v2.0.3 / chapter 6 of 7 / 01 feb 07 / greg goebel / public domain
* While the US Navy's Regulus cruise missile effort was a dead end, the USSR perceived a real need for submarine and ship launched cruise missiles, particularly for antiship attack, and developed a series of impressive weapons with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. This chapter describes Soviet-Russian naval cruise missiles, and also outlines what little is known about Chinese cruise missiles.
* Although Chelomei's OKB-51 had been disbanded in the winter of 1953, the death of Josef Stalin in the spring of that year led to a reshuffling of power. Lavrenti Beria was in charge for a short time, but before the end of the year he had been arrested and shot, which no doubt had an impact on the influence of his son Sergei and the MiG missile effort. In any case, Chelomei's advocates were able to resurrect him -- no doubt much to his relief, since failures in Stalin's day were judged equivalent to treason and could mean imprisonment or execution -- and Chelomei's organization was restored under his leadership as "OKB-52".
Chelomei took over a factory in the Moscow area, known to locals as the "drunken factory", suggesting he had some challenges in getting things up to speed. He was successful, coming out on top of a number of other design bureaus working on parallel programs. OKB-52 survives to this day, renamed as "NPO Mashinostroyenia" or "NPO Mash" for short in 1983, to be taken over by Gerberd A. Efremov after Chelomei's death in 1984.
The first major contribution of OKB-52 was a ship-launched missile. The USSR had already developed such a weapon, the "Schuka", later "P-1 KSShch", with the NATO codename "SS-N-1 Scrubber". Incidentally, "Scrubber" in British usage roughly equates to the US term "bimbo". It was deployed on a handful of destroyers. Details are unclear, but speed was high subsonic and range was about 80 kilometers (50 miles). It was a dismal failure and it is likely the lack of information on the type is partly due to the type's insignificance; nobody wants to dwell on failures. OKB-52 was assigned to take another shot at the concept, and proved much more successful.
The effort was designated "Project 5 (P-5)" and focused on development of a cruise missile for launch from submarines against ground targets. Initial flight tests of the 4K95 missile for the P-5 system were in 1957 and it was accepted for service in June 1959 on board modified WHISKEY-class conventional submarines. NATO assigned the P-5 the codename of "SS-N-3A Shaddock".
OKB-52's P-5 was a clean design with a pencil-like fuselage; swept wings and tail surfaces that folded for storage in its launch container; a turbojet engine fed by a split engine intake under the belly; and twin RATO boosters for launch. It had a range of 500 kilometers (310 miles) and an autonomous inertial navigation system (INS) for guidance. Given the limited accuracy of guidance systems at the time, presumably the P-5 was generally or always armed with a nuclear warhead. An improved variant, the "P-5D", with an additional Doppler radar navigation unit, was introduced to service in 1962 and was carried by ECHO I class nuclear submarines. The P-5D was also produced as a surface-to-surface weapon for tactical use, receiving the NATO codename of "SSC-1A Shaddock".
Even as the land-attack P-5 was being put into service, OKB-52 was working on
two antiship attack variants for dealing with Western aircraft carrier task
forces: the "P-35" (NATO codename "SS-N-3B Sepal") for launch from surface
ships, with this variant also being produced for coastal defense (NATO
codename "SSC-1B Sepal"); and the "P-6" (NATO codename "SS-N-3C Shaddock")
for launch from submarines. Both featured an INS-Doppler radar navigation
system, with an active radar terminal attack guidance system, and could be
fitted with either an 800 kilogram (1,765 pound) conventional warhead or a
nuclear warhead with an approximate yield of 100 kilotonnes of TNT. Range
was up to 350 kilometers (220 miles).
P-35 (SS-N-3B SEPAL) & P-6 (SS-N-3 SHADDOCK):
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spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 2.6 meters 8 feet 6 inches
length 10 meters 32 feet 10 inches
body diameter 90 centimeters 3 feet
launch weight 4,500 kilograms 9,920 pounds
speed Mach 1.4
range 350 kilometers 220 MI / 190 NMI
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
On launch with the RATO boosters, the missile would climb to high altitude,
speed up to Mach 1.4, and then start scanning for targets with its radar
seeker. The radar image was relayed back to the launch platform over a radio
datalink, allowing a shipboard operator to select the desired target in the
image -- presumably the biggest "blip", the aircraft carrier -- and authorize
an attack on it. On authorization, the missile would descend to low altitude
and perform its terminal attack at supersonic speed. It would plunge into
the water before striking the target to ensure the maximum amount of damage
to the target's hull.
