v1.1.1 / chapter 35 of 93 / 01 sep 07 / greg goebel / public domain
* Abraham Lincoln's patience with George McClellan finally ran out in November 1862. McClellan was dismissed from command of the Army of the Potomac and replaced by Ambrose Burnside, who loudly protested that he wasn't up to the job. However, Burnside still did do his best to move his army quickly against the rebels, though things didn't work out as he planned.
In the West, Grant finally began to pick himself out of his doldrums and move against the Confederates again, while Rosecrans and Bragg prepared their armies for a confrontation in central Tennessee. Down the Mississippi, Ben Butler was relieved from his position as dictator of New Orleans, to be in principle replaced by Nathaniel Banks. Unfortunately, to Lincoln's distress, Banks proved to be in no hurry to get to his new command.
* In late October 1862, Major General George B. McClellan had moved the Army of the Potomac into northern Virginia, skirting along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge mountains. The movement was characteristically slow and before he had made much progress, Lee, with Longstreet and his corps, had made it to Culpeper Court House, blocking the Federal line of march. In the meantime, Jackson remained in the Shenandoah Valley, seeking opportunities to play the war of division, maneuver, and recombination against the Yankees that had worked so very well in the past.
McClellan was stalled and Lincoln was disgusted. The President had pointed out to the general that the Federals were closer to Richmond than Lee was, and had privately resolved that if McClellan did not exploit this advantage he would be sacked. It was the "third time around" and McClellan was out. Old Francis Blair tried to plead the general's case, but the President was adamant: "I said I would remove him if he let Lee's army get away from him, and I must do so. He has got the slows, Mr. Blair."
Lincoln would have to wait a few days before removing him. 4 November was an election day in most Northern states, and firing McClellan on the eve of the election would have been seen as groveling to the radicals. The Emancipation Proclamation had been more than enough of a concession to them and Lincoln did not want to appear to be giving them more. Given the widespread public grumbling over the Proclamation, a general distaste for the Administration's arbitrary arrests of potential troublemakers, and deep frustration over the slow progress of the war, Lincoln had reason to be careful of public perceptions.
After the final tally on voting day, the Democrats went from 44 to 75 seats in the House, though the Republicans retained a majority. The gains by Democrats were not a surprise. Along with dissatisfaction over the Proclamation and the conduct of the war, Stanton's security men had been unusually enthusiastic about arresting troublemakers up to the time of the election, most of the arrested being Democrats -- though it seems likely that was because Democrats were much more inclined to be troublemakers than because of any inclination to persecute Democrats. Critics used the election to blast the administration's "tyranny, corruption, and maladminstration". The election results were painful, even if they failed to dislodge Republican dominance. Lincoln commented that he felt like the boy who had stubbed his toe on the way to see his girl: he was too big to cry, but it hurt too much to laugh.
However much the election setback pained him, now that it was over Lincoln could deal with General McClellan. On 5 November, even as the final votes were tallied, the President was having orders written up relieving the general of command. The next day, the orders were given to Brigadier General C.P. Buckingham, who was instructed to present them to McClellan under the authority of the Secretary of War. Buckingham questioned why it was necessary to send a general as a messenger boy; Secretary Stanton replied that McClellan might not accept the order from anyone of lesser rank. Stanton added, very much in character, that General Buckingham should arrive unannounced, lest McClellan be put on his guard.
The next morning, 7 November 1862, Buckingham took a train through an early winter snowstorm to McClellan's headquarters at Rectortown, near Manassas Gap. McClellan heard of Buckingham's arrival and suspected the worst, but was puzzled when the visitor went south to Salem, where Burnside's corps was camped. About 11:00 PM, Buckingham and Burnside, their coats and hats dusted with snow, showed up at McClellan's tent, with Burnside clearly in distress. McClellan greeted the two men courteously, they exchanged pleasantries for a moment, and then Buckingham got down to business. Buckingham presented McClellan with two orders, one from Halleck, one from the Adjutant General's office under the authority of the Secretary of War, relieving McClellan of command.
McClellan had been expecting something like this and had resigned himself to it. He remained composed while reading the orders, and then said pleasantly: "Well, Burnside, I turn the command over to you." Burnside, shaken, begged McClellan to stay on a day or two to help with the transition. When Buckingham had told Burnside that he was being given the top job, Burney had tried to refuse, saying he wasn't fit for the post. He agreed only when Buckingham told him that it was an order, and that command would otherwise go to Joe Hooker. McClellan agreed to stay on to help Burnside, and to say goodbye to his army.
