[76.0] July 1864 (2): About Enough For Another Killing

v1.1.2 / chapter 76 of 93 / 01 oct 09 / greg goebel / public domain

* By the summer of 1864, war weariness was widespread in the North, and there was public pressure for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Lincoln understood that anything less than a return of the rebel states to the Union would be defeat, though he was willing to be flexible about the terms under which it would be done. He also understood that Jefferson Davis had no interest in a return to the Union under any circumstances, making negotiations futile. However, in response to the public pressure, Lincoln did approve an informal peace probe, which confirmed everything he believed. It might have been a disappointment in itself, since he was as sick of the fighting as anyone, but it at least helped convince the public that the war had to be found to the bitter end.

North of Atlanta, Sherman was doing his best to reach that end, flanking Joe Johnston out of his Kennesaw Mountain line of defense in a series of moves that finally ended up with Union forces in eyeball distance of Atlanta. Johnston's failure to stop Sherman was the last straw in Richmond, and Johnston was replaced in command by John Bell Hood. Hood promptly all but wrecked his army with three rash attacks on the stronger Federals. The Confederates were able to kill the popular Union General McPherson, but otherwise the battles were lopsided rebel defeats. Sherman reached around Atlanta to encircle the city.

[76.1] PEACE FEELERS?

* While the war stumbled on as something of a black comedy, voices in the North crying for peace were making their own probes to see if the conflict could be settled by diplomacy instead of more bloodshed. In early July, Horace Greeley wrote the President a characteristically overheated letter, saying that he, Greeley, had been told that Confederate emissaries working in Canada wanted to make proposals for peace. Greeley encouraged Lincoln to investigate, to spare "new rivers of human blood."

Few people had an excess of confidence in the erratic Horace Greeley, and the covert sound to the Confederate "peace feelers" suggested that there was less to what Greeley saw than was actually there: if the Confederacy was serious about peace, Greeley was not a credible choice to deliver the message. Lincoln dropped the whole matter right back in Greeley's lap, sending him a reply that asked him to bring someone to the White House who was empowered to discuss peace terms.

This was an obvious response, but it seemed to have taken Greeley flat-footed. He squirmed, knowing that if the whole thing was a fraud he could end up looking very foolish, but he was stuck. He and the President's personal secretary, John Hay, went to the Canadian side of Niagara Falls to talk with the "emissaries", who turned out to be obviously little more than Confederate agents who were trying to muddy the waters in the upcoming Northern election and who had no authority to negotiate for anything.

Since Greeley refused to let the President release their correspondence on the matter, Lincoln was unable to use the incident to show the public the lack of substance in the popular belief that the Confederacy would immediately make peace if given half a chance. In fact, leaks about Greeley's mission did much to enhance that belief.

* The President had another opportunity to fix this matter, however. An Illinois colonel of volunteers named James F. Jaquess, who had been a Methodist minister before putting on Union blue, had seen too much destruction, particularly at Chickamauga, where much of his own regiment had been cut down. He requested a leave of absence to see if he could promote peace on his own. The request was granted.

His efforts made little progress until he linked up with a New York businessman named J.R. Gilmore, who had contacts in both North and South and also wanted to see what he could do to encourage peace. Gilmore contacted Lincoln and managed to get approval for a visit to the South to talk peace, though the President made it clear that the mission was entirely unofficial.

The exercise was perfect from the President's point of view. Jaquess and Gilmore were sensible and conscientious, and they might actually make a breakthrough that could help end the war. More likely, they would find that no breakthrough was at hand, allowing Lincoln to demonstrate Confederate stubbornness to the Northern public and throw cold water on the idea that the South was going to give up the fight voluntarily.

Jaquess and Gilmore were escorted across Ben Butler's lines on 16 July, and went to speak with Jefferson Davis the next day, 17 July. Jaquess wore his Union colonel's uniform, concealed in a long linen jacket while in transit to avoid difficulties. Davis was cordial and the three men spoke at length, but no matter what tack the two informal emissaries took, the Confederate president always came back to his sole negotiating position: the war would end when the North recognized Southern independence and ceased aggression the Confederacy. This was clearly a non-negotiating position, and after a time Jaquess and Gilmore recognized further discussion was useless and took their leave.

Gilmore spoke to Lincoln on his return, and the President asked him what he planned to do with the transcript he had written of the discussion. Gilmore replied: "Put a beginning and end to it, sir, on my way home, and hand it to the TRIBUNE." The TRIBUNE meant Horace Greeley. Lincoln responded: "Can't you get it into the ATLANTIC MONTHLY? It would have less of a partisan look there."

Gilmore answered that he was sure he could. Since publication in a monthly journal would take a little time, Gilmore agreed to release an excerpted version to the Boston EVENING TRANSCRIPT, and the article appeared on 22 July. The full version appeared in the ATLANTIC MONTHLY a few weeks later, in August. The articles were widely read, and did much to discourage the belief that the only reason that the war wasn't over already was the pigheadedness of Northern politicians. Most Northerners now saw that Southerners had plenty of pigheadedness of their own, and that the war wouldn't be over soon.

