v1.1.2 / chapter 27 of 93 / 01 oct 09 / greg goebel / public domain
* By the summer of 1862 the Confederacy, which had seemed so close to defeat in the spring, had taken the initiative and seemed close to completely reversing the course of the war. Confederate Generals Kirby Smith and Braxton Bragg were marching their columns into Kentucky, throwing all of Don Carlos Buell's plodding offensive plans into confusion. Back East, Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson were set to do the same thing to John Pope in Northern Virginia.
* After re-opening his supply line from northern Alabama back to Nashville, Union General Don Carlos Buell resumed his methodical offensive towards Chattanooga, attempting to build up a forward supply base at Stevenson, Alabama, and build a 1,400 yard (1,280 meter) long pontoon bridge across the Tennessee River at Bridgeport. By this time, Buell had details of Bragg's shift to Chattanooga. While Buell had over 45,000 men, a third of those were guarding his supply line and the remainder hardly seemed like enough to deal with Bragg. Buell still felt confident; he had, as mentioned, been promised two divisions from Grant if he should feel they were needed, and believed that he had access to forces adequate to deal with the Confederate incursion.
When Halleck, nagging him from Washington now instead of Corinth, wired him on 6 August, indicating that there was "great dissatisfaction here at the slow movement of your army towards Chattanooga", Buell responded immediately that he understood the reasons for anxiety, but he had "not been idle or indifferent." The next day he level-headedly described the reports of 60,000 rebels confronting him as "exaggerated" and proposed to march on Chattanooga "at the earliest possible day", adding that if he attacked the enemy "I do not doubt we will defeat him."
The enemy had other ideas. On 12 August, John Morgan and his troopers, who had left Kentucky in late July, destroyed a vital 800 foot (245 meter) long railroad tunnel at Gallatin, north of Nashville, by pushing burning boxcars down its length, where they incinerated the supports. Re-opening the tunnel would be difficult, and the low levels of the rivers of the region continued to make supply by water impossible. This disaster was followed by news that on 14 August, Kirby Smith had left Knoxville with 14,000 men to move towards the Cumberland Gap and into Kentucky. On the 16th, Buell dispatched William Nelson and a group of officers to Kentucky to work with local Unionists and organize a defense of the state, and called for the two divisions of Grant's that had been promised.
Dissatisfaction with Buell was reaching the breaking point in Washington. On 18 August, Halleck sent a wire informing Buell in an oblique way that he would be sacked if more action were not forthcoming. Buell called his bluff, replying that "if the dissatisfaction cannot cease on grounds which I think might be supposed if not apparent, I respectfully request that I be relieved" and that his position was "far too important to be occupied by any officer on sufferance."
Being relieved of duty turned out to be the least of Buell's immediate worries. The next morning he learned that Bragg's army was massing near Chattanooga for the offensive. Buell had told Halleck he looked forward to this prospect, but now that it was an imminent reality he had second thoughts, and moved his command north up his supply line into middle Tennessee to the vicinity of Murfreesboro.
On 23 August, Buell learned the full scale of Bragg's forces. There were fifty regiments, he was told, and they were well-armed, with plenty of artillery. He concluded that there was no choice but to dig in and prepare a defense. The two divisions that Grant sent him were redirected towards Nashville on forced marches, and the supply depot at Stevenson was ordered cleaned out. What could not be saved was to be burned, as was the recently-completed pontoon bridge at Bridgeport on which much effort had been spent.
The effect of this flurry of action on Buell's already discouraged troops was to make them even more discouraged. On receiving the order to pull out, one division commander muttered: "Don Carlos won't do; he won't do." By the end of August, the withdrawal was complete, with the army in a state of demoralization and confusion. An observer commented that "nobody knows anything, except that the water is bad, whiskey scarce, dust abundant, and the air loaded with the scent and melody of a thousand mules."
* For at least once in his life Braxton Bragg was happy, and he had good reason to be. The Federal drive into the South had stalled in almost every theater. With Buell retreating and on the defensive, Bragg saw an opportunity to turn the tables on the Yankees.
Bragg had discussed what might be done in the theater with Kirby Smith at the beginning of August. There were two sizeable Union forces in the area: Buell's, consisting of about 30,000 men, at the time in central Tennessee and northern Alabama; and George Morgan's, with about 9,000 men at the Cumberland Gap. Bragg's plan was for Smith to destroy Morgan, and then Bragg and Smith would fall on Buell. This done, the Confederate armies would mop up the Yankees in central Tennessee and then march into Kentucky. Morgan's cheery reports had led Bragg to believe that the populace would rise in support of their Confederate liberators and throw out the Unionists.
