v1.0.4 / chapter 2 of 2 / 01 apr 07 / greg goebel / public domain
* By early October 1942, both the Japanese and the Americans had realized that they were committed to an intense life and death struggle for Guadalcanal. The fighting between two determined opponents then began in earnest.
* Back in Rabaul, Japanese General Hyakutake had decided to commit major resources to clearing the US Marines off Guadalcanal. Unfortunately for him, the old Army-Navy rivalries resurfaced again, and the Navy refused to provide him with the means to transport his force in a consolidated fashion down the Slot. The Navy felt the only way to run the gauntlet was to send in small groups on fast destroyers at night. Even this was becoming riskier, since American fliers were becoming skilled in night attacks.
To break the impasse, Hyakutake sent his operations chief, Lieutenant Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, to Truk to plead the Army's case with Admiral Yamamoto. Tsuji made his case eloquently while Yamamoto listened patiently. In the end, Admiral Yamamoto admitted that the Navy had made mistakes that had cost the Army dearly, and committed to providing full naval support for a big push to retake Guadalcanal. Yamamoto also saw the operation as an opportunity. Once more, he would have the chance to press the "decisive battle" on the US Navy. Not all the Japanese military command was so optimistic. Guadalcanal was at the end of a long and dangerously exposed supply line that was vulnerable to strengthening Allied air and sea power. In fact, some senior officers were convinced the battle was lost and should be given up.
General Kawaguchi returned to Rabaul to report on the situation. There were those who disliked him and wanted him sent away for his failure, but he had his patrons as well, and his eloquent description of the suffering and failure of the Japanese Army on Guadalcanal helped convince his superiors of the seriousness of the situation. Because of his knowledge of circumstances in the combat area, he was ordered to return to Guadalcanal with General Hyakutake.
* Vandegrift was feeling so optimistic that he launched a counteroffensive against the Japanese on Guadalcanal, mostly concentrated to the west of Henderson Field. On 23 September, he sent two battalions on a semicircular sweep that took them south towards Mount Austen, then west and back north. The Marines met little resistance, and on 26 September finally joined up on the Mataniko River with a third battalion that had advanced west along the coast.
The combined force then tried to move west across the river on the 27th, but the Marines were pinned down immediately. Communications to the operational commander, Colonel Edson, were garbled, and he misunderstood them to mean that his Marines were successfully pushing back the enemy. Edson ordered an amphibious landing at Point Cruz, to the west of the mouth of the Mataniko River. The landing force managed to get ashore without trouble but immediately ran into a trap. They lost 60 men, the survivors finally managing to cut their way out to be evacuated by a destroyer.
The strong reaction of the Japanese reinforced Vandegrift's belief that he was facing a major enemy force that was preparing to attack him again. In fact, there were only about 5,000 Japanese, and they were so weakened by disease and starvation that only about half were fit for combat.
The Navy was unimpressed by Vandegrift's worries and felt that he was being excessively cautious. Turner wrote Vandegrift, suggesting that the general "go after them hard." Vandegrift reacted angrily. There was a sullen stand-off for a few days, until Admiral Nimitz flew in to Guadalcanal to inspect the situation. He was noncommital but sympathetic, and Vandegrift, having blown off a little steam, recovered his nerve and launched a second counteroffensive.
This time he sent a full regiment up the coast, with orders to be as loud and busy as possible. In the meantime, three battalions of Marines crossed the Mataniko River upstream and curved around to the rear of where the Japanese would be expected to make a stand on the west bank of the mouth of the river. The decoy regiment got to the east side of the river and began to go through exaggerated motions for a crossing. On the morning of 9 October, the Marines sprung the trap, pinning in the Japanese, pounding them with mortars and artillery, and cutting them down with machine guns and rifle fire when they tried to escape. It was a massacre. The Marines counted about 700 Japanese bodies, while 65 Marines were killed in return.
* That evening, farther to the west along the coast at Tassafaronga Point, General Hyakutake and his staff, along with General Kawaguchi, were dropped off with supplies. Hyakutake saw for himself the desperate condition of the soldiers, and his unpleasant awakening to the facts was accelerated by the reports coming back of the slaughter along the Mataniko River. He wired Rabaul: SITUATION ON GUADALCANAL IS FAR MORE SERIOUS THAN ESTIMATED.