The change of command was announced to the Army of the Potomac the next day. When McClellan rode among them one last time for a farewell review on 10 November, they broke ranks and mobbed him, crowding around him and stroking his boots, weeping in bitter sorrow and resentment. McClellan was stirred and mournful at this show of faith, but he knew he had to go.
When he boarded a train on 11 November to go to Washington, a mob of soldiers uncoupled his car and pushed it back up the rails, cursing the politicians in Washington and threatening revolt. They turned quiet when McClellan came out to address them, saying that they should "stand by General Burnside as you have stood by me, and all will be well." McClellan had not always demonstrated much dignity as commander of the Army of the Potomac, but he knew how to make a graceful exit; no doubt, the axe having fallen, he felt a certain amount of relief. With this, the soldiers in turn submitted, letting out a loud long hurrah as the car was coupled back up to the train and pulled out of sight.
* Rosecrans had replaced Buell; Burnside had replaced McClellan; Porter had replaced Davis. Lincoln had been cleaning house, throwing out officers who didn't want to fight and replacing them with those that he thought did. Halleck, in another of his moments of perceptiveness, had seen the purge coming in August, when he had written a friend: "The Government seems determined to apply the guillotine to all unsuccessful generals. It seems rather hard to do this when the general is not in fault, but perhaps with us now, as in the French Revolution, some harsh measures are required."
The President was not quite done, either. Fitz-John Porter had been relieved of duty by the same set of orders that had relieved McClellan, but Porter also had to face a court-martial for his actions or lack thereof during Second Manassas. The guillotine was to be specially sharpened for him.
Benjamin Butler had of course been found wanting, but he was far too useful as a prominent Democrat in the service of a Republican administration to be simply sacked, and he was a skilled administrator. Unfortunately, he had demonstrated little interest in fighting battles with the Confederates and the only too plausible rumors of his shady dealings in New Orleans had become an embarrassment.
Lincoln thought he had the ideal solution right at hand. Nathaniel Banks was in Washington, in charge of the city's defenses, and though he hadn't had much success in battle it generally hadn't been for any lack of aggressiveness; in fact, at Cedar Mountain Banks had shown more aggressiveness than was wise. Besides, Banks versus Stonewall Jackson was not a fair contest, and against less formidable enemies Banks might be expected to do better. It seemed like a good idea to swap Banks for Butler in New Orleans. Since both Butler and Banks were both Massachusetts politicians, the exchange would not cause political controversy.
On 8 November 1862, Banks was given orders placing him in command of the Department of the Gulf, and the next day Halleck sent him instructions detailing his agenda. Banks was to move on Mobile and Vicksburg; then Jackson, Mississippi; then the Red River; and, all this done, on to Texas. This was a remarkable set of expectations for an amateur general who had never won a battle after a year and a half of field operations and three major military campaigns, but Banks was enthusiastic. He was told that he would be given 20,000 reinforcements, and fairly delighted Lincoln with his energy.
* Out West, Grant had still not regained the energy that he had demonstrated up to Shiloh. In fact, he was proving a annoyance to the Lincoln Administration. The profiteers who followed the Union Army had few friends among the military command, except as much as they could buy them, and Grant found them a nuisance. When his father, Jesse Grant, came downstream from Illinois in the company of some eager cotton speculators by the name of Mack, Grant's patience snapped. This might have not been so harmful had the Macks not been Jewish. Grant overreacted: in early November, he issued an order evicting all the Jews from his military department, without regard for their actual activities or social status: "The Jews, as a class violating every regulation of trade established by the Treasury Department and department orders, are hereby expelled from the department within twenty-four hours of from receipt of this order."
Even in a more blatantly bigoted era, this was going way too far. Rabbis blasted the order, Jewish organizations protested, and most importantly a Kentucky Unionist from Paducah named Cesar Kaskel, a gentile, distressed at the peremptory eviction of 30 families of his honest Jewish neighbors, took a train to Washington and had a personal audience with the President. Lincoln wrote out an order in Kaskel's presence instructing Halleck to see to it that the order was immediately rescinded. The order was formally cancelled the next month. The only practical result had been to embarrass Grant and reduce his credibility with the administration. After the butchery at Shiloh and his recent indecisiveness, Grant's position was becoming increasingly weak. Rumors that he had been returning to the bottle didn't help.
