v1.1.2 / chapter 58 of 93 / 01 oct 09 / greg goebel / public domain
* Although the tide of the war seemed to have turned back against the Union after the Battle of Chickamauga Creek, with the coming of November it reversed itself again. In a story-book battle, Federal forces shattered Bragg's siege of Chattanooga, leaving the path into Georgia wide open.
The Confederates could take a little satisfaction in the pointless incursions of Nathaniel Banks along the Texas coast, which diffused Yankee efforts and did little harm to the South, and at George Meade's short-lived offensive against Lee, which was quickly frustrated. In comparison to the disaster at Chattanooga, these were small comforts.
In the meantime, President Lincoln articulated his thoughts on the war and its underlying rationale in a short, concise address at the commemoration of the national cemetery at Gettysburg. The address would prove to be one of the enduring masterworks of American oratory.
* Nathaniel Banks had never quite lost his thirst for military glory, and by late 1863 he believed it could be found in Texas. On 26 October, he loaded up a division of 3,500 men, commanded by a major general with the grand name of Napoleon Jackson Tecumseh Dana, on a convoy of steamships, and headed south towards the mouth of the Rio Grande. Banks wanted to seize the Texas coastline, and planned to work his way up from the Mexican border back to New Orleans.
Banks landed his troops at Brazos Santiago, just north of the mouth of the Rio Grande, on 2 November, and occupied Brownsville on 6 November. He honored the occasion by installing the Union-designated governor of Texas, Andrew Hamilton. Banks steamed up the coast, seizing the islands of Mustang and Matagorda, but Galveston was beyond his military means. Banks trumpeted his military victories, though they had been accomplished in the face of little or no opposition and for territory that few thought to be of any significance. Even Banks described the beachfront property he had obtained as "inclement and uncomfortable, in consequence of the sterility of the soil and the violence of the northers."
Lincoln graciously thanked Banks for his efforts, but the President really wondered if all Banks had succeeded in doing was moving a division of troops off the playing board. Halleck was downright annoyed over it, irritably replying to Banks: "In regards to your ... expeditions, no notice of your intention to make them was received here till they were actually undertaken." Halleck sensibly denied Banks' request for reinforcements to allow him to retake Galveston: the Union had more serious business to attend to.
* While the Union effort to relieve Chattanooga had the effect of making the Yankees there much more of a threat to the Confederates than the Confederates were to them, Braxton Bragg wasn't in a position to do much about it. He just didn't have the resources. In fact, instead of being reinforced, Bragg was sending troops away. The presence of Union forces in Chattanooga was intolerable, not only because of the town's strategic location, but because it was the gateway to Georgia and Atlanta; however, the presence of Burnside and his force in Knoxville was just as intolerable, since it broke the hold of the Confederacy on the mountain region.
During Jefferson Davis's tour of the South, Davis had sent Bragg a letter with a suggestion that Longstreet and his two divisions be sent to deal with Burnside, with Wheeler's cavalry in support. This gave Longstreet a total of about 15,000 men to evict the 25,000 under Burnside. Longstreet moved out with his troops on 4 November.
Longstreet was unsurprisingly gloomy and depressed over his assignment. He saw no sense in dividing Confederate resources in the face of superior Union forces, or in other words trying to fight two battles from a position of inferiority. He told General Buckner: "This was to be the fate of our army -- to wait till all good opportunities had passed, and then in desperation to seize upon the least favorable one."
Longstreet had also been thoroughly infected with the general demoralization and irritability of Bragg's command: Longstreet had become used to fighting for Lee, who was all that Bragg was not, and the contrast was discouraging. In fact, it appears that Bragg, who was perfectly aware of Longstreet's attitude, ordered the move partly just to get rid of Longstreet, whose stubbornness was low-key but very strong. On 31 October, Bragg had written Jefferson Davis that Longstreet's absence would "be a great relief to me."
Longstreet hoped to move swiftly and destroy Burnside's forces by parts, since that was the only way his smaller force could defeat a larger. However, due to supply problems, compounded by the destruction of bridges in the rough and mountainous terrain, fast movement was impossible. The locomotives available were extremely decrepit, and food and cold-weather gear were very scarce. Longstreet and Bragg traded angry messages. Much later Longstreet recollected: "Thus, we found ourselves in a strange country, not as much as a day's rations on hand, with hardly enough land transportation for ordinary camp equipment, the enemy in front to be captured, and our friends in the rear putting in their paper bullets." He concluded: "It began to look more like a campaign against Longstreet than against Burnside."