Smith had gone back to Chattanooga with Bragg believing that the two had an agreement, but while Jefferson Davis was enthusiastic about the plans of the two generals, Davis surprisingly failed to recognize the need for coordination between them. The two men answered only to Davis, and each could do as he pleased.
Smith was a single-minded man and had every intention of doing what he pleased. He had a hidden agenda, well concealed by a quiet and polite demeanor, and was intent on pursuing it whether Bragg liked it or not. Smith really wanted to march into Kentucky. He used his "agreement" as a lever to pry two brigades from Bragg, including one under Pat Cleburne, the promising Irish general from Arkansas. This left Bragg short-handed, but he managed to scrape up reinforcements of his own from Van Dorn and extended an invitation to John C. Breckinridge, still under Van Dorn, to take command of a Confederate Kentucky division.
Breckinridge was eager to fight at the head of troops from his native state, and immediately accepted. Bragg hoped that Breckinridge's presence would help draw Kentucky volunteers to the rebel cause, though as it would turn out Breckinridge would arrive much too late to figure in Bragg's offensive plans. Bragg had for similar reasons put Kentuckian Simon Boliver Buckner -- exchanged in July after five months in Federal hands and then promoted to major general -- in charge of another division.
* In any case, Smith made his move out of Knoxville on 14 August with 21,000 men without any real planning with Bragg. George Morgan's forces in the Cumberland Gap proved too well dug in to root out, so Smith left about 9,000 of his own men to keep an eye on them while the rest set off in the direction of Lexington, Kentucky.
Smith had expected to fill his ranks with Kentucky volunteers, but, as in eastern Tennessee, eastern Kentucky was strongly Unionist. On the 24th he sent a message to Bragg, saying: "Thus far the people are universally hostile to our cause." Smith was, however, confident that more enthusiasm would be apparent once he got out of the harsh and hostile mountain regions.
The locals found the invaders unimpressive, "ragged, greasy, and dirty"; they "surrounded our wells like the locusts of Egypt" and begged for bread "like hungry wolves". Fortunately, despite being heavily armed, the rebels refrained from simply taking whatever they wanted and "appeared exceedingly grateful" for whatever charity they received. Smith had been very specific that they were to conduct themselves with "the most perfect decorum of conduct towards the citizens and their property" so they would not antagonize the people Smith hoped would flood to their ranks.
Smith sent a message to Bragg on 24 August to ask him to move north into Kentucky to support his own offensive. The "agreement" between the two men having come to nothing, Bragg adjusted his own plans to operate in support of Smith, and on the 28th he launched his own army of 30,000 men northward across the Tennessee River at Chattanooga in order to keep Buell from falling on Smith and wiping him out.
On 29 August, Smith's column climbed up Big Hill, at the edge of the mountain barrens, where the Bluegrass country lay before them like the Promised Land. That evening, Smith's cavalry encountered Federal soldiers slightly to the north at a small town named Rogersville and were driven back after a short skirmish, which was ended by nightfall. Smith was actually pleased by this development, since it meant that the Federals were going to engage him in open country. If they chose instead to make a stand on the bluffs along the banks of the Kentucky River farther to the north, they would be much harder to deal with.
Smith told his men to sleep with their weapons in line of combat, ready to take the offensive at first light. There were about 7,000 Federals in front of them, also sleeping with their guns. They were very green Ohio and Indiana volunteers under the command of William Nelson, and had been sent to battle in haste by the governors of their states in response to an urgent plea for help from Washington.
Nelson was actually in Lexington, still farther north above the Kentucky river, when Smith's men made contact. Nelson got the news in the small hours of the morning of 30 August, and it wasn't welcome. The Union force was totally inexperienced, and the green soldiers didn't stand a chance in a fight against an experienced enemy force in open country. Nelson got dressed and immediately rode off to the battlefield, hearing the sounds of battle just after he got south of the Kentucky River. He had to take a roundabout route in order to avoid rebel cavalry, and it was noon before he arrived, just south of the town of Richmond, Kentucky, where he found his forces "in disorganized retreat or rather rout." They had fought well enough at first, but focused Confederate attacks were wearing them down, and they were on the verge of complete collapse.