Initial flight tests of the P-35 began in October 1959, with tests of the P-6 beginning in December 1959. During the 1960s, four KYNDA-class cruisers and four KRESTA-class frigates were equipped with the P-35, with each carrying four missiles. The P-6 was carried by 16 JULIET-class diesel submarines, with four missiles each, and 29 ECHO II nuclear submarines, with six missiles each. The P-35 / P-6 gave Red Navy warships and submarines a formidable equalizer against Western carrier groups to match the air-launched missiles being fielded by the Red Air Force.
However, the P-35 / P-6 did require assistance from aircraft as well. The first problem in organizing an attack with antiship missiles against a Western naval group was simply to find the target in the first place. Although it might seem hard to conceal something as big as an aircraft carrier with its escort vessels, the open ocean is a mighty big place as well, and in practice finding such a target was like hunting for a needle in a haystack. The answer was to use the Tupolev Tu-16RM Badger D signals-intelligence (SIGINT) platform to get a lead on the location, and then use a Tu-95RC Bear D radar platform to get a precise lock on it. Cooperation between the two platforms was loose: the Tu-16RM would spot an emitter from outside the range of carrier group defenses, cue the Tu-95RC to the target, and then go hunting for other emitters.
Along with the radar, the Tu-95RC featured a datalink system to cue the launch platforms with targeting information. ECHO II submarines used a fire control system (FCS) to program the missile guidance system and communicate with it in flight. The entire architecture -- aircraft, radar, datalink connections, FCS -- was designated the "MRSC-1 Uspekh", and was fielded in the second half of the 1960s.
Two improved and complementary systems were fielded in the 1970s. The first was the "Uspekh-U", which was essentially an updated Uspekh system with the same general capabilities but many refinements. Along with the Bear-D, the Kamov Ka-25 Hormone B and the Ka-27 Helix B naval helicopters were eventually integrated into the Uspekh system as targeting platforms. The other was the "MKRC Legenda" system, which was space-based, using the US-P SIGINT satellites and the nuclear-powered US-A radar ocean reconnaissance satellites (RORSATs) for targeting. Submarines were fitted with receiving gear to pick up targeting data from the satellites. The US-A RORSATs were something of an environmental threat that caused the Soviet Union a lot of bad press, so they were finally removed from service in the late 1980s by order of Mikhail Gorbachov, but naval SIGINT satellites remained in service.
Some sources claim that the P-5 / P-35 / P-6 series was also used for reconnaissance, and it is plausible that after their retirement from first-line service they were used as target drones. However, details of such roles are lacking.
* The P-35 / P-6 had its limitations. It took several minutes to set it up for launch -- submarines could only launch the weapon from the surface -- and only 12 could be launched at a time since that was the number of seeker radar and control datalink channels available. From the order to launch to impact took about 20 or 30 minutes, during which time enemy air assets were likely to be active. Two to four hits with nuclear-armed missiles would take out a carrier battlegroup; nobody thought that missiles with conventional warheads would be more than a serious annoyance to the enemy, and so making use of the weapon meant "going nuclear". Nobody with any sense saw that as anything but a suicidal act of desperation, and so the P-35 / P-6 was basically a weapon that nobody dared use.
The fact that a submarine had to surface to fire a P-6 was recognized as an obvious problem, and OKB-52 quickly went on to develop an antiship missile, the "P-70 Ametist" (NATO codename "SS-N-7 Starbright"), that could be launched from underwater. It was introduced to service in the late 1960s, to be followed by an improved and scaled-up successor, the "P-120 Malakhit" (NATO codename "SS-N-9 Siren"), in the 1970s . Both of these were rocket-powered, short-range weapons more in the class of the French Exocet missile. The P-120 has now been followed by a medium-range ramjet-powered weapon, the "P-100 Yakhont" (NATO codename "SS-N-26"). All these missiles are covered in the companion DUMB BOMBS & SMART MUNITIONS document.