The President had known that all along. Even before publication of Gilmore's short article, on 18 July Lincoln had gone back to the request for more troops that the Gold Hoax had forced him to shelve in May. Now he asked for 500,000 volunteers instead of 300,000, with a draft to be called after 5 September to make up for any shortfall in volunteers.

There was no way the President could call for more before election day in November. Phrasing it as a request for volunteers was trimming to the wind, since most of the men who were willing to sign up had already done so, and this simply amounted to a call for a draft with a built-in delay. It was what Lincoln could do, however, and it was still enough to inflame the war-weary North, with editors loudly protesting the action.

The President was also still willing to take extreme measures to see to it that the Union stayed the course. On 5 July, Lincoln had suspended the writ of habeas corpus in Kentucky, where local elections would take place on 1 August. The commander of the District of Kentucky, General Stephen Burbridge, arrested characters he regarded as disloyal, including many prominent Democrats, whether there was much proof of disloyalty or not. The heavy-handed tactics backfired: the Democrats swept the election anyway.

BACK_TO_TOP

[76.2] SHERMAN BEFORE ATLANTA / HOOD REPLACES JOHNSTON

* Although Sherman's frontal attack on Johnston's Kennesaw Mountain line had failed, Schofield had managed to improve his position during the fight, giving the Federals an opening for a flanking move around the formidable Confederate line of defense. Sherman waited for the roads to dry out and then moved out on 1 July. McPherson and Schofield's armies curved around the rebel defenses to the southeast, while Thomas and dismounted cavalry blocked any Confederate counterthrust.

Sherman didn't believe for a second that he would catch Joe Johnston napping, particularly because the rebels had a commanding view of the countryside from their eagle's roost on Kennesaw Mountain. Sherman ordered that scouts be sent out to check the Confederate line at sunrise on 3 July, and to nobody's surprise the scouts found the trenches empty.

Sherman hoped he could catch the rebels on the march, where they would not be able to offset their inferior numbers with stout earthworks. He was in a great rush that morning, pushing his people to move as fast as possible. However, in mid-day he found out that Johnston had already taken refuge in preprepared defenses at Smyrna, five miles (eight kilometers) to the southeast.

Sherman performed another flanking move. Johnston pulled out during the night. The Chattahoochie River, the last major natural barrier in front of Atlanta, was about 6 miles (10 kilometers) to the south. Sherman believed that Johnston was too good a general want to fight with a river to his back and would probably take his men across to dig in along the south bank. That would give the Federals an opportunity to catch the rebels astride the river, but when Sherman got to the Chattahoochie on the morning of 5 July, he found the rebels snugly holed up in yet another preprepared line of defense, to his surprise set up on the north bank of the river.

It might have seemed unwise to set up troops with their backs to a river, but these were no ordinary fortifications. One Federal officer judged the Confederate works to be the most formidable the Yankees had encountered in the whole campaign, a neatly laid out deathtrap that protected six bridges spanning the river, allowing the rebels to skedaddle quickly if it came to that.

Johnston's wagons were parked south of the river, behind a secondary line of earthworks that could be quickly occupied as a fallback defense. His cavalry patrolled the south bank beyond the limits of the rebel line, making sure that any bridges that the Federals could use to cross the Chattahoochie were burned. Sherman's frustration with this development was mixed with admiration of his adversary. Sherman had a much higher opinion of Johnston than Johnston's own superiors did. Sherman wrote later: "No officer or soldier who ever served under me will question the generalship of Joseph E. Johnston. His retreats were timely, in good order, and he left nothing behind." Johnston's superiors would have likely emphasized the use of the word "retreat".

Sherman did get a bit of satisfaction from his current situation. He and Thomas went to the top of a hill to see the lay of the land, and were rewarded with a view of the distant buildings of Atlanta, the goal of the whole campaign. The unexciteable Thomas showed no particular emotion at the sight, but Sherman was clearly exhilarated, "his eyes sparkling and his face aglow", as a witness said. One of his majors shared the emotion, writing home: "Mine eyes have beheld the promised land."

* Sherman was for the moment in no hurry to reach the promised land. His work crews needed some time to repair the railroad to the north and lay telegraph lines, and Johnston's defense was formidable enough to require some extended consideration anyway.

Clearly another flanking movement was required. Sherman ordered Thomas and McPherson to dig in before the rebel works to block a counterthrust. Schofield and his army were to stay in the rear and be ready to move quickly, while a cavalry division under Stoneman scouted downstream to the southwest and another cavalry division under Garrard went upstream to the northeast.

Stoneman found every bridge downstream burned and rebel cavalry watching him carefully. This expedition at least had the positive effect of distracting Johnston, who was less aware of Garrard's upstream expedition.

Garrard also found that the Confederates had been thorough in burning the bridges upstream. His division rode as far upstream as the town of Roswell, where there were many factories that the Yankees promptly put to the torch. Garrard's men found one textile factory that was flying the French tricolor. The factory owner, a Frenchman, claimed protection as a neutral, and the confused Garrard sent back a messenger to ask Sherman what should be done. Sherman lit up angrily, calling the Frenchman's claim "nonsense" and "perfidy", and gave Garrard authorization to hang the Frenchman. Garrard was not in a hanging mood and let the poor Frenchman go. Instead of burning the textile factory, however, Garrard tore it down and set his men to using the materials to rebuild the town's burned bridge.