Grant was in need of a wake-up call. He got it when he learned of the
"mysterious rumors of McClernand's command." Grant didn't know any specific
details about the secret army that John McClernand was raising to seize
Vicksburg. In fact, even Halleck wasn't let in on the plan, though since he
oversaw army logistics he had some idea that something was going on.
However, when Grant saw troops accumulating in his district that he knew
nothing about, he knew that some threat to his authority was in progress. He
wired Halleck on 10 November:
AM I TO UNDERSTAND THAT I LIE STILL HERE
WHILE AN EXPEDITION IS FITTED OUT FROM
MEMPHIS, OR DO YOU WANT ME TO PUSH AS
FAR SOUTH AS POSSIBLE? AM I TO HAVE
SHERMAN UNDER MY ORDERS, OR IS HE RESERVED
FOR SOME SPECIAL SERVICE?
Halleck responded immediately:
YOU HAVE COMMAND OF ALL TROOPS SENT TO YOUR
DEPARTMENT AND HAVE PERMISSION TO FIGHT WHERE
YOU PLEASE.
This sounded decisive and Halleck had many good reasons to back Grant against
McClernand, but Grant knew Halleck only too well and was not entirely
reassured. This insecurity did Grant some good, since he got moving again.
On 13 November, his cavalry entered Holly Springs, Mississippi, since
evacuated by the rebels, with Union infantry columns just behind the cavalry.
Holly Springs became a Union supply dump, a stepping-stone for an advance
down the line of the Mississippi Central Railroad that would cut off
Vicksburg and leave it to fall into his hands. Or so Grant believed.
* When General William S. Rosecrans inherited what had become known as the Army of the Cumberland from the unfortunate General Buell, he also inherited all of Buell's problems. A third of the army was either sick or absent without leave, and many of those still in the ranks were miserably drilled and equipped. The most overwhelming of these problems, however, was the army's exposed position at the end of a long and tenuous supply line. When Rosecrans marched the troops back into Nashville on 7 November after their long campaign in Kentucky, not only was the army in ragtag shape, but his means for improving their condition were limited.
Rosecrans was made of harder stuff than Buell. Rosecrans, then 43, was a volatile, contradictory, energetic man, quick to rage, just as quick to forgive. He was a devout convert to Catholicism who heard mass every morning, who carried a crucifix on his watch-chain and a rosary in his pocket. He was also notorious for hard drinking and foul language, though he was careful to draw the line between profanity and blasphemy. He was popular with the men, who enjoyed a general they could talk to and even share jokes with, nothing at all like the cold-fish Buell. They called him "Old Rosey" and "Fighting Rosey", with the hidden joke that "Rosey" also described the general's big red boozy nose.
If he found a soldier wearing worn-out boots or the like in an inspection, he would tell the man emphatically: "Go to your captain and tell him what you need! Go to him every day until you get it! Bore him for it! Bore him in his quarters! Bore him at meal time! Bore him in bed! Don't let him rest!" He would continue at length, explaining that the request would eventually make its way up the chain of command where at the top he would personally "see then if you don't get what you want!"
Rosecrans's logistical situation was troublesome. The rivers were still too low for effective navigation, and the few rail lines were continually harassed and cut by Confederate raiders. Rosecrans organized long wagon trains into Nashville while his men rested and refit. With his supplies dependent on such unreliable connections, Rosecrans wanted to get at least two million rations on hand before he advanced.
There were other problems to attend to. Nashville was a rebel city and the population was barely under control, something like a Baltimore of the West. The army provost marshal of the city, John Fitch, complained that it was "swarming with traitors, smugglers, and spies." Fitch observed that most of its male citizens were fighting in the Confederate army and the women they left behind were "arrogant and defiant, outspoken in their treason and indefatigable in their efforts" to aid their menfolk fighting the Federals. Rosecrans would have no such insubordination. He organized both regular police and secret police organizations that came down hard on troublemakers and suspicious characters, arresting them to throw them behind bars or send them over rebel lines.