* Along with these weapons, OKB-52 came up with the "P-500 Bazalt" (NATO codename "SS-N-12 Sandbox"), derived from the experimental "P-350 Bazalt", a direct follow-on to the P-35 that never reached production. The P-500 was largely overlooked in the West, since the Soviets released little or no information about it, and in fact no photographs of the missile were released until well after the fall of the USSR.
The design turned out to be much like that of the P-5 / P-35 / P-6, but the P-500 was also distinctly more formidable. It had substantially greater range, about 550 kilometers (340 miles), well out of the normal reach of a carrier group's defenses, and was faster, with a maximum speed of Mach 2 at altitude and about Mach 1.5 at low level. It was one of the first Soviet missiles to feature a digital processor, and it also featured a digital INS. It had a dual-mode seeker, which could operate in an active radar seeking or anti-radar passive homing mode. It even had an onboard active jamming system to disrupt defensive radars, and armor over vital systems to improve survivability. It could be fitted with a conventional warhead with a weight of 1,000 kilograms (2,200 pounds) or a nuclear warhead with a yield in the range of hundreds of kilotonnes.
The P-500 was designed for salvo launch, the Red Navy having moved to "mass
attack" tactics to deal with Western carrier groups. A submarine could
launch eight missiles in a rapid salvo, maintaining communications with them
all using a datalink system and providing course updates if necessary. One
of the missiles in the salvo would fly at a high altitude, up to 7,000 meters
(23,000 feet), using its active radar seeker to hunt the target. The others
would remain at medium to low altitude (down to about 30 meters / 100 feet),
with their seekers in passive homing mode while acquiring targeting updates
from the high-flying missile. The high flier would also allocate targets to
the missiles, with half of them attacking the carrier and the rest allocated
to other targets, one missile per target. If the high flier were shot down,
another missile in the target would climb and take over its role. The
missiles would all go to active radar seeking for terminal attack.
P-500 BAZALT / (SS-N-12 SANDBOX):
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spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 2.6 meters 8 feet 6 inches
length 11.7 meters 38 feet 5 inches
body diameter 90 centimeters 3 feet
total weight 4,800 kilograms 10,580 pounds
speed Mach 2
range 550 kilometers 340 MI / 295 NMI
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
Initial trials of the P-500 system began in 1969, with the weapon system
introduced to service in 1975. Ten of the 29 ECHO II-class attack submarines
were refitted to carry the P-500. The submarines could communicate with the
targeting systems from periscope depth. They carried eight missiles each,
usually six with conventional warheads and two with nuclear warheads. The
P-500 Bazalt was also used by surface vessels, including the four KIEV-class
cruiser-carrier vessels and four SLAVA-class cruisers. The KIEV ships had
eight launchers forward, while the SLAVA-class cruisers have 16 launchers,
and can use their Kamov Ka-27 Helix helicopters for over-the-horizon
targeting.
* One of the SLAVA-class cruisers, the VARYAG, may have been re-armed with the somewhat mysterious "P-1000 Vulkan", which began development in 1979 and was introduced into service in 1987. As far as sketchy reports go, the P-1000 is basically similar to the P-500 Bazalt, but has titanium armor and some titanium structural elements, reducing empty weight, and is also fitted with a more powerful RATO booster and a more fuel-efficient cruise engine, increasing its range to 700 kilometers (435 miles). The P-1000 was also fitted to five of the ECHO II-class submarines.
* In 1969, work began on a successor to the P-500, which would emerge as the "P-700 Granit" (NATO "SS-N-19 Shipwreck"). The concept was that the P-700 would be guided to its target directly from the satellite network after a mass underwater launch from a group of OSCAR I and OSCAR II submarines, each with 24 missiles, working in conjunction with Tu-22M antiship bombers. The submarines would receive initial targeting coordinates from a longwave communications link to ground bases, launch from a range of about 500 kilometers (310 miles) at a depth of about 30 meters (100 feet), and then depart at high speed. Five submarines launching together could fire 120 missiles, overwhelming carrier group defenses and giving a high probability of "kills" even with conventional warheads.
The guidance and attack scheme used by the P-700 is very similar to that used by the P-500: one missile in the salvo of 24 goes to high altitude and "leads" the rest using active radar seeker mode, while the others stay at low altitude and remain in passive guidance mode. The active seeker is only used in short "peeks" to reduce the chance of interception. High altitude speed is Mach 2.5, while low-altitude speed is Mach 1.5. The missile carries a deception jammer system to enhance penetration of enemy defenses; has a maneuvering guidance system that can follow one of a set of different preprogrammed courses to make its attack less predictable, and can receive guidance updates in flight; and has armor over its vital systems to help thwart carrier-group close-in defenses.