While this effort was underway, Schofield and his army moved upriver as well, in search of a crossing. On 8 July, Schofield selected Soap Creek, about halfway between the northeast limit of the Confederate line and Roswell, as a promising site. There was rebel cavalry on the south bank, but they were not alert, strong in numbers, nor heavily armed, and Schofield planned the operation carefully. He moved up artillery and troops to the riverbank under the cover of the brush lining the river, and loaded up assault teams into 20 pontoon boats put into Soap Creek well up from its mouth. On a signal, the assault teams paddled down the creek as fast as they could while the troops and guns blasted away at the Confederates on the other side of the river. The shock was too much for the rebel cavalry and they fled, leaving behind their only artillery piece.

It was neatly done, the Federals suffering no casualties in the operation. That night, Schofield's engineers set up two pontoon bridges, and by sunrise on 9 July two Union divisions were digging in to a bridgehead on the south bank of the Chattahoochie. The bridge at Roswell was repaired by 10 July, and then one of McPherson's corps crossed over it to expand the Federal bridgehead upstream. Johnston was already in retreat over the Chattahoochie by this time, burning his bridges behind him to delay pursuit. Sherman felt that for once he had caught Johnston napping.

That same day, Johnston now took up defensive positions on the outskirts of Atlanta, on the high ground before Peachtree Creek. The creek was just big enough to impede the movements of an army, and Johnston hoped that he would be able to man the Atlanta defenses with Georgia militia and use his own troops to make a flanking attack when Sherman tried to send his men across.

Sherman went idle again for a few days, getting organized, repairing bridges, and building up supplies. The men took the opportunity to bathe in the Chattahoochie, cooling off and getting rid of the grime of weeks of campaigning. Sherman, who lived as they lived, joined them in the river. Having refreshed himself, he set about planning his next move.

Johnston's defenses were strong, as they always were, and Kennesaw Mountain had taught him that a frontal assault was futile. Sherman considered another flanking maneuver. The terrain downstream was better suited to the offense, but if the Federals crossed upstream they would be better able to protect their rail lifeline, and also be able to cut the Georgia Railroad, which led into Atlanta from the east. By this time, Grant had informed Sherman that the offensive in the East had stalled and settled into a siege. Since Lee now had more troops than he could feed, it was very plausible that he might send reinforcements to help Johnston. Breaking the Georgia Railroad would block such a transfer.

Schofield already had two divisions in position across the Chattahoochie, with one of McPherson's corps further upstream. Stoneman would take his cavalry division downstream to mislead Johnston into thinking the Federals would cross in that direction, while McPherson would take a second corps upstream to cross at Roswell. McPherson's third corps would remain in line alongside Thomas's army until the last moment.

Once all of McPherson's army was across the river, it would move southeast towards Stone Mountain to cut the Georgia Railroad, and then turn west towards Atlanta, tearing up track along with the march. In the meantime, Schofield would parallel McPherson on the inside of this "grand wheel", while Thomas pushed forward in the center to distract Johnston from the other two armies curving towards his flank.

On 17 July, Sherman's grand army moved out in a clockwork operation. Sherman had feared that crossing the Chattahoochie would be bloody and expensive, and was correspondingly relieved and pleased to find it done very neatly. The barbarians were now approaching the gates of Atlanta.

* Apprehensions had been growing in Atlanta over the past few weeks as Sherman's troops had moved steadily south. Citizens had been fleeing the city, whose parks had been turned into field hospitals. Transportation was hard to come by, since the trains were being used by the military to ship out the wounded as well as vital stores and machinery. There was a worry that Johnston meant to abandon Atlanta. Georgia Governor Joe Brown had written Richmond a few weeks earlier: "This place is to the Confederacy what the heart is to the body. We must hold it."

Johnston was at a loss. His only hope of inflicting serious injury on the mighty Federal army before him was for Sherman to throw it at strong rebel defenses, where the masses of Union infantry would be cut to pieces. Sherman's limited and unsuccessful experiment at Kennesaw Mountain made it very unlikely that he would repeat that blunder.

Johnston thought that the best plan was for Morgan or Forrest to cut Sherman's rail lifeline, forcing the Yankees to either attack at a disadvantage or withdraw before they starved. Johnston felt that Wheeler could not be spared for such a raid, since cavalry was needed to keep an eye on Sherman's movements and provide a mobile reaction force to respond to Federal probes. The problem was that neither Morgan nor Forrest were in any position to help, though for entirely different reasons.

Morgan had basically shot his bolt for good during his bungled raid into Kentucky, and Richmond wasn't inclined to trust him to try anything like it again even when the situation was becoming desperate. As far as Forrest went, Confederate intelligence knew that A.J. Smith's three divisions had returned to Memphis from the Red River campaign, and were now on the move, their intent and destination unknown. Forrest's commander, Stephen Lee, not only insisted to Richmond that Forrest couldn't be spared, but wanted to get back some of the troops the late General Polk had brought to Johnston's army.