Similarly, demoralized Federals were often surrendering to the Confederates so they could be paroled and sent home. Rosecrans had men suspected of playing this game marched through the streets and camps wearing a white cotton nightcap, to advertise them as cowards before they were sent home. No doubt, in the fine tradition of military justice, men innocent of wrongdoing were punished in this way, but the number of defections still fell considerably. Rosecrans also demanded, and got the right, from Secretary Stanton to summarily sack officers guilty of serious misconduct. To his men, Fighting Rosey meant business.
* Rosecrans' Confederate opponents were facing even greater hardships. Roughly 15,000 of Bragg's men who had come back from their round-trip offensive into Kentucky ended up on the sick-list, and the 27,000 who were still up and about were hard-pressed to just stay fed and warm. Snow was covering the ground by 1 November, the winter promised to be harsh, and to compound the difficulties such supplies as could be obtained were being shipped over the mountains to support Lee and his men, who were being given priority at the time.
The rebels were still doing what they could to fight back. John C. Breckinridge had arrived in Chattanooga in early October with 2,500 men. He was reinforced by an additional 2,500 exchanged prisoners, but as he prepared to march north to join Braxton Bragg in Kentucky he got word from Bragg that the Confederates were withdrawing south. Breckinridge was ordered to proceed to Murfreesboro with his men and wait for the arrival of Bragg and his troops. Breckinridge arrived in Murfreesboro on 28 October, joining Bedford Forrest, who had been using the town as a base for small-scale raids.
Breckinridge was alarmed at the vulnerability of the forces under his command. Although there was only one Federal division in Nashville to the north, Breckinridge was still outnumbered. Once Rosecrans marched his forces into Nashville, Union superiority would be overwhelming. On 6 November, Breckinridge ordered Forrest and Morgan, who had returned from the Kentucky expedition in advance of Bragg's army, to perform cavalry raids on Nashville to throw the Federals on the defensive. Forrest felt they could have seized Nashville, but the arrival of the Union Army of the Cumberland the next day made the prospect much more difficult.
In the meantime, Bragg was shifting the rest of his men down through Chattanooga and then on towards Murfreesboro. When the troops began to arrive there in early November they found that Bragg, a skillful logistician, had managed to at least have stockpiled plenty of food to eliminate hunger from their list of miseries. The division Kirby Smith sent in support arrived a few days later, bringing the total of soldiers and cavalry under Bragg's command to a total of almost 50,000. Bragg was enthusiastic about his prospects. With drill and effort, the forces under his command, now dignified with the title of the Army of Tennessee, might well throw the Federal invaders out of Tennessee, even though the Confederates were still well outnumbered.
* Although the progress of the Yankees down the Mississippi and towards Chattanooga had been halted, the Federals were obviously gathering strength for another push. Jefferson Davis realized that the Confederate defense of the West was weak and disjointed, and so on 24 November 1862 he assigned General Joe Johnston, since recovered from his wound at Seven Pines, overall command of the entire Western theatre of war. Robert E. Lee had been encouraging Davis to centralize the loose Confederate command structure in the region, and Davis regarded Johnston as one of the few generals the Confederacy had with sufficient stature for such an important command.
Johnston was in charge of Bragg's forces at Murfreesboro and Pemberton's forces in Vicksburg. Davis also encouraged Kirby Smith to send assistance to Bragg and Smith did so, sending his strongest division. This was remarkable act for Smith, who began the Kentucky campaign with a total lack of cooperation with Bragg and had ended it with nothing good to say about him. However, Smith was a great admirer of Davis, and Davis had done an extremely good job of placating Smith during the general's visit to Richmond. In fact, Bragg and Smith would reconcile their differences and be on good terms from that time on.
Unfortunately, the long-standing friction between Jefferson Davis and Joe Johnston remained in effect. Johnston was not pleased with the strategic situation as he found it. His two major forces were relatively weak and faced with superior Union military strength, with Grant preparing to move on Vicksburg and Rosecrans building up supplies for an advance on Murfreesboro. Johnston proposed that he consolidate his forces and then smash Rosecrans. Grant would be then isolated and forced to retreat. Davis rejected the proposal and suggested in turn that Johnston send forces from Bragg to help Pemberton. Johnston replied that Confederate forces in Arkansas would be more appropriate to the task. Even in the face of a crisis, the two men could not agree on anything.