* Burnside was perfectly aware of Longstreet's movements. Grant was being prodded by the War Department to send help to Burnside, but Grant had his hands full with Chattanooga, and Burnside didn't seem particularly worried anyway. In fact, Burnside told Grant that the most sensible thing he, Burnside, could do was to engage Longstreet outside of Knoxville and then simply withdraw slowly to the city's defenses. This would keep Longstreet busy and separated from Bragg for as long as possible. Although Burnside was aware that he had a much larger force than Longstreet, he saw no reason to try to wipe the rebels out. If and when the Federals broke out of Chattanooga, Longstreet's troops would be isolated and forced to withdraw anyway.
Burnside accordingly dangled his force in front of Longstreet. Joe Wheeler's cavalry tried to maneuver around the Federals, but Union cavalry under Brigadier General William P. Sanders managed to frustrate them. Longstreet tried to repeatedly flank Burnside's force as it withdrew, leading to a confrontation in the mud and rain on 16 November at Campbell's Station, about 15 miles (24 kilometers) to the west of Knoxville. Confederates attacks were clumsy and uncoordinated; the fight ended up being an artillery duel, with a loss of about 300 Federals and 174 rebels. Burnside was able to continue his withdrawal, covered by Sanders' cavalry, and pulled into the defenses of Knoxville on 17 November. Sanders was killed by a sharpshooter during a skirmish the next day.
Longstreet arrived before Knoxville and found the defenses thoroughly solid. For the moment, he probed and inspected the fortifications, trying to figure out what to do next.
* After Robert E. Lee's foray into northern Virginia in October, the Confederates settled down into their new line on the Rappahannock. The Army of Northern Virginia was not in any condition to take the offensive again for the season, since the men lacked such essentials as shoes and clothes, but Lee could still lay traps for the Yankees.
The Rappahannock line was most vulnerable at Kelly's Ford, where the north bank was higher than the south bank, allowing the Federals to lob artillery fire down on the Confederates. In response, Lee set up a defense in depth, with the main works well back from the river and so out of range of Union guns. He also set up an outpost on the north bank of the river at Rappahannock Station, five miles (eight kilometers) upstream, by the simple measure of reversing old Federal works at that location. The outpost was backed up by a pontoon bridge, allowing the rebels there to withdraw if pressed too hard, or to pull in reinforcements if an opportunity arose. Dick Ewell's corps manned the defenses.
On 5 November, Lee received reports that the Federals were scouting his defenses. At about noon on 7 November, he was told the Army of the Potomac was on the move in mass. Lee arranged his forces to greet the Federals, and reports indicated that Meade's men were falling into his trap as expected.
Fighting broke out near Kelly's Ford at dusk, but Lee believed it was only a demonstration. New reports quickly reached him that proved it wasn't. The Federals had stormed across the ford and overrun two Confederate regiments on guard there, inflicting about 349 casualties. The Yankees had quickly laid down a pontoon bridge and were now pouring across the Rappahannock.
The losses were distressing, but now Lee was in a position to make use of the upriver force at Rappahannock Station to disrupt the Federal move with a deadly counterstrike. Or so he thought: he now received very unpleasant news that the Yankees had quietly assembled in front of the outpost in the dark before moonrise and overrun the two brigades there, all but wiping them out. About 600 of the rebels managed to escape across the river, but there were 1,674 casualties, including one of the biggest hauls of prisoners the Yankees had ever taken in a single grab. The only saving grace was that the Confederate pontoon bridge had been burned, denying it to the Federals. The situation threatened catastrophe. Lee's plans had been completely upset and the Federals had the initiative. He kept his head and did the only thing he could do: he ordered the Army of Northern Virginia to pull back over the Rapidan.
The rebels were vulnerable until the move was completed, and Lee feared he would not get away. The two armies faced off on 9 November, but neither Meade and certainly not Lee were inclined to fight. The Confederates managed to get back to their old lines on the Rapidan the next day. The Federals had suffered only 461 casualties in the operation. Meade and the Army of the Potomac had avenged their humiliation at being pushed around by the rebels in October. To be sure, they had not done the Confederates serious damage either, but notice had been served that Robert E. Lee and his generals could no longer trick the Yankees as easily as they had in the past.