Simply put, the Confederacy was now scraping the bottom of the barrel while the Union's seemingly endless resources were mobilized against the South along all major fronts. Yankee trains continued to run down the track from Tennessee towards Atlanta without interference; if there was a wreck, the locomotive and cars were simply shoved off to one side to let others come through. Wheeler's cavalry did make pinprick raids to try to cut the railroad, but it was well protected by Federal cavalry and detachments of infantry, who were expecting such tricks and not taken unaware. What damage Wheeler's cavalrymen did was quickly repaired by the unbelievably efficient Federal railroad crews, who had rebuilt the span over the Chattahoochie in less than five days.

* Johnston could also hope that Sherman might be careless and separate his three armies too widely, inviting attack in detail. On hearing of Schofield's crossing of the Chattahoochie on 9 July, Johnston felt that Sherman had given him such an opportunity.

Johnston prepared for his counterstroke, but days passed and it didn't happen. Braxton Bragg had come to Atlanta to survey the situation and report back to Jefferson Davis. Johnston did not respect or trust Bragg, who further damaged his credibility by foolishly insisting his visit was unofficial in nature. Johnston said as little as possible to his visitor. Bragg got an earful from John Bell Hood, little of which was flattering to Johnston, and unsurprisingly Bragg's report back to Richmond indicated that Johnston would almost certainly continue his policy of falling back. On 16 July, Jefferson Davis wired Johnston to ask what the plan was for the defense of Atlanta.

All Johnston could give in response was vague generalities. The pressure to remove him was becoming overwhelming. However, despite the bad history between Johnston and Jefferson Davis, Davis was very reluctant to change commanders of an army in the middle of a crisis. The only candidate available to replace Johnston was Hood, and he was a big gamble. On 12 July, Davis had wired Robert E. Lee, asking for an opinion of Hood as a replacement for Johnston. Lee responded directly in a telegram:

   I REGRET THE FACT STATED.  IT IS A BAD TIME TO RELEASE 
   THE COMMANDER OF AN ARMY SITUATED AS THAT OF TENNESSEE.  
   WE MAY LOSE ATLANTA AND THE ARMY TOO.  HOOD IS A BOLD 
   FIGHTER.  I AM DOUBTFUL OF THE OTHER QUALITIES NECESSARY.

Hood had graduated from West Point near the bottom of his class, coming uncomfortably close to expulsion, and the severe injuries he had taken in combat had done nothing to make his thinking clearer, all the more so because he was probably taking opiates to relieve the pain. However, Davis was stuck: Atlanta couldn't be given up without a fight. There might be no way to win such a fight, but to not make the fight was equivalent to surrender, and Davis simply couldn't conceive of it. Ironically, those in his cabinet who had backed Johnston seven months previously, particularly Secretary of State Judah Benjamin, now felt betrayed and were the loudest in demanding his removal.

On the night of 17 July, Johnston got a telegram from Richmond ordering him to turn over command to General John B. Hood. Johnston wrote an emotional address to deliver to his troops and an icily scornful reply to Richmond. Hood, on receiving the news, found himself having second thoughts about taking command since Sherman seemed to have the rebel Army of the Tennessee backed up against the wall, with the Federals poised to attack immediately. The next morning, 18 July, Hood met with Lieutenant General Alexander P. Stewart, who had recently been promoted from a division in Hood's own corps to take over command of the corps of the late General Polk from General Loring. The two generals tried to talk Johnston into staying on until the Battle of Atlanta was determined, but he would have none of it, replying: "Gentlemen, I am a soldier. A soldier's first duty is to obey."

When Hood and Stewart met General Hardee, the three of them sent a telegram to Jefferson Davis asking that the change in command be postponed. Davis replied quickly, saying bluntly that he hadn't wanted to make such a decision in the first place, had only done so because the necessity seemed so obvious, and wasn't about to change it. Hood went back to Johnston and tried to prevail on him to stay and help. Hood claimed that Johnston agreed to assist, but whatever the case Johnston went into Atlanta and took a train to Macon, Georgia.

Johnston had read his farewell address to the men that morning. The men and officers wept. They were collectively thrown into gloom by the loss of their commander, and the general feeling was that Richmond had done Johnston a great wrong. Hardee was upset as well, not just at the loss of Johnston, but at the idea that Hood was to be his new boss. Hardee was technically senior to Hood and didn't think much of his generalship. Hardee immediately sent a request to Jefferson Davis for a transfer, saying that the fact that he had refused command six months earlier didn't mean he had renounced it for all time. Davis persuaded Hardee to withdraw the request. Other senior officers in the army were just as doubtful of Hood. Pat Cleburne said: "We are going to carry the war to Africa, but I fear we will not be as successful as Scipio was."

* The news was printed in an Atlanta newspaper that day, 18 August, and a copy of that newspaper was in Sherman's hands the following morning, courtesy of a spy. Both McPherson and Schofield had been classmates of Hood's at West Point, and in fact Schofield had tutored Hood in mathematics, preventing him from washing out. Schofield warned Sherman: "He'll hit you like hell, now, before you know it."

