS)". The new avionics required enhanced power and cooling systems, as well as a fiber-optic data bus.
The AN/APG-79 is derived from technology developed by Boeing and Raytheon for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. The radar has an antenna that consists of a matrix of programmable transmit-receive (T/R) modules, which can act cooperatively or individually, allowing the system to act as a "low probability of intercept" radar; a precision jammer; or an ELINT system to locate and target emitters. Functions can be performed simultaneously by allocating blocks of T/R modules to each function; the AN/APG-79 is "multimode" in a very strong sense, since it can actually operate in several modes at the same time, tracking an aerial target while mapping out ground targets. Astonishingly, the high degree of parallelism allows the front-seater and the back-seater to effectively each have their own radar. An AESA is so capable that it is really not entirely accurate to call it a "radar", since it is more than that.
Even ignoring its ability to perform operations in parallel, the AN/APG-79 is much more capable than the AN/APG-73 that it replaces. The AN/APG-79 has three times greater detection range and incorporates a high-resolution synthetic aperture radar (SAR) mode that has five times the resolution of the AN/APG-73, allowing the Block 2 Super Hornet to take over the maritime targeting job from the S-3 Viking.
The Block 2 has a completely new forward fuselage, partly to support the new systems. However, the new fuselage also reduces the parts count by 40% to improve manufacturability and maintainability, and provides better maintenance access. The new forward fuselage was actually introduced into production in 2003; all Super Hornets with the new forward fuselage are capable of being refitted with the AN/APG-79 AESA. An upgrade program for the older machines is scheduled to begin in 2008; 235 machines will be upgraded, with an ultimate total of 415 Super Hornets out of the planned total of 552 to feature the AN/APG-79. Such Super Hornets as have been fitted with the AESA have been used for service evaluation, with a number of software changes implemented as a result. The AN/APG-79 is expected to be ready for full operational service in 2008.
Most of the Block 2 Super Hornets will be two-seaters, reflecting Navy doctrine for "net-centric" warfare, in which weapons platforms are "nodes" in a network where volumes of tactical data are transferred back and forth. In net-centric warfare, two crew are needed because the back seater has to track the network activity; make the appropriate decisions based on that data; and control the aircraft's systems accordingly, while the front-seater actually flies the aircraft. This means the back-seater is more a peer to the front-seater than ever before -- and in fact, in the Block 2 Super Hornet, the back-seater can actually perform weapons release.
Boeing leased the very first F/A-18F back from the Navy to perform experiments to demonstrate the utility of the Super Hornet in the net-centric combat environment -- for example collecting video data from a SHARP pod and transferring it to an airborne command post, as well as a FAC on the ground. The Navy is retraining F-14 back-seaters, traditionally known as "radar intercept officers (RIOs)", to become Block 2 Super Hornet "weapon systems officers (WSOs)".
* The Block 2 Super Hornet also features an improved defensive countermeasures system, based on the new Raytheon AN/ALR-67(V)3 RWR and the BAE Systems / ITT AN/ALQ-214(V) Integrated Defensive Electronic Counter-Measures (IDECM) system. The IDECM integrates an ITT signals receiver; a BAE Systems onboard jamming techniques generator; and the AN/ALE-55 fiber-optic towed decoy (FOTD). The FOTD is trailed behind the aircraft on a fiber-optic cable and broadcasts the jamming or deception signals produced by the techniques generator. This means that if a missile has a "home on jam" mode, it will attack the FOTD and not the aircraft.
Along with the improved avionics, the Block 2 Super Hornet is qualified to carry new weapons. The longer range and greater capability of the AN/APG-79 AESA implies a longer range and more capable AAM, and the result is the "AIM-120C-7" variant of the AMRAAM. The AIM-12OC-7, also known as the "Pre-Planned Product Improvement (P3I) Phase 3" AMRAAM, features a new, smarter seeker and an improved flight control system that stretches its range.
Work is beginning on an "AIM-120C-8" or "P3I Phase 4" AMRAAM. It is scheduled for introduction to service in 2007. Details remain classified, but it is believed it will probably have an improved motor to further extend its range. With the AIM-120C-8, the Block 2 Super Hornet will be able to provide long range air defense for US Navy carrier groups, taking up the slack left by the retirement of the Tomcat.