He managed to rally them on the edge of town, using the rock walls and tombstones of a cemetery as a line of defense. Once the men were in place he walked his huge frame up and down the line in front of them to encourage them, shouting: "If they can't hit me they can't hit anything!" They hit him twice. Both wounds were minor but painful, and he received them without benefit, for the men immediately crumbled under attack and fled, only to run into the artillery of cavalry detachments that Smith had sent around to catch them. The Yankees threw down their arms and threw up their hands. Nelson was captured, but quickly escaped.
Much of the credit for the victory belonged to Pat Cleburne, the tough 34-year-old Irish fighter, now a brigadier general, who directed assaults that rolled over the Federals every time they tried to make a stand. He wasn't on hand for mopping up, however, since a bullet had struck him in the cheek, knocked out the teeth behind it, and gone out his open mouth. It was a spectacular Confederate victory. The Federals lost about 1,000 killed and wounded, plus over 4,000 captured, along with a large amount of supplies, weapons including nine artillery pieces, and ammunition. The rebels lost about 450 killed and wounded out of the 7,000 fighters they had actually fielded.
* Bragg was in high spirits. On 27 August, he had written Sterling Price back in Tupelo, saying that he would have "Buell pretty well disposed of. Sherman and Rosecrans we leave to you and Van Dorn, satisfied that you can dispose of them, and we confidently expect to meet you on the Ohio and there open the way to Missouri." Despite the confusion in the campaign so far, things had gone well. Bragg had every good reason to think he might gain the upper hand in the war in the West and help assure a complete Confederate victory.
* Despite Stonewall Jackson's fumbling at Cedar Mountain, Lee was pleased with the victory, but realized it wasn't enough. The Federals had not been seriously hurt, and were still building up mass in northern Virginia. That mass had to be broken up, hopefully permanently, before it began its forward motion towards Richmond.
On 13 August, the day after Jackson returned to Gordonsville, Lee sent James Longstreet with ten brigades to reinforce Jackson for more ambitious offensive operations. At the same time, Lee sent Hood with two brigades to Hanover Court House north of Richmond, where the force would be able to block any Federal advance from Fredericksburg, while still being able to move in support of Jackson.
Whatever worries that Lee might have had about McClellan's intentions were dispelled that same day by intelligence indicating McClellan's men were being loaded into transports. The next day, D.H. Hill's scouts, operating on the south bank of the James, confirmed that Fitz-John Porter's corps had already left. While Lee still suspected the withdrawal might be a feint, he weighed the possibilities and gambled that it was not. The race to northern Virginia was on.
Lee arrived in Gordonsville on 15 August to find that Pope had obligingly placed all his forces in a trap. Pope's men occupied a triangle bounded by the Rappahannock on the north, the Rapidan on the south, and the O&A railroad on the west. The Rappahannock and the Rapidan joined about ten miles (sixteen kilometers) west of Fredericksburg. If Pope's forces could be driven east into the junction of the two rivers, they could be penned in and destroyed with little chance of escape.
Lee concentrated his forces to the south of Clark's Mountain, just below the Rapidan alongside the O&A, where they could assemble unseen by Federal scouts. The plan was that cavalry would move out in darkness and burn the bridge over the Rappahannock at the top of the triangle, cutting off Pope from his supply base at Manassas, as well as eliminating any prospect of reinforcements or path of escape. Lee's infantry would then descend on the Federals and finish them off. The two sides were for the moment evenly matched, both with over 50,000 men, but initiative and geography would give the Confederates a decisive advantage. Both Jackson and Longstreet were enthusiastic. Jackson wanted to move out the next day, but Longstreet was more cautious and proposed a day's delay. Lee agreed to the wait. Rebel forces were to move into position on Sunday, 17 August, and jump off at dawn on Monday when the news arrived that the vital bridge over the Rappahannock had been cut.
* It was a neat plan; the only problem was that it all went wrong immediately. Jeb Stuart had two cavalry brigades in his division. One, commanded by Wade Hampton, had been left in defense of Richmond, while the other, under Robert E. Lee's nephew Fitzhugh Lee, was guarding Hanover Junction. Fitzhugh Lee was ordered to rendezvous with Stuart east of Clark's Mountain on Sunday night, and then the combined force would move north and burn the bridge over the Rappahannock.
Stuart made it to the rendezvous on time, but Fitzhugh Lee was nowhere to be seen. Midnight came, and Stuart and his staff decided to get some sleep in a nearby house. They awoke before dawn to hear hoofbeats approaching; believing that the tardy Fitz Lee had finally arrived, they mounted and rode up to meet him and his men -- only to run into Yankee cavalry instead, who opened fire on them. Stuart and most of his staff managed to escape on their horses, but the Union raiders captured Captain Norman Fitzhugh, who was carrying orders outlining Lee's plans in his dispatch case, and then rode off across the river. Much to Stuart's embarrassment, they also took his plumed hat and cape along with them.