Sherman hardly needed the advice, having put his forces on alert to prepare for an attack, but he was far from intimidated. A Federal officer from Kentucky who had known Hood in the prewar Army related that he had watched Hood play poker: "I seed Hood bet $2,500, with nary a pair in his hand." That was how Sherman sized up Hood as well. There would be hard fighting now, but what of it? The rebels would come out on the short end of that contest, shattering themselves against superior Union might. Sherman described Richmond's decision as having "rendered us most valuable service."

BACK_TO_TOP

[76.3] SMITH IN NORTHERN MISSISSIPPI

* To the west, in Mississippi, Stephen Lee's fears over Federal intentions in his domain had proven well-founded. General Cadwallader C. Washburn, Lee's Federal opposite number in Memphis, had taken Sherman's order to "follow Forrest to the death" to heart and dispatched A.J. Smith to do the job. Smith's three divisions were reinforced by Grierson's cavalry division and Bouton's brigade of black troops, both of whom had scores to settle with Forrest from the fiasco at Brice's Crossroads in June.

This gave Smith a force of 14,200 men in total, supported by six batteries of artillery and supplied with rations for twenty days. They moved out on 5 July, cutting a swathe of destruction through northern Mississippi as they advanced. Forrest's scouts were impressed with Smith's professionalism, reporting that they found "his column well closed up, his wagon train well protected, and his flanks covered in an admirable manner."

Forrest had about 6,000 troops, reinforced to about 8,000 when Stephen Lee rode in to take charge. Lee was in a hurry to deal with Smith, since reports were trickling in that Union General Canby was preparing to advance on Mobile, Alabama from New Orleans. The rebels were completely outnumbered by an adversary who they were not very likely to surprise or panic, and all they could do was harass the rear of Smith's march. By the evening of 13 July the Federals were in Harrisburg, just outside of Tupelo, where they settled in for the night, setting up stout defenses in expectation of a rebel attack.

Forrest was actually pleased to hear this, since he knew that Smith didn't have indefinite supplies and would eventually have to pull out, making the Federal column vulnerable to the sort of running, harrying, exhausting attack that Forrest had refined to an art. Stephen Lee liked the notion, too, but he had to consider the threat to Mobile as well, and that meant dealing with the Federals immediately. Although Forrest objected, Lee ordered an assault at dawn. The Yankees were well set up and professional, but Lee hoped that surprise and energy would compensate.

The attack demonstrated neither. After the sun came up on 14 July, there were delays and confusion, and the assault didn't jump off until 07:30 AM. Even then it was done piecemeal, with the only result of piling up dead and wounded rebels. In midmorning Lee decided enough was enough, and called a halt to the attacks. He had lost about 1,326 men to Smith's 674 casualties. Shooting continued in an idle fashion the next morning, 15 July. At midday, Smith learned that most of the meat in his wagon train had spoiled and that he was low on ammunition; he decided immediately to pull out. His troops burned Harrisburg as they withdrew and marched back north the way they came, in the same tight and tidy order that had characterized their march south.

When they set up camp that evening five miles (eight kilometers) to the north, Forrest attacked in an attempt to put the "skeer" into them, but the Federals didn't take fright. They not only drove off his troopers but put a bullet into his foot, forcing him to give up command and seek medical attention. These weren't the same Yankees he had run circles around in the past.

Smith continued his withdrawal the next day, making arrangements for a supply train to meet him on the march. The Federals were back in Tennessee on 21 July. Smith and Washburn were both pleased with the results of the expedition, since for the first time the Yankees had taken on Forrest, done him far more damage than he had done them, and returned in good order.

Sherman was not at all pleased: he didn't want Forrest bloodied, he wanted him put into a pine box. As long as Forrest was alive and capable of raising hell, Sherman's supply lines in middle Tennessee and the whole Atlanta campaign were at risk. Smith unhappily swallowed Sherman's reprimands and threw himself into planning a second excursion into northern Mississippi that would deal with Forrest once and for all.

BACK_TO_TOP

[76.4] THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA

* Confederate General John Bell Hood was an uncomplicated man who liked to fight. His superiors had selected him to command the Army of the Tennessee on that basis, and under those circumstances it was unsurprising that he decided to fight after only a day in his new position. He called a council of war with his corps commanders -- Hardee, Alexander Stewart, and Ben Cheatham, who had taken Hood's place at the head of his corps -- and instructed them to take the offensive at 1:00 PM the next day.

Union Generals Schofield and McPherson and their armies were moving on Decatur, Georgia, 5 miles (8 kilometers) to the east of Atlanta, with Schofield on the northern side of the drive and McPherson on the southern. In the meantime, George Thomas was moving his army across Peachtree Creek, 4 miles (6.4 kilometers) to the north of the city. Sherman was now moving to encircle Atlanta, and Hood thought he had a chance to catch the Union forces separated, strung out, and vulnerable. Cheatham, braced by Wheeler's cavalry, would perform a holding action on McPherson and Schofield to the east, while the other two corps drove north to hit Thomas as hard as possible.

For whatever reason, Hood ordered that the assault begin at the late hour of 1:00 PM on 20 July, but it actually went forward at 3:00 PM. The delay was disastrous. Old Slow Trot Thomas had all his people across Peachtree Creek, and they were already partly dug into defenses that made the best use of terrain. The Yankees were actually taken off guard, with some regiments running off toward the rear in disorder, but the Federals quickly rallied and stood fast. Hardee's push was thrown back, as was Stewart's just to the west. Hardee was going to commit Pat Cleburne's division, but Hood ordered that reinforcements be sent over to help Cheatham, whose "holding action" wasn't going well. Cleburne took his men over to brace up the defense to the east, and the battle flared along both the northern and eastern sectors until darkness put a stop to it.