Hyakutake had planned to simply attack Henderson Field up the coast, but whatever illusions he might have had that direct, bold action would roll the Marines back in front of them had been thoroughly dampened. Instead, he decided to send a regiment up the coast as a diversion, while the 2nd Division under Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama circled south of Mount Austen and hit the Americans from the rear at night.
A trail had already been cut through the jungle for the movement of Maruyama's men. The jungle was very rugged and the Japanese engineers had only hand tools, but they had managed to clear a path, even though soldiers could only infrequently walk upright along it. General Kawaguchi had come to ruin fighting over the same and similar terrain and he was not optimistic. However, he knew his political position was shaky and dared not protest loudly.
* Hyakutake called for reinforcements, and on the 11 October six destroyers and two seaplane carriers came steaming fast down the Slot, carrying heavy weapons, supplies, and more troops. The supply convoy was accompanied by a bombardment force, consisting of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers under command of Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto.
The convoy was spotted by a B-17, and as the sun set a US Navy force under Rear Admiral Norman Scott that had been hiding about 160 kilometers (100 miles) south of Guadalcanal moved to intercept it. Scott was an experienced Navy hand who had served in the First World War. He commanded a force of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and five destroyers. The Navy was very sick of having their asses kicked by the Japanese in night actions, and Scott had been drilling his men for night combat for weeks for a rematch.
Scott's scout planes targeted the supply convoy at about 2300 hours, but the report was confusing. However, the Americans spotted the Japanese first, and just before midnight the light cruiser HELENA opened up on the cruiser AOBA, mortally wounding Admiral Goto. Scott ordered a cease fire under the mistaken impression that they were shooting at friends. The Japanese were similarly confused, but in a few minutes Scott decided the vessels in front of him really were hostiles and bore in to attack.
In fact, Scott's warships hadn't really obeyed the order to stop shooting; they had only slackened their fire. The confusion over, both sides slammed into each other in earnest in the dark, until about 20 minutes after midnight. The Japanese cruiser AOBA took about 40 hits but survived, while the cruiser FURUTAKA and the destroyer FUBUKI went down in Ironbottom Sound. The US cruiser BOISE was badly hurt but survived, while the destroyer DUNCAN sank.
The Battle of Cape Esperance was a turning point for the US Navy. For the first time making effective use of their shipboard radar systems, the Americans had finally beaten the Japanese at their own game, a night naval engagement, and the Japanese were correspondingly humiliated. However, as with Mikawa's victory at Savo Island, Scott did not intercept the supply convoy. The Japanese were able to deliver badly needed equipment and supplies to General Hyakutake and his men.
This did not necessarily tip the odds in their favor. The Americans on Guadalcanal were receiving reinforcements as well. On 13 October, Vandegrift received a shipment of 2,852 Army troops from the Americal Division, as well as more weapons, ammunition, and supplies. This gave Vandegrift a total of over 23,000 men to defend Henderson Field.
* Even as the Americans were sorting out the new arrivals that day, the Japanese bombed Henderson Field with 24 aircraft at noon, inflicting serious damage, followed some time later by a second attack with 15 more bombers. Navy construction battalions, or "SeaBees", were busy cleaning up the mess that afternoon when they came under fire from a long-range 150 millimeter gun that had recently arrived and been placed near the Mataniko River. The Japanese gunners were skilled and accurate, and the Marines quickly named the gun "Pistol Pete".
The Japanese were only getting warmed up. While the sun set, the battleships KONGO and HARUNA were moving towards Guadalcanal under the escort of six destroyers, with orders to blast Henderson Field off the map. Japanese soldiers set up oil drums on the shore and lit them to act as target markers. At a little after 0100 hours on 14 October, the two battleships opened up with their 36 centimeter (14 inch) guns.
The bombardment was unlike anything the Americans had ever endured or that many of them would ever endure again. For a half hour, the big shells pounded Henderson Field, smashing equipment and aircraft, blasting fuel and ammunition dumps. The shelling went quiet for a moment, but the two battleships were simply turning about for another pass. The hammering continued for another hour and a half. The Americans were unable to put up any effective resistance, though four torpedo boats made a valiant but futile attempt to attack the battleships. Finally, after firing over 900 shells, the Japanese turned north and left.