* Those "Confederate forces in Arkansas" had been in fact a subject of intense controversy in both Little Rock and Richmond. When General Theophilus Holmes had received orders from War Secretary Randolph telling him to march to the aid of Vicksburg, he was shocked. In mid-November, Holmes received a follow-up order requesting that he move across the Mississippi with 10,000 men. Holmes protested to Richmond, saying that the orders were equivalent to giving up Arkansas to the Federals, and besides there was nothing for the Arkansas troops to live on during a march over territory ruined by drought and warfare.
The protest reached the desk of Jefferson Davis, who wrote a stiff note to Randolph, suggesting the "impropriety" of removing Holmes from his headquarters in the Transmississippi and coldly remarking that the matter "was not contemplated by me." This was more in the form of a reprimand than an ultimatum. In fact, Davis was in favor of obtaining reinforcements from the Trans-Mississippi, and his real objection was the transfer of Holmes. However, as a reply he got a letter of resignation from Randolph, who did not care for the way Davis limited his authority.
This left Davis in a difficult political position, since with Randolph gone he had no Virginian of stature in his cabinet. Davis quickly came up with a proper replacement, in the form of James A. Seddon, a bony, cadaverous-looking 47-year-old Richmond lawyer who had served two terms in the US Congress. Seddon moved into the office of Secretary of War on 22 November. Joe Johnston visited Seddon to lobby for soldiers from the Transmississippi; Seddon listened politely, but the orders Johnston got on the 24 November said nothing of the matter. Holmes and his Arkansas soldiers would stay where they were, at least for the time being.
* President Lincoln had promoted Ambrose Burnside to the command of the Army of the Potomac over Burnside's own objections. Partly the President had done so because there was no other suitable candidate available, but Lincoln also felt Burnside had the twin virtues of aggressiveness and political neutrality, virtues that McClellan had lacked. Indeed, Burnside regarded the bickering that afflicted his fellow officers with deep disgust.
The army itself had misgivings about Burnside. When his fellow officers came to congratulate Burnside, he thanked them and then, with, as one of the group wrote, a clumsy directness that put the general's sincerity above all doubt, added that "he knew he was not fit for so big a command, but he would do his best." Such an attitude did not inspire confidence. The hotheads in Congress weren't pleased, either. While Burnside wasn't interested in politics, simple neutrality wasn't good enough. If he wasn't with them, he was against them, and his good friendship with McClellan didn't win him any good will among them either.
Lincoln was not seriously disturbed by these factors. He was, however, concerned with Burnside's military judgement. Burnside did not like the position of the Army of the Potomac near the Blue Ridge Mountains. It put him in a position suspiciously similar to that John Pope had been in only a few months before: Lee to his front and Stonewall Jackson on his flank, a combination that had brought Pope to ruin. On 9 November, Burnside proposed to maintain the position for a short time and then, when all preparations were in place, shift the entire army to Fredericksburg and move straight on Richmond. Under such circumstances, Burnside would be able to force Lee to battle on unfavorable terms.
Such a massive movement depended on precise logistics. Burnside wrote plans requiring that 30 boats and barges be loaded up with supplies and sent down the Potomac to create a new supply base at Belle Plain, about 10 miles (16 kilometers) north of Fredericksburg, and that wagon trains and herds of beef be dispatched from Alexandria to meet the Army of the Potomac when they arrived for the crossing. Since all the bridges across the Rappahannock River to Fredericksburg had been destroyed in earlier fighting, pontoon bridges would have to be set up quickly to allow the army to cross the river without delay.
The troubling feature of this plan to the President was not its ambition, which was welcome, but that it reflected the "on to Richmond" strategic focus that Lincoln found so frustrating. While such a drive might actually force Lee to fight a losing battle with Burnside, it was just as plausible, or given Lee's inclination to take extreme risks even likely, that instead the Army of Northern Virginia would leave Richmond to the Federals and move north to attack the defenseless cities of the Northeast. Trading queens would hurt the Union more than the Confederacy, for Northerners would not be able to take the pain anywhere near as well as Southerners. The Union's real strategic target was Robert E. Lee and his men.
Halleck visited Burnside at the Army of the Potomac's headquarters in Warrenton on 12 November to voice such concerns, but Burnside would not be budged. Lincoln, though still unconvinced, was unwilling to simply override the general without giving him a chance to prove himself, and also pleased to see someone so energetic when inaction seemed to be the rule everywhere else. Lincoln gave Burnside the go-ahead. On the 14th, Halleck wrote Burnside: "The President has just assented to your plan. He thinks that it will succeed, if you move very rapidly; otherwise not."