The fighting had been hot enough to even get Pap Thomas excited for a while, but the "Battle of Peachtree Creek", or "Hood's First Sortie", was a flat failure for the Confederates, with Hood losing 2,500 men to Union casualties of 1,600. This would have been bad enough had the two armies been more equal, but the casualties inflicted on the bigger Union force were hardly enough to make them slow down. Hood blamed the fiasco on Hardee, complaining that Hardee had moved slowly and timidly, with Hood citing the much greater losses of Stewart's corps as proof.

* Fighting continued on the next day, 21 July, with Cheatham and Cleburne on the defensive, trying to hold back intense pressure from McPherson and Schofield to the east. Cleburne found McPherson's rifled artillery particularly accurate and deadly. However, that morning Wheeler's cavalry had detected that McPherson's southern flank was unguarded, and Hood eagerly jumped at the opportunity to stage a second Chancellorsville, with Hood playing the role of Stonewall Jackson.

In any case, Sherman was pushing Hood so very hard that his only choice was to hit the Yankees or withdraw from the city. Hood did pull his troops back that evening to defenses on the outskirts of Atlanta, prepared at Joe Johnston's order weeks before, but also ordered Hardee to take his corps on a night march through Atlanta and then on a loop south of the city that would finally end up on McPherson's flank. Hood had swallowed his reservations about Hardee for the moment.

Cleburne's division would join the three divisions of Hardee's corps to lend more power to the flanking attack. In the meantime, Wheeler's cavalry would destroy McPherson's wagon train, parked near Decatur, and if Hardee's attack were successful, both Stewart and Cheatham would sally out of their entrenchments to assist in the destruction of McPherson's army and prevent him from receiving assistance from other Union forces.

The flanking attack was supposed to take place at dawn on 22 July, but Hood's rearrangements of the rebel Army of the Tennessee were complicated to begin with, and his troops had been thoroughly worn out by days of hard fighting in the hot July sun. The assault didn't get off until about 12:30 PM, and immediately ran into trouble.

If McPherson's flank had been completely unprotected the morning before, it wasn't now. McPherson had detached a two-division corps under Major General Grenville Dodge to protect his flank. As luck would have it, Dodge was right in the path of Hardee's push, and set up a three-deep fighting line. The rebels weren't expecting to run into Yankees just yet, and the landscape was so covered with brush that they weren't aware of Dodge's defensive line until they emerged into the open to run into heavy volleys of rifle fire. Hardee's three divisions were stopped in their tracks, with one of the division commanders, Major General William H.T. Walker, shot off his horse and killed before he knew what was going on. The rebels tried to rally and attack again, to no better result.

Only Cleburne's Arkansas division found the way clear, and immediately exploited the opportunity with their accustomed aggressiveness by falling on the flank of Frank Blair's division. McPherson was conferring with Sherman at a house in the rear when the shooting broke out, and the younger man immediately jumped on his horse to find out what was going on, followed by his staff. McPherson quickly realized that Dodge was holding fast, and so he went on to Blair's division to see what was happening.

He found out the hard way. Cleburne's troops had forced Blair's division back, driving a wedge between Blair and Dodge, and were pushing hard into the gap. By bad luck, McPherson ran into a group of Cleburne's men. He cool tipped his hat to them, and then tried to gallop off to escape. They shot him through his chest, knocking him off his horse. He lingered for a time and then died. He was 35 years old.

Sherman received news that McPherson's horse had come riderless out of the woods. He ordered Black Jack Logan to take over command and deal with Cleburne's men. Sherman also sent a division from Schofield to deal with Wheeler's attack on McPherson's wagon train, but sent no other reinforcements. Sherman would be criticised for this after the battle, and also for not ordering Thomas and Schofield to push on the hollowed-out Atlanta defenses. Swallowing his irritation at rear-area strategists who had little idea of what a battle was like, he simply replied that he felt McPherson's men could hold their own, and besides they had something to prove to the insolent rebels who had killed their popular commander.

Logan might have been a politician turned general but he had warrior's instincts. He rallied his men to hold, then made counterdrives that pushed the rebels back with heavy casualties. The Federals quickly recovered McPherson's corpse. The Yankees fought with determination, chanting "BLACK JACK! BLACK JACK!" as they moved against the rebels, totally intent on crushing them.

At about 3:30 PM, Hood ordered Cheatham to attack. His troops made some progress at first, denting the Federal line, only to then be pushed right back in hard fighting. The fact of the matter was that the rebels had shot their bolt and lost the battle, though they didn't give up easily. On the southern flank of the fighting, one Alabama regiment repeatedly attacked an Iowa regiment that was protected by earthworks, with the attackers shot down in numbers with every attempt. The rebel commander, Colonel Harris D. Lampley, led a charge right up to the Yankee works, taking a wound and screaming abuse at his men for failing to follow him. The commander of the Federal regiment, a hefty fellow named Colonel William W. Belknap, simply reached over the breastworks, a bullet tearing through his beard, snatched Lampley by the collar, and hauled him inside. Belknap roared angrily at Lampley: "LOOK AT YOUR MEN! THEY ARE ALL DEAD! WHAT ARE YOU CURSING THEM FOR?!"