From that time on, the incident would be known to those who endured it as "The Bombardment". By midmorning, fires were still burning all over Henderson Field. 41 Americans were dead, most of the aircraft were damaged or destroyed, and almost all the fuel had been burned.
A Navy admiral in Espritu Santo, Aubrey Fitch, responded to the crisis by ordering all available Dauntlesses and Wildcats under his command to fly in and reinforce Henderson Field. He also organized an airlift of fuel and other supplies, flying them in using Douglas R4Ds, the Navy designation for the popular Douglas DC-3 / C-47.
In the meantime, six new Japanese fast transports were moving down the Slot with 4,000 men, 14 tanks, 12 150 millimeter guns, and other supplies under escort of warships and aircraft. The Cactus Air Force managed to attack them with 11 aircraft, but with little effect. By midnight, the transports were being unloaded near Tassafaronga Point, while the cruisers CHOKAI and KINUGASA provided a repeat performance of the shelling of the previous night on a smaller scale. They fired over 750 20 centimeter (8 inch) shells and then departed, unharmed.
The Cactus Air Force managed to catch three of the transports still being unloaded when the sun came up and set them on fire, forcing their captains to ground them. However, most of the supplies and men had made it to shore. General Hyakutake had 15,000 men and was ready to take the offensive.
Vandegrift had an accurate picture of Hyakutake's capabilities and was once more unsure that he could hold Henderson Field. He sent back a report to his superiors that if Guadalcanal were to be held, the Navy would have to put a stop to Japanese naval operations and he would have to be immediately reinforced. Vandegrift's impression that Nimitz was on his side was confirmed when Nimitz finally relieved Admiral Ghormley on 18 October, replacing him with Vice Admiral William Frederick "Bull" Halsey.
Nimitz had not been pleased with Ghormley's lack of aggressiveness and wanted someone who could fight. Halsey was a scrappy guy from New Jersey who was much more inspiring than the relatively low-key Ghormley, well-liked by his men and the press for his slugging aggressiveness and a certain sort of crusty old-salt sense of humor. Halsey received the order immediately after arriving at Noumea by flying boat, saying: "Jesus Christ and General Jackson! This is the hottest potato they've ever handed me!" He was not entirely happy to relieve Ghormley, a friend for 40 years, and to be put in charge of an operation that was hanging by threads.
Halsey ordered Vandegrift to fly to Noumea to report on his situation. When
the general arrived, he detailed the desperate position of his men and said
he would need reinforcements. Turner raised objections that Halsey knew were
valid, but whatever the risks, the Americans could not afford to lose
Guadalcanal. It would be a major strategic and moral defeat. Halsey told
Vandegrift: "All right, go on back. I'll promise you everything I've got."
Halsey was determined to fight it out. He sent out his first general order
to his command:
KILL JAPS. KILL JAPS. KILL MORE JAPS.
BACK_TO_TOP
* On the ground, the Japanese were preparing for their big push to take Henderson Field. Maruyama was hoping to have 5,600 men in place by 21 October to attack the Americans from the south, but even with the trail cut through the jungle, the going was very tough for the sick and starved Japanese, and the attack was repeatedly postponed.
General Kawaguchi was placed in command of the right flank of the attack. The attack plan seemed much too similar to the one that had led him to ruin in September, and he expressed misgivings about the battle plan to Colonel Tsuji, suggesting that it would be better to try to flank the American defenses from the southeast. Kawaguchi thought that Tsuji agreed and that the change in plans would be passed up to General Maruyama, but there was some mixup and Maruyama wasn't informed. When Maruyama found that Kawaguchi wasn't where he was supposed to be, sacked him on the spot. Kawaguchi believed Tsuji had deliberately betrayed him and never forgave him.
Finally, Maruyama set the jump off time for the night of the 24th. Unfortunately, General Sumiyoshi on the coast didn't get the word and launched a diversionary attack over the mouth of the Mataniko on the afternoon of the 23rd. While the attack was supported by nine tanks, the Americans were well prepared and only one of the tanks made it across the river; it did not survive long.
About 600 Japanese were killed. The diversionary attack was a costly fiasco that did nothing but put Vandegrift's men on the highest alert. By the next afternoon, they were perfectly aware that the Japanese were massing to the south for an attack. Marine lines to the south were built up under the direction of Colonel Lewis "Chesty" Puller, an experienced and notoriously gung-ho Marine officer with a barrel chest.