On the other hand, Confederate soldiers were totally humiliated, and Dick Ewell was bitterly criticised. Robert E. Lee did not join in the criticism, since Ewell had proven his value many times, but Lee's praise of the excellent conduct of his troops in the fiasco included no trace of admiration for Ewell.
* The cemetery that the governors of the Northern states had laid out for their dead at Gettysburg was ready for dedication by late October. The dedication ceremony had to be noble and dignified, not only to honor the dead, but to give the governors an opportunity to put on an impressive appearance for the voters.
Pennsylvania Governor Curtin was the host, and so he decided to invite the famous public figure and orator Edward Everett to speak at the ceremony. Everett replied that he would be glad to do so, but he had prior commitments and could not be at Gettysburg on the planned date, 23 October. If the dedication were postponed to November, he would be able to speak.
Telegrams went back and forth and the dedication ceremony was postponed to 19 November. General Meade was invited, but had to reply apologetically that the pressures of war did not allow him to attend. After a time, somebody suggested that the President be invited as well. To be sure, this was a state's matter, but it seemed appropriate to invite the Chief Executive as well. An invitation went out on 2 November, asking the President to attend and to say a "few appropriate remarks" after Everett's address, a soft hint that he should avoid length and the folksy, undignified stories for which he was notorious. Lincoln accepted, seeing in the ceremony a chance to make the goals of the Administration better known to the public.
There was some criticism of the President for attending the ceremony. A few hostile editors attacked Lincoln for what they felt was a cynical use of a solemn occasion to promote his own agenda. Some prominent Republicans commented on the matter with contrived indifference, hinting that they regarded the President as a political nonentity and that it made no difference what he did. Lincoln shrugged and went.
On 18 November, the President took a special train to Gettysburg, in the company of some of his cabinet secretaries and a few foreign ambassadors. The little town, now patched up from its battle scars as well as possible in the time available, was packed with dignitaries and the curious. Generals Doubleday and Gibbon were present. The ceremony was crowded. Everett gave his speech, which lasted for two hours, as a proper oration was supposed to in those more patient days. Although Everett was almost 70, he did not falter once during his speech. On completion, after a chorus had sung a song written for the occasion, the President rose and gave his short comments:
BEGIN QUOTE:
Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.
Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.
But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate -- we cannot consecrate -- we cannot hallow-this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us -- that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion-that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain-that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom -- and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.
END QUOTE
This is not quite the text that was delivered on 19 November 1863, since the President polished the speech a bit later for the records and likely had improvised from his original written text anyway, but it is essentially what was said. The speech went over flat, probably because the audience had been worn out by Everett, and the applause was minimal. Lincoln clearly thought it was a failure, saying it "didn't scour."
The next day, however, Everett wrote the President: "I should be glad if I could flatter myself that I came as near to the central idea of the occasion, in two hours, as you did in two minutes." Lincoln, somewhat relieved, replied: "In our respective parts yesterday, you could not have been excused to make a short address, nor I a long one. I am pleased to know that, in your judgement, the little I did say was not entirely a failure."
Whether the speech went over with the public was one thing, but the opinion of Everett, who was president of Harvard, had been an ambassador to England, a Secretary of State, and a governor of Massachusetts, carried weight. In time, others would share his opinion, and the Gettysburg Address would become familiar to every American born since that time.
At the moment, however, the only consolation was Everett's compliments. The President was sick in bed with cowpox, a mild but still contagious relative of smallpox, and was isolated. This was not entirely a bad thing, since it was one of the few times Lincoln had been able to lay back and rest since he had taken office. He also typically found some humor in the illness: "I now have something I can give everybody."
* Life in Chattanooga was idle and quiet while the Union tried to get the pieces in place for offensive action. There was fraternization between the pickets, as was likely to happen under such circumstances. Tennessee Private Sam Watkins, that commonsense observer of life at the bottom of the Confederate States Army, related how he had seen a Yankee soldier strike up an acquaintance with a rebel sergeant, with the two men trading items and stories. Later on he found out that the Yankee was none other than Colonel John T. Wilder of the Lightning Brigade, scouting out possible river crossings.