Along with the AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM, the Block 2 Super Hornet can carry the Raytheon AIM-9X Sidewinder. This new version of the venerable Sidewinder family not only provides off-boresight targeting, with its seeker cued by the pilot's JHMCS sight, and extreme agility, it is even capable of a degree of "beyond visual range (BVR)" engagement. Aircraft sensors can allow it to obtain a lock at ranges in excess of 22 kilometers (12 NMI), and Raytheon is now working on a "lock on after launch (LOAL)" mode that will allow the missile to engage targets at the very limits of range or behind the launch aircraft.
* Beyond the Block 2 Super Hornet, other improvements in the pipeline include:
Boeing has also performed studies on further improving the stealthiness of the design. Although the US Navy expects to eventually stop buying Super Hornets and buying F-35 JSFs instead, stretchouts in the F-35 program have hinted that more F/A-18E/Fs will be purchased beyond those projected.
* The Navy's Grumman EA-6B Prowler electronics countermeasures (ECM) platform provided excellent service for decades, but by the year 2000 its days were clearly numbered. The Navy estimated that the Prowler force would fall below minimum strength by 2006, meaning that acquisition of a replacement was urgent.
The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet was judged the best candidate for a replacement, since the aircraft was in production and could be adapted to the standoff jamming mission with relatively little effort. Since the Navy is standardizing on the Super Hornet as its basic combat aircraft, a Super Hornet ECM had the advantage of being compatible with other Navy aircraft in terms of much of its logistics and its ability to operate with a strike package.
In late 2002, the Navy formally committed to development of an ECM version of the two-seat F/A-18F, designated the "EA-18G Growler", with plans to acquire 90 new-build machines, included in the total planned order for 552 Super Hornets. The Growlers will be built on the same production line as the F/A-18E/F, with the Super Hornet upgraded to an "F-Plus" configuration to make the airframes of both variants compatible. The F-Plus will have a slight weight penalty.
The operational EA-18G is to be based on the "ICAP-3" upgraded countermeasures system developed for the Prowler. Each of the Super Hornet's engines incorporates an electrical power generator, allowing the aircraft to drive internal ECM systems. The Growler's kit will include:
The EA-18G will also be fitted with the AN/APG-79 AESA radar, which will eventually be closely integrated with the rest of the Growler's countermeasures systems.
A typical operational configuration will be three AN/ALQ-99 jammer pods, two external tanks, two HARMs, and two AMRAAMs. The Growler will be a state of the art jamming platform, capable of simultaneous action against a wide range of radar and communications systems. Boeing had to design a special cancellation device to prevent the aircraft from jamming its own UHF radio system.
A two-seat F/A-18F is being used as the basis for the EA-18G because the workload requires a dedicated electronics warfare officer (EWO or "raven"), riding in the back seat. Since the Prowler seats three ravens, the Growler will feature enhanced automation to reduce workload. The front-seater will also be able to operate countermeasures systems to balance the workload when needed.
An F/A-18F configured as an initial EA-18G prototype performed its first flight in that configuration in November 2003. The first true prototype performed its initial flight in the summer of 2006. The first production Growler is scheduled to be delivered to the Navy in 2008 and reach initial operational capability in 2009. There will be one five-aircraft squadron on each of the Navy's carriers.
* The first foreign sale for the Super Hornet was a buy of 24 machines by Australia in 2007, for initial delivery in 2010. Australia, as mentioned, is a Hornet I operator, and with the looming retirement of Australia's General Dynamics F-111 strike aircraft, there was a need to acquire a replacment long range combat aircraft. The Super Bug doesn't have the range of the F-111, but it has substantially more range than the Hornet I, and the fact that the Super Hornet makes a pretty good tanker should help fill the gap. Several more nations, particularly some of the other current Hornet I users such as Switzerland, are also interested in the type.
Boeing is also considering what to do to make the Super Hornet more competitive in the export market, including making the aircraft stealthier, adding conformal fuel tanks for greater range and endurance, improving the Super Hornet's precision strike capabilities, and in particular reducing cost by a substantial percentage to make the fighter competitive with foreign rivals such as the French Rafale, Swedish Gripen, Eurofighter Typhoon, and MiG and Sukhoi fighters.
While the Super Hornet has a substantially smaller radar cross section than the original Hornet, Boeing engineers believe that it can be cut further. The new avionics of the Block 2 Super Hornet, particularly the AN/APG-79 AESA, may make the fighter more attractive in the export market as well.
* The Super Hornet has been a thoroughly abused aircraft, with its critics sparing little in their attacks, and its defenders calling the critics liars. Its murky origins are not inspirational, and even its defenders admit it lacks an edge in speed and agility.