The attack jumped off after midnight, and Japanese advance units excitedly announced that they had broken through and were overrunning the airfield. They were mistaken. The Japanese had a strong enthusiasm for coming to grips with an enemy that allowed them to do the extraordinary, but it had a downside, sometimes influencing them to take a unrealistically positive, even deluded, view of a situation. Seizing the airfield should have broken American resistance, but instead of dying down, the fighting became hideously intense. It turned out that the advance units had simply run into an open field and in the dark had assumed it was the airfield. In fact, the attack was being cut to pieces. By dawn, it was obvious that it had been a bloody failure.
* The mistaken report that the airfield had been seized was relayed back to Admiral Yamamoto, who ordered a strike force under Vice Admiral Kondo to move in and engage the US Navy around Guadalcanal. A separate, smaller force, consisting of the light cruiser YURA and eight destroyers, was already moving in to support Maruyama's attack with naval gunfire. After the sun came up, Yamamoto received word that the attack had failed, and so the admiral told Kondo to halt and wait for further instructions. The YURA force didn't get the word until it was too late. Dive bombers from Henderson hit the light cruiser repeatedly and sent her to the bottom.
Kondo's force was about 480 kilometers (300 miles) northeast of the island. Halsey was determined to deal with the Japanese, and his own task force was sitting off the Santa Cruz Islands, about 640 kilometers (400 miles) east of Guadalcanal. The task force included the carriers HORNET and ENTERPRISE, just returned to the war zone after lightning repairs in Pearl Harbor, accompanied by nine cruisers and 24 destroyers, and was under the command of the aggressive Rear Admiral Thomas Kincaid.
American patrol planes found Kondo's fleet, organized in two groups, on the afternoon of 25 October. The patrol planes were spotted by the Japanese, however, and Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, in charge of the carrier group, decided to make a hasty exit. Yamamoto angrily overruled Nagumo and ordered him to attack. While Nagumo feared another disaster like the one at Midway, particularly because he had no idea where the American fleet was, orders were orders. The Japanese fleet went south to engage the US Navy.
The Japanese had a larger force. The carrier group included three carriers, a heavy cruiser, and eight destroyers. The surface force leading them included two battleships, four cruisers, and seven destroyers. While they didn't realize it, the US Navy force was steaming almost directly towards them.
Back on the island, Maruyama's men made another desperate attack after the sun went down. They were driven back once again with heavy losses, and the attack fizzled out around midnight. Maruyama had lost a total of 3,000 men in his attacks, and had failed completely.
* The Japanese fleet was located by a B-17 at about 1430 on 26 October. The
Japanese discovered the American force not much later. Kincaid already had
his orders, radioed out by Halsey that morning:
ATTACK REPEAT ATTACK
Both forces launched aircraft that evening, and the air strike forces
actually passed within sight of each other. Although Kincaid's force
detected the Japanese aircraft on radar, he delayed in ordering Wildcats into
the sky to meet them, and the American fighters were not able to climb high
enough in time to stop the enemy. The Japanese Aichi "Val" dive screamed
down on the HORNET and blasted it, the squadron commander deliberately
crashing into the carrier's deck.
In the meantime, Navy Dauntlesses were making their own strikes on the Japanese, badly damaging the cruiser CHIKUMA and hitting the carriers SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU.
Another group of Japanese aircraft found the ENTERPRISE and her screen, steaming about 16 kilometers (10 miles) away from the HORNET and her escorts. Kincaid had again delayed in launching fighters, but the anti-aircraft fire of the American vessels was intense and effective, particularly with the new 40 millimeter Bofors guns then being fitted to warships, along with the proven 20 millimeter Oerlikon guns.
Two bombs hit the ENTERPRISE and a near-miss damaged a turbine bearing, but the carrier was not put out of action. By this time, American fighters were in the air to beat back further attacks, but the Japanese still managed to hit the battleship SOUTH DAKOTA and the cruiser SAN JUAN. The HORNET was under tow when yet another Japanese strike wave hit the HORNET. Saving the carrier was hopeless, and it went down early the next morning.
The Japanese had got the better of the US Navy, sinking a carrier and a destroyer, while damaging another carrier, a cruiser, and a destroyer. The Americans damaged three Japanese vessels. The Japanese had, however, been thwarted in helping Maruyama take Henderson Field, and they had lost about 100 aircraft and crews, in comparison to 74 lost by the Americans. The Japanese could not afford to lose so many trained airmen.