Grant went near the front lines one day and the Confederates became aware of his presence. Instead of trying to shoot him, the order went out: "Turn out the guard for the commanding general!" The rebels lined up and saluted Grant, who returned the favor.
Everybody knew the cordiality could not last. In fact, when Grant heard on 5 November that Longstreet had left with his troops, Grant wanted to attack Bragg immediately. Bragg was weakened for the moment, but if Longstreet managed to defeat Burnside quickly, those rebel troops would be back again soon enough, or might take off on an excursion to threaten Grant's supply lines. Furthermore, Grant knew that President Lincoln regarded the relief of east Tennessee Unionists as a very important matter, and if those loyal citizens were threatened, Grant would probably have to go to their aid. Better to knock the props out from under Longstreet's offensive by smashing Bragg.
Thomas had to tell Grant it simply wasn't possible. The men were now well-fed, but the horses needed to haul artillery had either been eaten or were weak, and replacements hadn't yet arrived. Grant tried to argue the matter with Thomas, suggesting alternate plans for moving the artillery, but Thomas was an artillery man by training and quickly blew apart Grant's suggestions.
Grant accepted that an immediate attack was out of the question. He sent messages to Sherman, which amounted to: HURRY UP. More specifically, they ordered Sherman to leave one division behind to continue work on rebuilding railroad lines in the region, and bring up the other four divisions as fast as possible to Chattanooga.
The rail work was delegated to a division under Brigadier General Grenville M. Dodge. Dodge was expert engineer, who Indian tribesmen watching him work in the Far West had nicknamed "Level Eye", and he put his troops to work efficiently and effectively. Dodge had a monstrous job. Grant wrote later: "The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the road bed. All the bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. All bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur, and then to Stevenson."
Dodge and his men accomplished miracles. Over the next month and a half, they would rebuild 182 bridges, a similar number of culverts, and re-lay about 101 miles (163 kilometers) of track. Few of his troops had any previous experience in such work, but they did a remarkable job that laid the logistical groundwork for future offensive actions into the South.
Sherman arrived in Bridgeport, Alabama, on 13 November, ahead of his men, to be greeted by a message from Grant telling Sherman to come to Chattanooga for discussions. Sherman got into the town by the Cracker Line the next evening. He was glad to see that Grant was off his crutches, but shocked at the difficult situation in the town. "Why General Grant, you are besieged!"
"It's too true," Grant replied, but he had plans for fix that problem soon enough. Grant felt that Thomas' men were still demoralized by their defeat at Chickamauga Creek, and wanted Sherman's relatively fresh troops to lead the breakout assault. Grant felt that once Sherman's men began driving back the rebels, Thomas' men would recover their spirits and prove effective again. Hooker and his troops would lend a hand where it seemed necessary.
Sherman had to get his men to Chattanooga first. Longstreet had been gone for ten days and could be back at any time, so there was a need for haste. Sherman left to collect his troops the next afternoon, and hoped to have them there to begin the breakout on 20 November.
* Although Sherman left Chattanooga in a hurry on 14 November to collect his troops, haste was not possible due to rainy weather that only seemed to get worse, turning the roads into quagmires. Sherman wasn't in place with three of his divisions, ready for assault, until 23 November. The fourth division, under the command of Brigadier General Peter J. Osterhaus, was stranded when the rising Tennessee washed away a pontoon bridge. Grant shrugged, ordered Osterhaus to join Hooker's forces instead, and detached a division under Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis to join Sherman as a replacement. Sherman took the precaution of massing his troops across the Tennessee river in the hills to keep Bragg from realizing the scale of Union reinforcements. Grant hoped that the comings and goings of Union columns around Chattanooga would confuse Bragg. It worked.
The delay actually worked in Grant's favor, for on 22 November Bragg had decided to detach two more divisions to assist Longstreet, then besieging Burnside in Knoxville. By the time the Federal assault was ready to go forward on the morning of 24 November, the two rebel divisions were already moving out, making the odds in favor of the Yankees just that much better.