It turned out that Robert Toombs had left the ford over the Rapidan unguarded by generously telling the pickets to go get some sleep. Toombs was relieved of command and sent to the rear, but the damage had been done. The infantry had a traditional dislike of the "glory boys" in the cavalry, and wherever Stuart went for the next few days, the soldiers called out to him: "Where's your hat?!"
Fitzhugh Lee arrived a day late, explaining that his orders had not indicated any need for haste, and so he had detoured to pick up supplies and ammunition. Even if he had been on time, it would have made little difference, since the ground forces were not in position anyway. The attack was rescheduled for Wednesday, 20 August. Lee ordered another division to move up from Richmond to add weight to the attack.
Then, on the evening of 18 August, scouts reported the Federals were breaking camp. When Pope learned of the orders in Captain Fitzhugh's dispatch case, he recognized that he was in a trap and decided to get out as fast as he could. A Pennsylvania chaplain wrote: "The heat was intense and the dust suffocating," but the men moved swiftly, realizing that "grim and relentless as fate, the rebel hordes were already on our trail and eager for out destruction."
The withdrawal was demoralizing. Virginia citizens jeered at the retreating Yankees; many of the men were ill and all were tired; and the move was made in such haste that equipment was jumbled and misplaced. As Lee observed the retreating Federals from the top of Clark's Mountain the next day, he remarked to Longstreet: "General, we little thought that the enemy would turn his back upon us so early in the campaign." This was an idle joke, since Lee realized that Pope was one step ahead of him, and only because Lee's own plans had been a muddle so far.
Lee set out in pursuit on 20 August. He was too late: by that time, Pope's army was mostly north of the Rappahannock. Stuart's men clashed with the Federal cavalry rear-guard and bloodied them, but the Yankee horsemen bought enough time to see the tail of Pope's column across the river. For the next two days, Lee probed for a crossing, but he always found Union troops and their artillery ready for him on the high ground north of the river. If Pope was contemptuous of the defensive in theory, he was demonstrating great skill at it in practice.
Lee had to do something and do it fast. Pope, in place with his three corps under Sigel, Banks, and McDowell, had been joined by advance elements of Burnside's force under Major General Jesse L. Reno. More troops were on the way, and if the Federals achieved concentration, they would have roughly 130,000 men to face less than half that many Confederates.
Stuart's cavalry offered a means of breaking the deadlock. Lee ordered Stuart to swing around Pope's army and raise hell in his rear, particularly along the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, Pope's lifeline to Manassas. Stuart was only too eager, since he was fuming over the loss of his hat and the mockery he had been suffering. He wrote his wife: "I intend to make the Yankees pay for that hat."
* Lee was faced with a theater of action that could be contained in a rectangle. The base of the rectangle was the Rappahannock on the southeast, with the O&A railroad on the southwest, the Bull Run stream on the northeast, and a string of low mountains, the Bull Run mountains, on the northwest. The rectangle was about 25 miles west of Fredericksburg and the Aquia Creek base, where Union reinforcements were arriving.
The O&A ran over three streams, with Cedar Run in the south, Broad Run towards the north, and Bull Run at the very top of the rectangle. There was a whistle stop named Catlett's Station near Cedar Run, another named Bristoe Station at Broad Run, and Pope's big supply base at Manassas was between the Broad Run and the Bull Run.
The Warrenton Pike ran through the middle of the rectangle parallel to the O&A, passing through Warrenton in the south, then north through Gainesville, Groveton, over the hilly country where the battle of Manassas had taken place, and then out of the rectangle towards Alexandria and Washington.
The Bull Run mountains on the northwest were cut by a pass named Thoroughfare Gap, through which the Manassas Gap railroad line ran from the town of Salem on the west of the mountains to the towns of Hay Market and Gainesville and finally to the Union supply base at Manassas. All in all, the area provided a region of varied terrain that provided considerable inspiration to a general with Lee's disciplined imagination.
The most noticeable detail was that the O&A could be cut at three bridges within that region. Since Pope was dependent on that railroad, destroying any one of those bridges would greatly inconvenience him.