Confused and overoptimistic reports filtered up to Imperial Navy headquarters and the high command thought the American fleet had been wiped out. Nonetheless, despite this exhuberance, the failure of the Maruyama attack convinced Admiral Yamamoto that the battle for Guadalcanal was lost. The Americans were stronger than the Japanese on the island, and could receive supplies and reinforcements at a faster rate.
* By the first days of November, the survivors of Maruyama's disastrous attempt to break the Americans had filtered back to the coast. Colonel Tsuji sent a message to Army high command in Tokyo, taking responsibility for the defeat. On 3 November he was ordered back to Tokyo to report on the situation. General Kawaguchi left the island in disgrace the next day. Reinforcements, advance units of the Imperial Army's 38th Division, were filtering in. Despite increasing doubts about the feasibility of holding Guadalcanal on the part of the Imperial Navy, the Army still wanted to fight.
The 38th Division's commander, Lieutenant General Tadayoshi Sato, arrived at Tassafaronga Point on 9 November with more of his men. They had been shipped down by five destroyers in the night, but the bulk of the division and its supplies were still at Shortland Island. The Japanese intended to bring the remainder down in 11 transports and cargo vessels, escorted by 12 destroyers. They were to be proceeded by a raiding force, under the command of Vice Admiral Hiroaki Abe, consisting of two battleships, a light cruiser, and 14 destroyers, that would lay down fire on Henderson Field to ensure that the transports arrived safely.
* The raiding force moved out of Rabaul on the morning of 12 November and by that afternoon was approaching Guadalcanal. There was an Allied surface force in the area, Task Group 67.4, under the command of Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callahan, who had taken over command from Norman Scott. Task Group 67.4 consisted of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and eight destroyers. Callahan led the group from the heavy cruiser SAN FRANCISCO. Admiral Scott served under Callahan in command of the heavy cruiser ATLANTA.
The Navy warships were escorting a supply convoy in the area. The supply convoy managed to unload by dusk and took off for the open sea, while Callahan's group looked for the Japanese raiders. Abe knew he outgunned the Americans and did not think they would try to take him on, and so he steamed on, unaware that he was heading for a confrontation. Bad weather complicated matters, hiding both forces from the other and confusing their movements.
The cruiser HELENA sighted the enemy at 0124 hours on Friday, the 13th of November. At 0149 the shooting started. The result was a mad, furious, confused, brutal fight at close range in which the two sides blasted away at each other and sometimes at their own vessels.
The fight lasted for a half hour. The US Navy got the worst of it, with the cruiser ATLANTA hit by torpedoes and by "friendly" shells. One hit the bridge, killing Admiral Scott and most of the bridge crew. ATLANTA would sink soon, along with two destroyers. Only one of the American vessels hadn't been hit. SAN FRANCISCO also took a hit in the bridge, killing Admiral Callahan and everyone else there.
The US Navy had not taken a beating passively. One Japanese destroyer went down and another was crippled, and Abe's flagship HIEI took fifty hits. The engagement became known as the Battle of Friday the 13th. The battle put on spectacular fireworks for the observers at Henderson Field. One private with a literary bent wrote:
BEGIN QUOTE:
The star shells rose, terrible and red. Giant tracers flashed across the night in orange arches ... the sea seemed a sheet of polished obsidian on which the warships seemed to have been dropped and been immobilized, centered amid concentric circles like shock waves that form around a stone dropped in mud.
END QUOTE
* That was only the beginning. Callahan had taken on a fight at long odds and at the cost of his own life to slow down the Japanese, and had succeeded in doing so. Henderson Field was intact, and when the sun came up American fliers went out looking for revenge. They caught up with the limping HIEI quickly and pounded her with bombs and torpedoes. The battleship went down during the day.
However, the Japanese were demonstrating their customary aggressiveness as well. When the five surviving warships of Task Group 67.4 left for the New Hebrides to tend to their wounds late that morning, a Japanese submarine, the I-26, tried to torpedo the SAN FRANCISCO. The torpedoes missed that vessel, but one hit the light cruiser JUNEAU and set off a great explosion that simply blew it to bits. Captain Gilbert Hoover on the HELENA, in charge of the force, decided it was too risky to pick up survivors and left them. Almost the entire crew of the JUNEAU, some 700 men, died, including the five Sullivan brothers. After that, the US Navy never assigned more than one family member to a single ship.