Bragg was betting that the strength of his position on the high ground would compensate for his inferiority in numbers, and he also believed, with some but not enough basis in fact, that Longstreet's move towards Knoxville would encourage the Federals to send off troops in that direction. This belief had been reinforced by the confusing movements of Sherman's forces. Bragg was trying to confuse the Federals in turn, sending Grant a note on 22 November: "As there may still be some combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." Grant, who generally had no high opinion of Confederate generals and certainly had no high opinion of Braxton Bragg, saw the message for the silly trick it was and ignored it.
Bragg knew that the Federals were building up reinforcements, writing to his wife that he found a strange beauty in the impressive terrain, "brilliantly lit up in the most gorgeous manner by the myriads of camp fires." The myriads of campfires meant myriads of Union troops. They wouldn't remain at their campfires for long. Grant had received reports from a rebel deserter that Bragg was pulling out. In this case, the deserter may have been confused by the two divisions that Bragg was sending to assist Longstreet. Although the report was incorrect, it left Grant eager to move.
At 12:30 on the afternoon of the 23rd, Thomas' men moved out in front of the town on what seemed to be a dress parade, marching with spit and polish and bands blaring until all of Thomas' men were in formation. Confederate pickets got out of their entrenchments to watch the festivities, but at 1:30 PM, Federal buglers and drummers called a "charge" and the Yankees swept forward abruptly, overrunning the advance line of rebel entrenchments around a small hill named Orchard Knob. The Federals quickly altered the entrenchments to face the other way. Grant was pleased that the Army of the Cumberland was by no means as cowed as he had assumed. Bragg was still not particularly worried, since he felt that even the relatively thin force on top of Missionary Ridge held such an advantage due to the terrain that the Federals had no hope of dislodging them.
The next morning, 24 November, Bragg received news that the Federals were pouring across the Tennessee River upstream of Chattanooga, poised to flank the weakly-defended northern end of the rebel line of Missionary Ridge. The force was Sherman and his men, which was a particular shock to Bragg. Although Bragg knew that Sherman had been on the march towards the area, Bragg had assumed that Sherman was taking his divisions into the mountains to help Burnside. Bragg sent frantic orders to the tough Irish General Pat Cleburne, the commander of one the divisions sent to reinforce Longstreet, to return the division immediately on a double-time and block Sherman's force.
* The Confederates held the high ground in an arc halfway around the town, with Missionary Ridge dominating the northern segment of the rebel line and Lookout Mountain looking over the other. Missionary Ridge was very steep, and the rebels were well dug in and supported by artillery.
Grant's plan specified that Hooker move his men against Lookout Mountain, while Thomas demonstrated towards Missionary Ridge to keep the rebels in place and Sherman administered a knockout flanking blow from the north end of Missionary Ridge. Hooker had three divisions, consisting of one of those that he had brought from back East, one provided by Thomas, and Sherman's division under Osterhaus that had arrived late. Thomas had four divisions, while Sherman had four divisions as well, including three he had marched to the area and another provided by Thomas. Howard commanded two more divisions as a reserve.
Things went well, if not as planned. Sherman's troops had rowed across the river in the darkness the night before, capturing the sentries without firing a shot. By noon the next day his engineers had set up a long pontoon bridge across the swollen Tennessee. Sherman moved his men onto high ground against little opposition, thinking that he was now poised to roll up Bragg's defenses. That afternoon, unfortunately, Sherman found out that his maps were faulty. He was on Tunnel Hill, named for the railroad tunnel that ran under it, and this hill was detached from Missionary Ridge by a rocky narrow valley. He would not be able to begin his proper assault for another day, and he had lost the advantage of surprise.
Hooker's attack on Lookout Mountain proved easier than expected. His primary goal was not to seize the mountain as such, but to clear the rebels off its slopes; seize the Chattanooga Valley, which lay between Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge and contained Chickamauga Creek; and then capture Rossville Gap, which cut through Missionary Ridge and gave the Federals a back-door route into Bragg's positions on the ridge.
There were only three rebel brigades on Missionary Ridge to hold back three divisions of Yankees. The rebel defense was disjointed and confused, while the Union attack went like clockwork. The Confederates were ordered to perform a fighting withdrawal, and they did so against fast-moving lines of Federals moving up the mountain in mists and intermittent drizzle. The rebels inflicted casualties on the attackers and then fell back. By sundown, Hooker's men were in possession of the western side of the mountain.