Stuart moved out with 1,500 men and two guns on the morning of Friday, 22 August, crossing up the Rappahannock to the northwest of Federal lines. His intent was to circle around Pope's forces and destroy the railroad bridge over Cedar Run at Catlett's Station. They made it to Warrenton, about halfway to their objective, by noon, where Stuart had a conversation with a young woman who said that a Yankee quartermaster had bet her a bottle of wine he would be in Richmond in a month. Stuart took down the fellow's name and passed it on to his staff.
A thunderstorm broke on the raiders after sundown. Stuart described it as "the darkest night I ever knew." This actually helped them move undetected, however, and near Catlett's station he captured a contraband who told them that Pope had set up his headquarters there. The contraband helpfully offered to guide the rebels to Pope's private quarters. They surrounded the brightly lit camp. The bugler sounded the charge, and a thousand troopers roared down on the surprised defenders. The Yankees scattered. A flash of lightning would show a rush of men running helter-skelter, and the next flash would show no one in sight.
About 200 Federals were captured. Pope wasn't there since he was off on an inspection, but they took his personal baggage, a payroll chest containing $350,000 in Union greenbacks, and a dispatch book containing copies of all orders that had passed through Pope's headquarters over the last week. They were unable to destroy the bridge over Cedar Run, since it was too wet to burn and they could not inflict much damage on it with axes. Stuart and his men withdrew before dawn, taking the prisoners and as much loot as they could handle, going back the way they had come. The Union quartermaster Stuart had made a note of was their guest, and Stuart obligingly stopped at Warrenton to pick up the bottle of wine the fellow had bet with the young woman. He would be in Richmond well before 30 days in the confines of Libbey prison.
Stuart and his men got back to Confederate lines that afternoon, covered with mud but in good spirits. Fitzhugh Lee clowned around in the hat and coat of a Union major general. The label revealed it was John Pope's, and so Stuart sent a message across the lines to offer a "prisoner exchange", Pope's coat for Stuart's hat. Nothing came of it, but Stuart felt that he had sufficient revenge on the Yankees.
* Robert E. Lee was more concerned about the captured dispatch book. It arrived at Lee's headquarters the next morning, Sunday, 24 August, and gave bad news. Fitz-John Porter's corps had arrived at Aquia Creek on the 20th, to be followed by Heintzelman's on the 22nd. Although Lee did not know the disposition of McClellan's three remaining corps, he assumed more soldiers in blue would be arriving soon. In fact, Franklin's corps was boarding the transports that day, and Sumner's would do so the next day, while Keyes and his corps were to be left to hold down Yorktown. In a few days, there would be almost no hope of defeating the Federals.
By the 24th, the Yankees were in front of Lee in such strength that he had no hope of dislodging them by a direct attack. However, Pope was still dependent on the O&A railroad lifeline, and by convincing Pope that his lifeline was in serious danger Lee might be able to force Pope to retreat, throwing confusion into the imminent link-up of Federal forces and leaving the Yankees disorganized, scattered, and vulnerable to attack in detail.
Faced with a long chance and no chance, Lee took the plunge. He decided to divide his forces, sending Stonewall Jackson with three divisions to move on the Federal supply base at Manassas, while Longstreet held the line on the Rappahannock with four divisions. Lee was betting that Pope was not ready to attack him yet, for Pope was already well stronger than Lee's entire army and could easily destroy either Jackson's or Longstreet's separated commands if he caught wind of what was going on.
Lee went to Jackson's headquarters at noon and, under the rumbling of artillery, gave Jackson his orders. Jackson was to move out in the morning, advance behind the screen of the Bull Run Mountains, descend around the mountains through Thoroughfare Gap, and raise hell in Pope's rear along the O&A. It didn't matter where, just as long as it properly scared Pope, and, God willing, nervous Yankee politicians in Washington. Lee and Longstreet were to follow along the same route after a day or two. If Jackson managed to stampede Pope, the two wings of Lee's army would then reunite near the old Bull Run battleground to exploit any blunders Pope might make.
* McClellan arrived on the Potomac by steamship that day, trailing the soldiers he had been sending north to John Pope over the last two weeks. They had not been pleasant weeks for him. He had no reason to like Pope and no reason to believe a word he was told by his superiors. Halleck had sent him reassurances, saying that: "It is my intention that you shall command all the troops in Virginia as soon as we can get them together." -- and sent McClellan's friend Ambrose Burnside to provide encouragement. Good old Burney was too simple and direct for anyone to mistrust him, but McClellan was beyond simple reassurances.