The fighting finally faded out in the dark. The next day, 23 July, the two wounded armies faced each other, with little inclination to renew the fight for the moment. That night, Hardee withdrew back into the Atlanta defenses.

The "Battle of Atlanta" or "Hood's Second Sortie" was an even bigger disaster than Hood's first go at Sherman, with the rebels losing about 8,000 men to about 3,700 Yankees. Cleburne had lost 40% of his troops. The attack might have actually succeeded had Dodge's corps not been in the right place at the right time, but war is a contest of both luck and skill, and Hood was simply not very lucky. He refused to admit that he had been defeated, claiming a "partial success" and insisting that the battle had done much to improve morale. Sometimes it seemed that Hood regarded high casualties in and of themselves as a positive virtue.

Almost everyone was shocked by the death of the charismatic McPherson. Even Hood was shaken at the killing of his old schoolmate. Sherman, an emotional man, was in tears. Like a cliche in a war story, McPherson had been trying to find an opportunity to take leave and get married, and Sherman wrote the bereaved woman an effusive letter about their "dead hero" and "that bright particular star." Later, he would write about McPherson in a more characteristic style: "I expected something to happen to Grant and me; either the rebels or the newspapers would kill us both, and I looked to McPherson as the man to follow us and finish the war."

* McPherson was gone and now Sherman had to consider the dead general's replacement for command of the Union Army of the Tennessee. Although Black Jack Logan looked like the prime candidate and was respected for both his leadership and fighting spirit, the unassertive Thomas told Sherman that he would not be able to work well with the over-assertive Logan, and suggested that an officer with a professional background would be more appropriate. Sherman agreed to that extent, saying that politicians in uniform tended to be excessively interested in covering themselves with glory to further their political careers. In fact, other officers found Logan to have an annoying flair for the dramatic, one saying that he "always played to the gallery." Sherman asked Thomas to suggest a candidate, and Thomas suggested one-armed Major General Oliver Otis Howard instead.

Howard was certainly professional, though he was very sanctimonious; the rough Westerners called him "Old Prayer Book". Furthermore, his command of "Dutchman" back east had been marked largely by disasters and routs. Sherman worried that appointing Howard would make Logan "mad as hell", but then went ahead and did it anyway.

Logan was upset though he kept a lid on it, but it was just too much for Joe Hooker. Hooker hadn't even been a candidate for the job; however, he felt with some reason that Howard's Dutchmen had caused his defeat at Chancellorsville and had a low opinion of him -- while Hooker of course had a high opinion of himself and technically ranked Howard. Hooker described the appointment as "an insult to my rank and services" -- and immediately submitted his resignation. Few of Hooker's peers liked him, and Sherman was a person of strong likes and dislikes. Thomas cheerfully forwarded the resignation to Sherman, and Sherman accepted the resignation without hesitation, no doubt thinking that his decision to assign Howard to the command was already paying highly satisfying dividends.

Hooker was actually very popular with his own men, and some of them wept bitterly on hearing the news of his departure. He went north to a non-combat command and out of the war for good. To grind in the indignity, Hooker was replaced in command of his old corps by Major General Henry W. Slocum. Slocum was another one of Hooker's long-standing enemies. The feelings between them were so bitter that Slocum had been transferred to Vicksburg before the beginning of the Atlanta campaign just to keep the two from each other's throats.

* Now Sherman strengthened his grip on Atlanta. His railroad was pouring war materials into a forward base just behind Thomas's lines. The next move was obvious. The Yankees held the rail line to the north, they had torn up the tracks to the east, and Atlanta's only lifeline was now the rail connection leaving the city from the southwest, the Macon & Western. Even this line wasn't fully operational. Outside the city, it split into branches, one going west to connect to Montgomery and Mobile, and the other splitting off to go east to Savannah. A Federal cavalry force of 2,500 troopers under Major General Lovell Rousseau had ranged through Alabama the week before and put the western connection out of business.

All that was left to cut was the last connection to Savannah. The plan was straightforward: Howard would shift his army behind Schofield and Thomas in a westward arc around the city, with the other two armies following behind. Sherman's cavalry would play an independent role in this move, with two columns riding to the southwest of the city to cut the railroad.

One column of 3,500 cavalry was under Brigadier General Edward McCook, while the other consisted of 6,500 troopers under Stoneman, including Garrard's division of 4,300. Stoneman wanted to extend the raid to free Union prisoners at Macon and Andersonville, and Sherman granted him permission, though on the condition that Garrard's force not be included in the extension of the raid.

The big move jumped off on the morning of 27 July. Schofield and Thomas demonstrated fiercely to keep up the pressure on Hood in Atlanta, while Howard took the Army of the Tennessee on its arc around the rear. Federal shells dropped on Atlanta and its defenses, while the two columns of cavalry set off across the country.