The Japanese were still determined to get the troop convoy to Guadalcanal. That evening, the 14th, they returned to Guadalcanal with cruisers and destroyers and hit Henderson Field for 37 minutes. The pounding was severe, but although 18 aircraft were destroyed, the Cactus Air Force was still in business when the sun came up. The American fliers quickly found the troop convoy, under command of the persistent Admiral Tanaka, who continued towards Guadalcanal even though air attacks continued all day. Destroyers laid down smoke screens, but by the time the 15th of November was over, six of the transports had gone to the bottom and one was disabled. Tanaka put survivors on escorting destroyers and sent them back to Shortland Island.
Four transports and four destroyers steamed on. Yamamoto was backing up the effort to the maximum, ordering Admiral Kondo down the Slot to hit Henderson Field once more that night with the battleship KIRISHIMA, two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and escorts of destroyers.
Halsey was just as stubborn, and dispatched Task Force 64 under Rear Admiral Willis "Ching" Lee to meet the Japanese. Task Force 64 included the battleships WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA, plus four destroyers. The ships had been protecting Halsey's last carrier in the area, the ENTERPRISE, but now they were looking for a fight. They swung around Cape Esperance that night and about 2252 hours made radar contact with Kondo's lead vessel, the light cruiser SENDAI. Lee waited until about 2320 to begin his attack. Both sides went into combat energetically. In a short time, all four of Lee's destroyers had been disabled and the SOUTH DAKOTA was limping, taking a pounding from the KIRISHIMA and the two heavy cruisers.
Then salvos from the WASHINGTON bracketed the KIRISHIMA. Nine 41 centimeter (16 inch) and many smaller shells smashed into the Japanese battleship, wrecking it. At 0025 hours, Kondo decided he'd had enough, and withdrew, leaving behind the stricken KIRISHIMA and a disabled destroyer. The captain of the KIRISHIMA had his men abandon ship onto a helpful destroyer, and then scuttled his vessel.
Admiral Tanaka had dispatched three of his destroyers to help Kondo. By the time the battle was over, he didn't have enough time to unload the transports by landing craft before the sun came up, so he asked permission to simply run them aground. Rabaul refused, but Kondo gave permission, and Tanaka ran the transports into the shore near Tassafaronga Point. By this time it was getting light and the Cactus Air Force spotted the beached transports immediately. They hit them all through the day, and the result was a ghastly slaughter of Japanese troops. In the end, only 4,000 troops and a small load of supplies arrived on Guadalcanal, at the cost of 11 transports, two battleships, a heavy cruiser, and three destroyers. The US Navy lost two light cruisers and seven destroyers, while seven other ships were damaged. but they had won the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, as the three-day fight would be known.
Vandegrift send a message to Halsey with grand praise for the Navy:
BEGIN QUOTE:
WE BELIEVE THE ENEMY HAS SUFFERED A CRUSHING DEFEAT -- WE THANK LEE FOR HIS STURDY EFFORT OF LAST NIGHT -- WE THANK KINCAID FOR HIS INTERVENTION YESTERDAY -- OUR OWN AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN GRAND IN ITS RELENTLESS POUNDING OF THE FOE -- THOSE EFFORTS WE APPRECIATE BUT OUR GREATEST HOMAGE GOES TO SCOTT, CALLAGHAN AND THEIR MEN WHO WITH MAGNIFICENT COURAGE AGAINST SEEMINGLY HOPELESS ODDS DROVE BACK THE FIRST HOSTILE STROKE AND MADE SUCCESS POSSIBLE -- TO THEM THE MEN OF CACTUS LIFT THEIR BATTERED HELMETS IN ADMIRATION.
END QUOTE
A Navy after-action analysis of the battle was actually very critical of Admiral Callahan's leadership in the fight, but since he was dead he was beyond any reprimands, and it made more sense to play him up as a hero to boost morale than to make a public issue of his failings. In fact, despite the blunders, the Americans had reason to be pleased with the outcome, all the more so because the war finally seemed to be tilting in favor of the Allies. Rommel was on the run in North Africa, the Germans were being chewed up at Stalingrad. Everywhere the Axis tide seemed to be going back out to sea.