As with the P-500, no images of the P-700 were released until well after the
fall of the USSR, and the general belief in the West was that it was another
evolutionary descendant of the P-5 / P-35 / P-6. When images were finally
released, it turned out to be almost completely unrelated in configuration,
with a fuselage like a fat cigar, a jet inlet in the nose, twin delta wings,
and cruciform tail surfaces. The P-700 can carry a 750 kilogram (1,650
pound) conventional warhead or a nuclear warhead with a yield of hundreds of
kilotonnes. It is of course much more sophisticated, in particular featuring
a digital processor with three CPUs.
P-700 GRANIT (SS-N-19 SHIPWRECK):
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spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 2.6 meters 8 feet 6 inches
length 10 meters 32 feet 10 inches
body diameter 85 centimeters 33.5 inches
launch weight 7,000 kilograms 15,435 pounds
speed Mach 1.6
range 550 kilometers 340 MI / 300 NMI
____________________ _________________ _______________________
Work on the missile was conducted by OKB-52 while the overall system was
built by TsNII Granit. Initial flight tests were in 1975, but developed
proved unsurprisingly troublesome, and the missile wasn't accepted for
service until March 1983.
Two OSCAR I submarines were built, and were followed by 11 OCSAR II boats. One of the OSCAR II boats, the KURSK, infamously exploded and sank on 13 August 2000 with loss of all hands. If necessary, an OSCAR submarine can perform its own targeting for its load of 24 missiles with a long-range sonar system. The P-700 is also carried on surface vessels, including four KIROV-class cruisers and the full carrier ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV. Each KIROV-class vessel carries 20 P-700 near-vertical launch tubes; the launch system was adapted directly from the submarine launch system without many changes, and in fact the tubes have to be filled with water before missile launch. The missiles can be targeted by ship's radar and ELINT systems. The ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV carries 12 P-700 launchers.
* Sketchy reports indicate that the Chinese have been working on cruise missiles since at the least the late 1970s. Early development efforts focused on derivatives of fairly antique Soviet missiles, such as the "Silkworm" antiship missile, but a 1995 Russian document indicates that they may have developed a version of the Kh-55 with Russian assistance.
The Chinese may also have had access to Tomahawk cruise missile technology. Of the hundreds of US cruise missiles fired in anger through the 1990s, at least six were duds that fell to ground more or less in one piece. Some of these duds are believed to have fallen into Chinese hands.
The first operational Chinese cruise missile is believed to have entered
service in 1992, under the designation "Hong Niao-1 (HN-1)". Intelligence
assessments appear somewhat fuzzy, but the information available indicates
that it has a modest range and resembles the Kh-55, with popout wings, tail,
and engine. Guidance appears to be similar to that of the TLAM-D, with INS,
terrain following using a radar altimeter, and a scene-matching terminal
guidance system. It can carry a nuclear, high explosive, or cluster munition
warhead.
HN-1 (ESTIMATED SPECIFICATIONS):
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 3 meters 10 feet
length 6.4 meters 21 feet
total weight 1,400 kilograms 3,090 pounds
warhead weight 400 kilograms 880 pounds
speed subsonic
range 600 kilometers 370 MI / 320 NMI
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
Reports also suggest that an HN-2 version was introduced in 1996, with
increased range, and that an HN-3 version with even more range is in the
works. Current versions are believed to be fired from truck launchers like
the BGM-109G Gryphon, but using twin solid rocket boosters.
In the fall of 2004, the Chinese test-flew a new ground-launched land-attack cruise missile, named the "Dong Hai 10 (DH-10 / East China Sea 10)". It is believed to have a range of about 1,500 kilometers (930 miles), with a terrain mapping guidance system backed by a GPS-INS navigation system. It is unclear if the DH-10 has any relationship to the HN-2 or HN-3.