Burnside acted with admirable speed. He had inherited the Army of the Potomac from McClellan organized as seven corps. For the sake of mobility, on receiving the go-ahead he restructured the army into three "Grand Divisions" of two corps each, including the Right Grand Division under Bull Sumner, the Center Grand Division under Hooker, and the Left Grand Division under Franklin, with a corps under Franz Sigel left as a reserve.
Sumner moved his men out on 15 November, followed on the next days by Franklin, Hooker, and the cavalry. The lead elements arrived in Falmouth, on the north bank of the Rappahannock just up the river from Fredericksburg, on the 17th, and Burnside came up with the rear of the movement on the 19th. A reporter for the NEW YORK TRIBUNE wrote to his paper citing officers who couldn't have believed "that a great command cannot move more than six miles a day, and accustomed to our old method of waiting a week for the issue of new clothing ... rub their eyes in mute astonishment. We have marched from Warrenton forty miles, in two days and a half."
There was little Confederate resistance in front of them across the river. General Sumner proposed they simply ford the Rappahannock and proceed south, but it began to rain that day and rising waters made Burnside conclude that would be unsafe. The rain would have other consequences that Burnside would find out about very soon.
Joe Hooker proposed to Burnside to take the Center Grand Division across the river upstream at a place with the promising name of United States Ford, and strike south of Fredericksburg, living off the land. Hooker had also gone over Burnside's head and sent a letter directly to Secretary of War Stanton, not only promoting his own plan and asking the Secretary to assist, but criticising his superior as timid and daring to sign the letter as "Your Friend", even though he had only met Stanton once. Burnside rejected Hooker's plan, and Stanton didn't bother to answer. Hooker was by nature a schemer and such clumsy and artless intrigues seemed surprisingly dim coming from him, but it seems more likely that Hooker's only intent was to go on record as having opposed Burnside's plans. If Burnside fell, Hooker would not fall with him and might even profit.
In any case, Burnside wired his superiors:
AS SOON AS THE PONTOON TRAINS ARRIVE, THE BRIDGE
WILL BE BUILT AND THE COMMAND MOVED OVER.
This conditional statement would now become more complicated than anyone
could imagine.
* The pontoon bridge Burnside referred to was the responsibility of the 50th New York Engineering Regiment, one of the few engineering units made up of volunteers. They had put a pontoon bridge across the Upper Potomac at the town of Berlin, Maryland, to support McClellan's move across the river to the south, and were also responsible for two pontoon bridges at Harper's Ferry.
On 6 November, the War Department decided to dismantle the Berlin pontoon bridge and move its components to Washington for potential use in Virginia, but at the time there was no need for haste. Orders were sent by mail instead of by telegraph, and they did not reach the commander of the 50th New York, Major Ira Spaulding, until the 12th. Spaulding was energetic and went into action immediately, dispatching a company to tend the bridges at Harper's Ferry while the rest of his men dismantled the bridge at Berlin and put its elements in motion over roads on big wagons and down canals towards Washington. Spaulding arrived in the city on the evening of the 13th, ahead of his men, to report to his superior officer, Brigadier General Daniel P. Woodbury.
Woodbury indicated that once Spaulding's men arrived, they should prepare a pontoon bridge on wagons and stand by to move out quickly, but the next morning, 14 November, Woodbury sent new orders instructing Spaulding to stow his bridges at a depot and put his men into camp. These orders came down from Halleck himself. Burnside had discussed his plans to move down the Rappahannock with Halleck on his visit on 12 November and thought he had made it clear that the pontoon bridges needed to be in place before the Army of the Potomac arrived in front of Fredericksburg. Unfortunately, Halleck seemed to be under the impression that Burnside and his men would ford the Rappahannock upstream and had no immediate need of pontoon bridges.
Spaulding's orders were changed again on the evening of 15 November, instructing him to have his men organize two pontoon bridges and ship them by steamer down the Potomac to the new supply base at Belle Plain. No means were provided along with the shipment to move the components over land once they got there. The 50th New York Engineers put their backs into it and the next morning a steamer named HERO dutifully showed up to tow the bridge components downstream.