* Grant was not entirely satisfied with operations on 24 November. He hoped to deal with the rebels decisively the next day. That night, there was an eclipse of the moon. Both sides took this for a portent: the Confederates felt it meant bad luck for them, and the Federals agreed.
The last rebel defenders of Lookout Mountain pulled off of the eastern side of the peak during the night to brace up the defense of Missionary Ridge, damaging the bridge over Chickamauga Creek to block pursuit. Union soldiers crawled up the cliffs of the tall mountain during the night and planted the Stars & Stripes on top just before dawn. When the sun came up, the banner was waving on top for all to see. The fight for Lookout Mountain had cost the Federals about 480 men while the rebels had lost about 1,251, most taken prisoner. The newspapers played up the "Battle Above The Clouds" and the men who did it, though Grant later pointedly wrote that it was all a myth, nothing more than a large-scale, one-sided skirmish. This was uncharitable, but there was something about Joe Hooker that inspired a lack of charity.
* Sherman's attack on the north end of Missionary Ridge from Tunnel Hill on 25 November 1863 began about 10:00 AM -- and went nowhere, even though Howard's two reserve divisions were added to the weight of the four Sherman already had on the spot. The broken terrain was an obstacle to a coordinated attack, and Pat Cleburne's men held the rocky and steep slopes of the far side of the gulch. The rebels threw back attack after attack, inflicting serious casualties on the Federals who literally rolled back down the hillside. The Federals were unable to inflict any serious harm on the defenders. Cleburne described the fire his men sent into one Union advance as "a continuous sheet of hissing, flying lead."
At about 2:00 PM, Thomas was ordered to detach a division to help Sherman, but Sherman had replied that there was really no place to squeeze them into his narrow front. The division was quickly turned around and put back in place. At 3:00 PM, the Confederates, sensing that Sherman's troops were exhausted, hit them with a countercharge that completely took the wind out of them.
Sherman decided he'd had enough and sent a message to Grant at his headquarters on Orchard Knob that further efforts were futile. Grant had not had enough, and sent back a simple order: "Attack again." Sherman sensibly followed the letter of his instructions, sending in only about 200 men from Brigadier General Joseph Lightburn's brigade. They were, as Sherman expected, badly cut up and sent falling back. Sherman lit a cigar, took a few drags on it, and then said to an aide: "Tell Lightburn to entrench and go into position." Sherman cared for his men; he had sacrificed as many of them as his orders had required him to, and he was not willing to sacrifice any more.
* By this time, Hooker was across the Chattanooga Valley and pounding at Rossville Gap. He would have been there hours earlier, but his men had halted for about three hours while the bridge over Chickamauga Creek was repaired. Once they got across the creek, they quickly moved on the rebel defenders in Rossville Gap from several directions, smashing the Confederates there and putting Bragg's entire defense at risk. Grant had little confidence in Hooker and no great confidence in the two corps he had been given from the Army of the Potomac, which he regarded with some basis in fact as cast-offs. However, both Hooker and his men were proving much more effective than Grant had expected.
The real surprise was in the center of the attack, in front of Missionary Ridge. Sherman had been telling Grant that the Confederates facing Tunnel Hill were being continuously reinforced, though that wasn't true, and in midafternoon PM Grant noticed a movement on the top of Missionary Ridge that he interpreted as yet another transfer of reinforcements to block Sherman. He ordered Thomas to make a "demonstration" in front of Missionary Ridge to keep the rebels occupied.
Thomas had been doing little all day and was restless. He had a personal reason to want to be more involved with the battle, having a score to settle with Braxton Bragg. Some time earlier, Thomas had received a letter from a Northerner to a rebel officer, and had tried to pass it through the lines with a covering note so it could reach its proper recipient. Bragg immediately replied by sending back the message with a note of his own: "Respectfully returned to General Thomas. General Bragg declines to have any intercourse with a man who has betrayed his State." This was Bragg at his pettiest; Bragg had once been Thomas' commanding officer and it hit a nerve in the normally unflappable Thomas: "Damn him! I'll be even with him yet!"
A simple demonstration wasn't adequate revenge, but it would have to do. The order went to Gordon Granger, directing the corps remaining under Thomas' control, to move forward with his four divisions, 25,000 men in all, and take the Confederate rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge.