Halleck had been shrill and continuous in his badgering of McClellan, to the point where McClellan had felt obligated to complain about the "tone" of the messages he was receiving. When on 21 August he had received a message saying that Pope's forces were hard-pressed he felt an unavoidable satisfaction, writing his wife: "Now they are in trouble they seem to want the 'Quaker', the 'procrastinator', the 'coward', and the 'traitor'. Bien." As he left on the 23rd, he had further written his wife: "I take it for granted that my orders will be as disagreeable as it is possible to make them -- unless Pope is beaten, in which case they will want me to save Washington again. Nothing but their fears will induce them to give me any command of importance or treat me with otherwise than with discourtesy."
He was completely correct. When he arrived at Aquia Creek, he wired Halleck for instructions, and was told in reply that he could stay at Aquia Creek or Alexandria, "so as to direct the landing of your troops". It didn't matter where McClellan went. His only role was to simply help in the handing over of his divisions to Pope. He was, for the moment, no more than a witness to events.
* Those events were beginning to reveal a pattern of confusion among the Federals. While Pope was accumulating an enormous army, as noted it had been originally thrown together from separate commands. Adding new elements from the Army of the Potomac, which had a collective distaste for Pope that he had done much to encourage, hardly made it more coherent.
The adventures of Colonel Herman Haupt, the superintendent of military railroads, on that day were a case in point. Haupt was an efficient and methodical sort of fellow, much like the Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs. Though Haupt had graduated from West Point in 1835, he had resigned shortly afterwards, to eventually become chief engineer of the Pennsylvania Railroad. He was back in uniform somewhat against his will, but he was competent, decisive, and admired in high places. Lincoln often told of the remarkable bridge that Haupt had built "out of beanpoles and cornstalks" between Fredericksburg and Aquia Creek -- 80 feet (24 meters) tall and 400 feet (122 meters) long, constructed with green logs and saplings in two weeks by unskilled soldiers.
Haupt was trying to move General Joe Hooker's division forward to Pope. Haupt managed to find the trains, but though Hooker's men were ready to board, there was a slight problem. Hooker himself was nowhere to be found; the general liked to have a good time and was likely out enjoying himself in many bars and whorehouses to be found in Washington. Haupt telegraphed his good friend and fellow railroad man, Assistant Secretary of War P.H. Watson, who replied: "General Hooker was in Alexandria last night, but I will send to Willard's and see if he is there. I do not know any other place he frequents. Be as patient as possible with the generals; some of them will trouble you more than the enemy."
Hooker was eventually found and that problem was taken care of, but then Haupt found himself confronted by another one that immediately confirmed Watson's advice. General Samuel D. Sturgis, the same fellow who had led the retreat from Wilson's Creek, showed up with his own division and demanded to be moved immediately. To emphasize his point, he had his men seize enough of the railroad to completely tie things up. Haupt tried to talk sense into Sturgis but Sturgis wasn't interested in listening to a colonel, much less one who was just a civilian pressed into uniform.
Haupt was no stranger to this sort of pigheadedness. When Pope had taken command, he had told Haupt that Pope's quartermaster would handle the trains, and Haupt would simply do as he was told. In two weeks the rails were completely paralyzed. Haupt had meanwhile lobbied Secretary Stanton to give him unconditional authority over the rails, but by that time Pope was only too glad to let Haupt clean up the mess.
Sturgis was out of line, but he had the soldiers and swore he would use them to get his own way. Haupt angrily telegraphed Halleck and got back an order that allowed him to arrest Sturgis if that became necessary. Haupt called Sturgis into his office, showed the general the order, explained the realities of the situation to him, and said Sturgis and his men would have to wait their turn to be moved south. Sturgis had been drinking and for some reason thought the order was from Pope, replying: "I don't care for John Pope one pinch of owl dung!" Haupt tried to explain the matter again; Sturgis repeated: "I don't care for John Pope one pinch of owl dung!" Haupt explained with strained patience one more time, and one more time Sturgis began to reply: "I don't care for John Pope -- "
Sturgis's chief of staff tugged at his sleeve to stop him and in some agitation whispered into the general's ear. Sturgis blinked, got unsteadily to his feet, and then said boozily into Haupt's face: "Well, then, take your damned railroad!" The whole fiasco had taken up the better part of the day and blocked the movement of four troop trains. In the meantime, Lee's men were getting ready to move themselves, on foot instead of rail, but with much more focus.
A little over a week earlier, McClellan had written Halleck, saying: "I don't like Jackson's movements. He will suddenly appear where least expected." As mentioned, McClellan had his moments of perceptiveness: in fact, Stonewall Jackson was busily preparing exactly such a magic trick.