However, in the fine style of military bureaucracy, Spaulding was then ordered to kit up a third pontoon bridge and transport it by land to Fredericksburg. This turned out to be a nastier task, since Spaulding and his men had to obtain horses and harness, only to find that many of the horses had never been broken to harness, and that the harnesses had to be unboxed and assembled. They also had to find rations for themselves and forage for the horses. It wasn't until the afternoon of 19 November that they finally got on the road.
Then the rain began to fall.
* Of course Robert E. Lee had not been idle during this time. The news of McClellan's dismissal had filtered South on the 10 November. Lee expressed some regret at his adversary's departure: "We always understood each other so well. I fear they may continue to make these changes till they find someone whom I don't understand."
In fact, on hearing that Sumner's wing had left camp on the 15th, Lee was perfectly baffled. If Lee had a reputation for being able to read an opponent's intentions with surprising accuracy, up to this time such a feat had been relatively easy since McClellan had been so predictable. Faced with an unknown quantity such as Burnside and conflicting reports and rumors, Lee could be as in the dark as any other military commander.
The fog did not begin to clear until the evening of 17 November, when Lee found out that Sumner's lead brigades were approaching Fredericksburg. Lee did not know if this was a Union feint or the spearhead of an offensive, but the next day, the 18th, he ordered Longstreet to personally lead two divisions east. He also sent Stonewall Jackson a suggestion (Lee rarely gave Jackson a direct order) that some of his divisions be moved east of the Blue Ridge, and sent Jeb Stuart and his cavalrymen north of the Rappahannock to obtain badly-needed intelligence. One of Stuart's men quickly reported back that the entire Army of the Potomac was on the move east with completely surprising swiftness. Lee still remained unsure of Federal intentions. Rumors of a Federal offensive south out of Harper's Ferry made him reluctant to move Jackson out of the Shenandoah Valley. For the moment, he kept his options open.
However, Lee was certain that he did not want to fight the Federals on the Rappahannock. There was little room for a battle of maneuver around Fredericksburg, and so he wanted to position the Army of Northern Virginia along the line of the North Anna river, 25 miles (40 kilometers) further south. There the terrain was much better suited to defense and provided opportunities for the devastating counterstroke against the Federals that Lee had sought since the beginning of the summer.
However, on 19 November Lee still sent two more divisions east. Jefferson Davis had indicated in his messages to Lee that he did not want the Yankees to move into the strip of land between the Rappahannock and the North Anna, since they could then cut vital rail lines and do other damage to land that so far had escaped serious damage. Lee swallowed his misgivings and obeyed. By the morning of the 20th, while the last of Burnside's men were moving in across the Rappahannock from Fredericksburg, advance elements of Longstreet's corps were arriving on the other side and beginning to dig in. Lee himself joined them during the day. If Burnside was to do something, it would have to be done quickly.
* Unfortunately, the rain came down and Major Spaulding's big wagons carrying the third pontoon bridge sank into the mud. The engineers muscled them as well as they could, but they made no real progress. In the meantime, the HERO had arrived at Belle Plain on 18 November with the components for the first two pontoon bridges, but nobody there had instructions on what to do with them. No one thought to contact Burnside's headquarters for clarification.
Furthermore, Major Spaulding had no idea he was supposed to be in a hurry. Even his boss, Brigadier General Woodbury, had not been told there was any urgency. Spaulding had been working competently and diligently under the circumstances, but after a hard time of slogging through mud he concluded on 22 November that the exercise was futile. He decided to drag the wagons to a nearby stream, unload the pontoon boats, put the wagons and other components into them, and float them downstream to the Potomac where a steamer would tow them to Belle Plain, while the horses were led overland to the same destination. An officer was sent back to Washington to requisition the steamer.
Things didn't get moving smoothly until 24 November, but the pontoons reached Belle Plain that evening. Spaulding's horses hadn't arrived, but he obtained others from the local quartermaster and had his men work through the night to move the pontoon boats and other materials down the road to Falmouth. They arrived there the next afternoon, the 25th. Woodbury had preceded Spaulding down to Belle Plain in order to straighten out the tangle of the first two pontoon bridges the HERO had towed there. He had arrived at Falmouth with them the day before, and was promptly put under arrest by an angry Burnside, to be held until he gave a "satisfactory explanation" of the delays. Woodbury gave such an explanation and Burnside, who could be impulsive but was not unkindly, had him released. Spaulding and his men got few thanks for their labor or the misery they had endured.