The cavalry raid quickly ran into trouble. Joe Wheeler only had 6,000 cavalry in eight brigades to oppose 10,000 Federal troopers, but the Yankees were split in two, inviting attack in detail. Furthermore, politicians in uniform weren't the only ones who had an excessive interest in covering themselves in glory. Stoneman had become so fixated on the headlines and medals he would win for freeing thousands of Union prisoners that the actual goal of the raid, to cut the rail connection to Savannah, became a second priority at best.

Knowing that Garrard's cavalry division couldn't accompany him on this ride to glory, Stoneman ordered Garrard to take his troopers due south, while Stoneman took the remaining three brigades to the southeast. Now there were three separated columns, not just two, and Wheeler was quick to exploit the opportunity. Garrard ran into Wheeler's entire force and was thoroughly spooked, taking his men back to Federal lines as fast as they could ride. Recognizing Garrard's movement as the diversion it was, Wheeler ordered one of his eight brigades to pursue and keep Garrard running. Wheeler ordered three other brigades to chase Stoneman, and then led the remaining four brigades to fall on McCook.

McCook had been tearing up track to the east of Jonesboro and was riding back to Union lines when Wheeler jumped his force and surrounded it. The Federals managed to break out, with heavy losses. McCook made it back to Union lines on 30 July, less 950 of his men, his pack train, and two guns. Although McCook had destroyed a large Confederate wagon train, the damage to the railroad was minimal and quickly repaired.

On that same day, Stoneman was poking at Macon, finding it defended by local militia. While he was considering how to deal with that obstacle, the three brigades sent by Wheeler fell on him and forced him to flee. He decided to make a stand with one of his brigades while the other two tried to get away. The rearguard brigade was gobbled up wholesale, with many of the 700 men taken prisoner, including Stoneman. One of the other two brigades managed to get back to Union lines, but Wheeler caught up with the other at Jug Tavern on 3 August and crushed it as well. Stoneman ended up in prison in Macon, in need of rescue himself. Sherman wired Washington:

   ON THE WHOLE, THE CAVALRY RAID IS NOT DEEMED A SUCCESS.

Black Jack Logan's troops were leading the advance. Logan's force consisted of his corps, reinforced by a division from Grenville Dodge's corps, Dodge himself having been grazed on the forehead by a bullet the week before and out of the fighting for the time being. Howard, expecting trouble, told Logan to halt near a rural chapel named Ezra Church and have his men throw up a breastwork of logs as fast as they possibly could. The soldiers even stripped out the pews of the church to help built their defenses.

Howard's assessment of Hood was absolutely correct. Hood planned to set up his old corps -- now under Stephen D. Lee, who had been promoted to lieutenant general and brought from Mississippi to take over for Cheatham -- in the Federal line of march to perform a holding action, while Stewart took his corps and circled around for a flank attack on Howard from the southwest. Hardee would remain in the Atlanta defenses to block any push by Thomas or Schofield into the city's defenses. Hardee's corps had been reduced by a division, the cut-up brigades of the late Walker's division having been parceled out to the other three divisions in the corps.

Howard's army had been moving rapidly, and Lee found the Yankees coming on before his own corps had found time to dig in. Lee didn't want to run, didn't want to stay there and be overrun, and so he took the only option he had left, ordering his three divisions to charge the Federals. It is possible that this might have worked had the Federals been taken by surprise, but they were even more alert than they had been on 22 July. Logan's hastily-built breastworks were solid enough to stop Lee's charge cold and throw the rebels back with heavy losses. Sherman heard the sounds of firing and said: "Logan is feeling for them, and I guess he has found them."

When a messenger arrived to give more details, Sherman was delighted, replying excitedly in a singsong: "Just what I wanted! Tell Howard to invite them to attack! It will save us trouble! Save us trouble! They'll only beat their brains out! Beat their brains out!" Sherman was absolutely correct. Lee tried again, repeatedly, only to find stronger defenses and more Yankees with every attempt. A Union soldier wrote later: "Each attack was less vigorous and had less chance than the one before it."

Stewart, realizing that Lee would probably be crushed before a flank attack could be launched, came to Lee's assistance. Stewart managed to get one division into the fight before nightfall put an end to the shooting, with little result other than to increase rebel casualties. Hardee had arrived by that time, having been ordered by Hood to go out and take charge personally while Cheatham took command of the troops in the Atlanta defenses.

All Hardee could do was deal with the flood of casualties. The rebels had lost 5,000 men to Howard's 600 casualties. Hardee found his troops totally demoralized by the botched assault. During the night, one Federal called out across the lines: "Say, Johnny, how many of you are there left?" A rebel soldier replied: "Oh, about enough for another killing."

Hood no longer had the resources to think he could defeat Sherman and his troops, who were thoroughly canny opponents in any case. Despite the fact that the "Battle of Ezra Church" or "Hood's Third Sortie" had been an unarguable, one-sided Union victory, Sherman wasn't going to take the chance that Hood might get lucky with another one of his rash assaults, and the failure of Union cavalry probes to cut off Atlanta had made Sherman cautious. Sherman decided to move methodically and tighten his grip around Atlanta by degrees. After all, it wasn't like the city was going anywhere.

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