* Back in Tokyo, the Imperial Army high command still wanted to carry on the fight, encouraged by the request of the Emperor himself to save the Japanese warriors on Guadalcanal. In the face of the Emperor's request, the Imperial Navy could not protest, but the admirals had no further heart for an operation they regarded as a lost cause.
The Army high command was somewhat unsettled in their determination by reports from General Hyakutake on Guadalcanal that his men were dying of starvation and disease at a rate of about a hundred a day. The Navy was still trying to get some supplies to the starving men, but ever increasing American sea and air power made the supply line continuously more tenuous. The Navy was coming up with some new schemes to help, such as a plan to load supplies in strings of oil drums hung on fast destroyers. The drums would be cut loose off of Guadalcanal, and motorboats or swimmers would pick them up.
The scheme was tested by the resolute Admiral Tanaka, who took nine destroyers down the Slot to drop off supplies in this way on the evening of 29 November. While the destroyers were dropping their cargo just before 2300 hours, one of the warships reported sighting a column of American warships bearing down on them. There were five US Navy cruisers, escorted by six destroyers. The commander of the force, Rear Admiral Carleton H. Wright on board the cruiser MINNEAPOLIS, knew Tanaka's destroyers were there but hesitated to attack. He finally gave the order at about 2320. The Americans launched torpedoes and started firing. They pounded the destroyer TAKANAMI, mortally wounding it.
The American sailors on board the MINNEAPOLIS were cheering when the cruiser was hit by two torpedoes. Another torpedo hit the NEW ORLEANS, setting off forward magazines and blowing off its bow, while yet another torpedo hit the PENSACOLA and flooded its engine room. While the ships milled around in confusion, the cruiser NORTHAMPTON was hit by two torpedoes, which set off shattering secondary explosions. The NORTHAMPTON quickly sank, while Tanaka's destroyers sped off in the dark. Tanaka had proven once again to the Americans that the Japanese should not be underestimated, losing one destroyer while sinking an American cruiser and chewing up three others, even though the Japanese force was far weaker than its opponent. The Battle of Tassafaronga was a lopsided victory for the Japanese.
Tanaka tried to run supplies in oil drums twice more over the next few evenings, but the scheme was ineffectual and the danger ever more severe. The Navy high command was certain that Guadalcanal should be evacuated, and slowly the Army high command was coming around to the same point of view. The squabbling still went on through most of December. On 23 December, General Hyakutake sent a message to the high command from Guadalcanal:
BEGIN QUOTE:
NO FOOD AVAILABLE AND WE CAN NO LONGER SEND OUT SCOUTS. WE CAN DO NOTHING TO WITHSTAND THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE. 17TH ARMY NOW REQUESTS PERMISSION TO BREAK INTO THE ENEMY'S POSITIONS AND DIE AN HONORABLE DEATH RATHER THAN DIE OF HUNGER IN OUR OWN DUGOUTS.
END QUOTE
On Christmas Day, the high command met to discuss the situation. Nobody seriously believed that Guadalcanal could be held. The only problem was determining how best to deal with the humiliation and embarrassment to the Emperor it involved. The meeting was angry and quarrelsome, but despite protests over the delay, the Navy conducted strategy-game exercises to confirm what everyone really knew by this time: there was no way to supply a useful offensive force on Guadalcanal.
The bickering went on for several days, until on 29 December a report arrived from Rabaul indicating that almost everyone in the area believed that Guadalcanal must be evacuated. On 31 December, Army Chief of Staff General Hajime Sugiyama and Navy Chief of Staff Nagano informed the Emperor of the decision. The Emperor was very displeased and questioned them for two hours, but in the end he agreed to the withdrawal.
* By this time, the command of ground forces on Guadalcanal had changed. On 9 December, General Vandegrift and the 1st Marine Division had shipped out to Australia for badly needed rest and refit. In their place was the XIV Corps, under US Army General Alexander M. Patch, which included the 2nd Marine Division and the 25th and Americal Army divisions. Patch spent much of January 1943 probing the Japanese positions at Mount Austen, to the south of Henderson Field. The terrain there was extraordinarily rugged and the Japanese were heavily dug in, but soldiers of the Americal Division managed to seize a strategic point known as the Gifu. This deprived the Japanese of any viewpoint of Henderson Field and Lunga Point, and they could no longer interfere with American activities on Guadalcanal.