The Chinese have introduced a shorter range air-launched cruise missile, the "Ying Ji 63 (YJ-63 / Strike Eagle 63)", with jet propulsion, a range of up to 500 kilometers (310 miles), with 500 kilogram (1,100 pound) conventional warhead, GPS-INS guidance, and an electro-optical terminal guidance system. Released pictures reveal a cigar-shaped fuselage with stubby swept vee tailfins, short mid-mounted, heavily swept cropped delta wings, and an engine inlet under the tail.
* In the summer of 2005, Pakistan flight-tested a cruise missile named the "Babur". No details were released other than that it had terrain-following; could be launched from air, ground, or sea; could carry a conventional or nuclear warhead; and had a range of about 500 kilometers (310 miles). It is generally believed that the Babur is a derivative or copy of a Chinese cruise missile, such as the HN-1 or YJ-63.
* One puzzling item that came up when I wrote the v1.1 version of this document concerned the operation of the pulsejet engine used on the V-1. Most sources claim that pulsejets cannot operate until they reach a certain launch speed. This is evidently true for ramjets, since if they are fired when they are motionless they just have flame coming out both ends and don't go anywhere. Since pulsejets are very similar to ramjets, it would seem that they would not be able to operate from a standing start, either.
However, I was later told that hobbyists have built pulsejet engines that can be operated from a standing start. On second thought, it does seem possible that the ignition of the fuel-air mixture in the throat of a pulsejet would close the shutters in the intake, ensuring that some thrust went out the back. Despite this, it is obvious that a pulsejet engine develops much more effective thrust at flight speeds, and that no aircraft or missile that was ever fitted with the German Argus pulsejet ever took off under its own power. This suggests that if the Argus pulsejet could generate any static thrust, it wasn't very much.
Another little puzzle was the appearance of the Soviet P-500 Bazalt missile. Pictures of the thing were hard to find, and some images were released on the internet of what was supposed to be a P-500, revealing a missile with a pencil-like forward fuselage, a thick rear fuselage, and an annular engine intake. The overall configuration suggested a screwdriver or sea serpent. However, other images appeared that showed the P-500 to be a clear follow-on to the P-5 series. OK ... but what was this other thing?
* Determining exactly what to put into this document was a bit tricky. There is a very thin line between different classes of missiles. For example, SLCM is regarded as a "strategic" cruise missile in this document, but it is used as a tactical antiship weapon, and is not too different in that role from the Harpoon antiship missile. Similarly, the Harpoon antiship missile evolved into the SLAM tactical cruise missile. The Soviet large antiship missiles, which often had strategic nuclear attack variants, were particularly confusing.
I had to use some judgement on what to place in this document or in its companion documents, DUMB BOMBS & SMART MUNITIONS and UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES. In some cases, the judgement was a bit arbitrary, and I can't claim rigorous consistency in my decisions. In fact, the v2.0.0 version of this document essentially stole a chapter from DUMB BOMBS that had seemed increasingly out of place.
Since this technology is in rapid evolution at this time, this document will be updated as new information becomes available. In particular, the information on Soviet-Russian weapons included here still remains spotty, and in some cases I was forced to deliberately write at a fuzzy level of detail since different sources wildly contradict each other. More information on these weapons is becoming available, and hopefully future versions of this document will be able to draw a clearer picture of them.
* Sources include:
Various web pages were consulted, such as the Centre For Defence & International Security Studies (CDISS) at Lancaster University in the UK, and the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) website. Early on I would incorporate details on every cruise missile program I came across, but it turns out that investigation programs often emerge from the fog only to fade back into it, and so I've learned not to pay much attention to them until they seem to clearly be going into development.
I originally began writing this document back in 1996, putting together a few short documents on various missiles and similar weapons. The exercise went completely out of control over the next few years, and I finally ended up putting together comprehensive documents on air-launched munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles.
* Revision history:
v1.0 / 01 feb 00 / gvg
v1.1 / 01 mar 01 / gvg / Minor cosmetic update.
v1.2.0 / 01 mar 02 / gvg / General update and rewrite.
v1.3.0 / 01 oct 02 / gvg / Cleaned up Soviet material, added HyFly & SLAM.
v2.0.0 / 01 jul 04 / gvg / Major update, went to 7 chapters from 5.
v2.0.1 / 01 oct 04 / gvg / Minor cleanup of details.
v2.0.2 / 01 oct 06 / gvg / Minor cosmetic update.
v2.0.3 / 01 feb 07 / gvg / Minor corrections of details.
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