* The arrival of Longstreet's advance units on 20 November had greatly agitated the citizens of Fredericksburg, since they brought with them a prospect of a battle raging down their streets. They had grown even more agitated the next day, the 21st, when General Sumner sent a message to the town's mayor, which began:
BEGIN QUOTE:
Under cover of the houses of your city, shots have been fired upon the troops of my command. Your mills and manufactories are furnishing provisions and the material for clothing for armed bodies in rebellion against the Government of the United States. Your railroads and other means of transportation are removing supplies to the depots of such troops.
END QUOTE
Sumner demanded that the city be surrendered. Otherwise, he would wait 16 hours for Fredericksburg to be evacuated and then begin bombarding it with his artillery. Longstreet, on his part, assured the mayor that he did not intend to set up defenses in the city, but indicated that he would resist the Federals if they moved into it. The mayor replied to General Sumner that he would stop the pot-shots and would cease the supplies to the Confederates. Sumner withdrew the threat.
During these days there was very little the Confederates could have done to stop the Federals if they had attacked in force. Lee was extremely puzzled that they had not done so. However, the last of Longstreet's corps had arrived on 23 November and Burnside's window of opportunity began to close. Longstreet found that a long wooded ridge behind the town provided an excellent defensive position that was out of range of Union artillery, and could be made into a fortress with application of spade and axe. While the rebels dug in, the Federal advantage gained by the Army of the Potomac's rapid movement faded and died out. By the time the pontoon bridges rolled into Falmouth on the 25th, no one was more aware of this unpleasant fact than Ambrose Burnside.
* His original plan having failed even before any serious shots had been
fired, Burnside was now forced to make a decision on what he had to do next.
Lincoln in fact wanted to consult with him on such matters, sending him a
telegram late that day that was almost comically meek in tone:
IF I SHOULD BE IN A BOAT OFF AQUIA CREEK AT DARK
TOMORROW (WEDNESDAY) EVENING, COULD YOU, WITHOUT
INCONVENIENCE, MEET ME AND PASS AN HOUR OR TWO WITH
ME?
The meeting took place on 26 November. What exactly was said was not
recorded. That same day, Lee sent for Stonewall Jackson. Jackson was
actually already on the march and had been since the 22nd, moving his men
with his accustomed ruthless speed over the Blue Ridge mountains and eastward
into Virginia.
Once again, events were building to a collision. On 28 November, Burnside apparently went up the river to Washington to confer with the President and General Halleck. Again, no record was made of what was said, but it seems clear that Burnside did not want to quit without a fight. On the 29th, Jackson arrived at Lee's tent in a blizzard, and his four divisions were quickly deployed up and down stream to guard against a Federal flanking attack.
Such an attack seemed certain, and the Confederate command suggested to the people of Fredericksburg that they were not safe in their homes. The citizens had to leave. Longstreet wrote:
BEGIN QUOTE:
The evacuation of the place by the distressed women and helpless men was a painful sight. Many were almost destitute and had nowhere to go, but, yielding to the cruel necessities of war, they collected their portable effects and turned their back on the town. Many were forced to seek shelter in the woods and brave the icy November nights to escape the approaching assault from the Federal army.
END QUOTE
Almost 75,000 Confederates opposed nearly 120,000 Yankees. They were the biggest set of armies to face each other in the war to date. When the two met, there would be a massive collision.
* Burnside, after getting off to a flying start, had then slid to a halt, stalled by military bureaucracy and his own lack of imagination. He wasn't the only general that month who had started off at a run and ended up in a crawl.
Nathaniel Banks had gone north to New York in a state of excitement that had pleased the President very much. Lincoln was much less pleased to get a requisition from Banks on 22 November that called for a quantity of supplies and horses that the chief quartermaster judged impossible to fill in any less than two months. The President sent an exasperated letter back north, explaining in a strained fashion that such an overemphasis on supplies had been "so far almost our ruin", and suggesting that Banks needed to move quickly, but would not move quickly if he burdened himself down so. Banks replied on the 24th that it had all been a miscommunication with one of his subordinates. He was not waiting for anything that wasn't "absolutely necessary".
Unfortunately, there were a great number of things that Banks felt were absolutely necessary: November ended with him still in New York. He would finally leave on 4 December, but for Fort Monroe, where he intended to continue his preparations. When he would get to New Orleans was anyone's guess.