Patch decided to encircle Mount Austen and starve the Japanese out, which would not be difficult since they were dying of starvation at a rapid rate to begin with. By mid-January, however, the Japanese were already implementing their evacuation plan. On 23 January, they began pulling out of their positions on Mount Austen, moving back to Cape Esperance for withdrawal. They left behind a rearguard to make noise and keep the Americans in the dark about the withdrawal.
The Marines tended to regard most Army units as lacking aggressiveness, and Patch's performance did nothing to change that impression. Although he had 50,000 men against a far smaller and sickly Japanese force, the rearguard kept the Americans completely bamboozled. The Japanese managed to withdraw almost entirely unmolested.
On the evening of 1 February 1943, the first evacuation column of 19 Japanese destroyers arrived off Cape Esperance. They had been attacked by American aircraft, but their fighter cover had driven them off. US Navy PT boats tried to interfere, but the Japanese sank three of them and sent the rest packing. That night, the Tokyo Express managed to evacuate over 5,400 starving Japanese soldiers. A second column of destroyers showed up on the evening of 4 February, and managed to pull out almost 5,000 men. Only one destroyer was damaged. Much to the surprise of the Japanese, the third and final column of destroyers managed to withdraw the remainder of the survivors, again with only one destroyer damaged. The Guadalcanal campaign was over.
* The 13,000 who were evacuated were all that were left of 38,000 men the Japanese had funneled into Guadalcanal, which became known as the "Island of Death" to them. In comparison, the Americans had lost only about 1,600 men in the ground battles, though the actions at sea had been costly to Allied naval forces.
The Japanese had been obsessed with the "decisive battle" with the Americans that would decide the fate of the war in the Pacific. To an extent, this was the exhuberance of the Japanese military at work again, the inclination to dare all in a glorious to-the-knife battle. Guadalcanal was nothing glorious, merely filthy, bloody, and diseased, but it was decisive all the same. From then on, the Japanese would be on the defensive and there would be less and less doubt of the ultimate result of the war.
* This document started out as a short outline of the Guadalcanal campaign. Like many of my projects, although I did not wish to become too detailed, the work got out of hand and I ended up writing about twice as much as I had planned.
The Guadalcanal campaign is interesting because it consists of an interwoven series of sea, land, and air battles over a period of about six months, making for a complicated and confusing narrative.
The narrative is also interesting for its insights. The early phases of the battle have the odd sense of being a bloody comedy, where the arrogant Japanese consistently underestimated their enemy and failed to take adequate actions to deal with them, while the Americans came close to simply giving away the campaign through bumbling, timidity, and indecision. It might be said that the Americans won the Guadalcanal campaign simply because they bumbled less than the Japanese.
However, in a broader sense, the Americans demonstrated a clear grasp of the art of war. The Japanese were not being entirely complacent in assuming that the Americans would not take the offensive against them until well into 1943, since there were senior officers in the American high command who assumed the same thing. They were pushed into action by aggressive leaders like MacArthur and King, who wanted to hit the Japanese as fast as they could. Neither the US Navy nor the Marines were really ready to take the offensive in August 1942, and their preparations and training were inadequate. But they took the initiative and, despite major reverses, held on to it to the end of the campaign. This decisiveness more than compensated for all the bumbling.
In combat, the Americans received a brutal education from the Japanese, but it is hard to believe that if the Americans had delayed they would not have suffered even more greatly at the hands of an enemy that had been given time to dig in. To the Japanese, Guadalcanal was the beginning of the end of the delusions that infected so many of their high command, particularly in the Army. Despite extraordinary fighting spirit, the Japanese hadn't the resources to deal with the Americans over the long run, and no matter how great the fighting spirit of the Japanese soldiers, sailors, and fliers, it couldn't compensate for the indecision and blunders of their leaders.
* Sources include:
* Revision history:
v1.0 / 01 aug 99 / gvg
v1.0.1 / 01 may 02 / gvg / Minor cosmetic update.
v1.0.2 / 01 may 04 / gvg / Minor cosmetic update.
v1.0.3 / 01 apr 06 / gvg / Minor cosmetic update.
v1.0.4 / 01 apr 07 / gvg / Minor cosmetic update.
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