However, it is worth asking if that edge makes a big difference. The second-generation Harrier II VTOL strike fighter is distinctly slower than the first-generation Harrier I, but the Harrier II is a far more capable aircraft, with greater load and range, as well as much more sophisticated avionics. Nobody makes much fuss about degraded performance -- though admittedly the Harrier II is regarded strictly as a strike aircraft. The Super Hornet has much the same set of advantages over the Hornet I, and in maturity will be able to carry an awesome range of weaponry. In the era of advanced AAMs that really work, its defects as a dogfighter may not count for much.
Many of the complaints about the Super Hornet, particularly from the Tomcat camp, seem partisan. For example, protesting that the AMRAAM doesn't match the range of the Phoenix tends to ignore the fact that the Phoenix was never really proven in combat; the missile's critics have suggested test exercises that demonstrated its capabilities were highly contrived, and that in reality the Phoenix was not anywhere as effective as AMRAAM. Work continues on improving AMRAAM and its range is creeping up towards that of the Phoenix. Super Hornet boosters have strong responses to the critics in the Super Hornet's capabilities, many of which are unarguable, and in the fact that the development program was generally on time and on budget, providing justification for the claim that the Super Hornet was the right choice to keep Navy Air in business.
Following the argument further becomes quickly tiresome for anyone who has better things to do. Since the Super Hornet is the way of the future for the US Navy, it's the reality, like it or not, and keeping an open mind seems like a sensible course of action.
It is interesting to wonder if the Super Hornet is one of the last of a breed. Although the Navy is committed to acquiring the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the fashion these days is to see the future as belonging to the robot "uninhabited combat aerial vehicle (UCAV)". Possibly the Super Hornet and the F-35 will be the last piloted fighters obtained by the Navy, though again it seems useful to keep an open mind.
* The following table summarizes Hornet production and users, with each entry
listing the variant, new-build quantities, user, and an optional comment:
___________________________________________________________________
YF-17 2 protos Northrop demonstrators.
_____________________________________________________________________
F/A-18A 9 protos
F/A-18A 370 USN-USMC
F/A-18A 98 Canada AKA CF-18A or CF-188A.
F/A-18A 57 Australia AKA AF-18A.
F/A-18A 60 Spain & 24 ex-USN F/A-18As; AKA EF-18A or C.15.
subtotal: 594
F/A-18B 2 protos
F/A-18B 40 USN-USMC
F/A-18B 40 Canada AKA CF-18B or CF-188B.
F/A-18B 18 Australia AKA ATF-18A.
F/A-18B 12 Spain AKA EF-18B or CE.15.
subtotal: 112
_____________________________________________________________________
subtotal: 706
_____________________________________________________________________
F/A-18C 466 USN-USMC
F/A-18C 32 Kuwait AKA KAF-18C.
F/A-18C 26 Switzerland
F/A-18C 57 Finland
subtotal: 581
F/A-18D 161 USN-USMC
F/A-18D 8 Kuwait AKA KAF-18D.
F/A-18D 8 Switzerland
F/A-18D 7 Finland
F/A-18D 8 Malaysia Did not acquire any single-seaters.
subtotal: 192
_____________________________________________________________________
subtotal: 773
___________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 1,479 not counting YF-17 demonstrators.
___________________________________________________________________
Some sources give the number of F/A-18As as 595 and of F/A-18Bs as 111.
F/A-18E/F quantities are not listed since the type is still being delivered.
* The Hornet was the last one of the modern American first-line fighters I documented. I am sure that the type has its fans, but somehow it's never caught my imagination. A colleague told me it was "downright ugly"; I wouldn't be that blunt myself, but it certainly doesn't look like it would win any beauty prizes, having more than its fair share of angles and edges. I find it looks slightly "bent". I have yet to find pictures of the thing that seem particularly inspiring.
However, I am not a Hornet-basher. Although some sources are blunt in their criticisms of the type, to me it all sounds like somebody else's quarrel. I do my best to make sure I stay out of arguments in which I have no real interest, nothing to gain, and don't really have the knowledge or data to make a credible judgement anyway.
* Sources include:
* Revision history:
v1.0.0 / 01 apr 04 / gvg
v1.0.1 / 01 mar 06 / gvg / Minor cosmetic update.
v1.0.2 / 01 apr 07 / gvg / Various additions of small details.
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