Thomas waited and nothing happened. It turned out that Granger had been distracted by engaging in a personal artillery duel with some rebel guns on Missionary Ridge and hadn't got around to ordering the attack. Thomas and Grant found him and confronted him. Thomas said: "Pay more attention to your corps, sir!" Grant added: "If you will leave that battery to its captain and take command of your corps, it will be better for all of us." Granger took the hint, and at 3:40 PM, six guns were fired in succession to begin the assault.
The attackers faced a triple line of rebel entrenchments, including the rifle pits at the bottom of Missionary Ridge, one halfway up its slope, and one at its top. Bragg had about 112 guns on top of the ridge. As the line of Federals advanced, the Confederate guns all went off. Although the Confederate fire was deadly, it had a perverse effect on the Federals: instead of intimidating them, they stepped up the pace, with some breaking into a run, and many shouting: "CHICKAMAUGA! CHICKAMAUGA!" They were rested and equipped, and they had scores to settle of their own, not only with the rebels who had bloodied them at Chickamauga Creek, but at the Union reinforcements who had gallingly come to "rescue" them.
The Federals quickly overran the Confederate line of entrenchments at the base of Missionary Ridge, with a few rebels scrambling up the steep slope but most, unnerved by the determined charge of the Yankees, simply throwing down their weapons and giving up. Once the Union men got to those trenches, they found themselves exposed to fire from above, and in sheer annoyance some of the troops decided to keep right on going. As they moved out, the others began to pick up the idea, and suddenly the entire wave of four Federal divisions was charging straight up the ridge, even as their officers called out for them to stop. They were ignored. Faced with the prospect of being left behind by their own men, the officers gave it up and joined the charge.
It seemed suicidal. One rebel officer concluded that all the Federals were drunk. Grant was watching from the rear with Thomas. Grant was chewing on a cigar, pulled it out of his mouth, and said, and demanded: "Thomas, who ordered those men up the ridge?!"
Thomas replied casually: "I don't know. I did not." Gordon Granger was there, and Grant then barked at him: "Did you order them up, Granger?!" Granger replied: "No, they started up without orders. When those fellows get started, all Hell can't stop 'em!" Grant did not share Granger's enthusiasm. The Confederate position seemed impenetrable. He considered calling the men back, but decided against it, muttering: "It's all right if it turns out all right. If not, someone will suffer." Thomas, never easily troubled, simply watched the rush up the slope.
The men scrambled upwards, moving as fast as they could with their packs, rifles, and heavy overcoats, getting on their hands and knees when they had to, or jabbing bayonets into the slope to pull themselves up. They were taking casualties but kept right on coming. The rebels found it unnerving.
Bragg, in his usual sour way, would later say that Missionary Ridge should have been held by a skirmish line. In fact, the Confederates had been overconfident of the strength of their position on Missionary Ridge and had not done a very good job of setting up their defenses. The troops at the entrenchments at the bottom of the ridge had been supposed to fire a few volleys and then retire up the hill to more defensible positions, but that had not been made clear to them. In between the capture of most of them and the terrified flight of the others, they helped panic their colleagues up the ridge. Worse, the top line of defenses on the ridge had been laid out on the very ridgeline, without regard to fields of fire. For much of the charge up the ridge the Confederates were either not able to get the Yankees in their sights, or were in the position of firing through their own people.
The Confederates on top of the ridge had a full view of the mad rush of 25,000 Federals up the hillside. It was too much for them. Nothing that had happened to the Confederate Army of the Tennessee had done much to give them much morale and they broke and ran, ignoring their officers, including Braxton Bragg, who ordered and threatened and pleaded with them to stand their ground. Bragg himself eventually decided to flee, narrowly evading capture. When the Federals got to the top of the ridge, all they encountered was the sight of a panicked rush of Confederates down the far slope. A winded Indiana private said: "My God, come see 'em run!"
Army Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs, who had come out from Washington to help deal with supply issues, had been standing with Grant on Orchard Knob, but suddenly one Union major spotted Meigs among the troops pouring over the top of the ridge, with the general "wild with excitement, trying himself to wheel one of those guns on the rebels flying down the opposite side of the mountain, and furious because he couldn't find a lanyard with which to fire the gun."
A Kansas private reported: "Gray-clad men rushed wildly down the hill and into the woods, tossing away knapsacks, muskets, and blankets as they ran. Batteries galloped back along the narrow, winding roads with reckless speed, and officers, frantic with rage, rushed from one panic-stricken group to another, shouting and cursing as they strove to check the headlong flight. In ten minutes, all that remained of the defiant rebel army that had so long besieged Chattanooga was captured guns, disarmed prisoners, moaning wounded, ghastly dead, and scattered, demoralized fugitives. Mission Ridge was ours." Years later, a Confederate soldier told a Union officer: "You Yanks had got too far into our innards."
The winners were jubilant, "completely and frantically drunk with excitement", waving flags, and cheering loudly. Phil Sheridan was sitting straddled on a captured gun and cheering, though another officer who jumped on a gun didn't bother to check to see if it was hot first and could barely sit down again for two weeks. Crusty Gordon Granger, who had galloped off to join his victorious troops as they dashed up the slope, rode around excitedly, laughing and roaring: "I'M GOING TO HAVE YOU ALL COURT-MARTIALED!" Their humiliation at Chickamauga Creek had been avenged, and they had shown up the newcomers who had been supposed to carry the battle.
With Missionary Ridge gone, the rebel siege of Chattanooga was broken forever. Bragg managed to collect his forces and withdraw in reasonable order, with the two divisions under Pat Cleburne and Alexander Stewart performing a stubborn rearguard action that allowed the Army of the Tennessee to get off the battlefield in good order. It was late in the day and late in the year, and the early fall of darkness allowed the Confederates to make their escape without immediate pursuit by the Federals.
* The Yankees took up the pursuit the next morning, 26 November. They overran the Confederate railhead at Chattanooga Station, finding the rebels gone but supplies burning in the streets and discarded equipment lying everywhere. On 27 November Cleburne's men set up am ambush at Ringgold Gap, a very narrow mountain pass about 15 miles (24 kilometers) south of Chattanooga, inflicting almost 450 casualties on a force of 12,000 under Joe Hooker and losing less than half that many themselves. The fight allowed Bragg to collect his force in Dalton, Georgia, which was defensible for the moment.
Bragg of course blamed the defeat on the "shameful conduct of the troops". Yankee soldiers who collected rebel prisoners and dead after the battle were more sympathetic, observing how ragged, starved, and ill the enemy was. The Confederates had lost only about half the number of men killed and wounded as the Federals, but the Yankees had hauled in over 4,000 rebel prisoners, and so Confederate losses were tallied at about 5,700, compared to a total of about 5,800 for the Federals. A good percentage of the Union casualties were taken in the mad dash up Missionary Ridge, which though a military miracle had been by no means bloodless.
As Civil War battles went, these were moderate casualties, nothing to compare to Antietam, Gettysburg, or Chickamauga Creek, but the victory had massive strategic implications. The rebels would never drive the Yankees out of Chattanooga, while the Federals were now poised to jump into the very heart of the Confederacy. A Northern reporter described Chattanooga as now "a gateway torn asunder." The Confederate victory at Chickamauga Creek had encouraged Southerners, but end it had come to nothing. A demoralized Confederate lieutenant told his company commander: "This is the death knell of the Confederacy."
The fight on Missionary Ridge gave the Union new heroes as well. Seven Congressional Medals of Honor, the highest American military decoration, were awarded to men who had participated. One was a teen-aged first lieutenant named Arthur MacArthur JR of the 24th Wisconsin, who carried the regimental colors to the top of the ridge after three other color-bearers had been killed. Decades later, MacArthur became the US Army commander of American forces in the occupation of the Philippines. His heroism would inspire his son, Douglas MacArthur, who became one of America's greatest generals.
* At first Grant had sulked while Thomas' men cheered on top of Missionary Ridge, since the actual conduct of the battle had completely stood his plans on their head. Grant said, using extremely hot language by his standards: "Damn the battle! I had nothing to do with it!" However, Grant was too much of a pragmatist to stay unhappy for what amounted to a massive victory. Since warfare often provides reverses that aren't according to plan, complaining about a victory that wasn't according to plan was silly.
The day after the bloody reverse at Ringgold, Grant abandoned the pursuit of Bragg's army. It was way too late in the year to move a full Union army through rough terrain, and the War Department was nagging Grant to do something to help Burnside in Knoxville. Offensive operations into Georgia would have to wait until spring.
