v1.4.1 / chapter 7 of 19 / 01 mar 08 / greg goebel / public domain
* The usefulness of robot aircraft for reconnaissance was demonstrated in Vietnam. At the same time, early steps were being taken to use them in active combat at sea and on land, but battlefield UAVs would not come into their own until the 1980s. This chapter covers early US efforts to acquire a battlefield UAV capability.
* UAVs, such as the Northrop Falconer, had been developed for battlefield reconnaissance beginning in the 1950s, but these machines saw little or no combat service. As discussed later, the Israelis pioneered the operational use of battlefield UAVs in the early 1980s, during their misadventures in southern Lebanon. Very few of the technologies they used were all that new, but the Israelis finally achieved the proper formula for operational success, using their battlefield UAVs to help destroy Syrian SAM sites and assist in other combat operations.
With the successes of UAVs in southern Lebanon, international interest in battlefield UAVs picked up significantly. During the 1980s, all the major military powers and many of the minor ones acquired a battlefield UAV capability, and UAVs are now an essential component of any modern army. These battlefield UAVs fall into two broad categories, which can be designated for convenience as "combat surveillance" and "tactical reconnaissance" UAVs.
The function of a combat surveillance UAV is to observe events on a battlefield in real time, orbiting over the battle area and relaying intelligence to a ground control station. Such machines are generally powered by small rotary or two-stroke piston "chain saw" engines.
They are guided by an autopilot system with RC backup. The autopilot directs the aircraft from sets of waypoints programmed in before takeoff, with the program set up by displaying a map on a workstation, clicking on the desired map coordinates with a mouse, and then downloading the program into the UAV. Navigation is often verified by a GPS-INS navigation system. Combat surveillance UAVs usually use the autopilot to get to the operating area, with the aircraft then operating by radio control to find targets of opportunity. The need to stay within radio range restricts combat surveillance UAVs to ranges within a line-of-sight of the transmitter. This is usually the determining factor in "range" specifications for such UAVs. For this reason, "endurance" is a more useful specification than "range".
The UAV sensors are generally housed in a turret underneath the aircraft, and almost always feature day-night imagers. The turret may also include a laser designator to allow the UAV to mark targets for smart weapons. Other specialized payloads, such as SIGINT packages, or new lightweight "synthetic aperture radar (SAR)" sensors with all-weather imaging capability, are now being fielded as well.
Larger combat surveillance UAVs have landing gear, usually fixed, and can take off and land on an unimproved airstrip, with an arresting hook to snag a cable for short landings. Such UAVs may also be launched by a RATO booster, and recovered by parachute, parasail, or by flying into a net. Smaller combat surveillance UAVs may be launched with a pneumatic, hydraulic, or electric catapult, with the very smallest launched by an elastic-bungee catapult.
* The tactical reconnaissance UAV is usually larger, jet powered, with longer range and higher speed. Like a combat surveillance UAV, it has an autopilot with radio control backup, but it relies more on the autopilot than on radio control, since its primary mission is to fly over predesignated targets out of line of sight, take pictures, and then come home. The tactical reconnaissance UAV will usually not loiter over the battle area, and real-time intelligence is less essential. A tactical reconnaissance UAV usually carries day-night reconnaissance cameras instead of a sensor turret, though SAR can be carried as well. They are generally launched by RATO booster and recovered by parachute, though they can be launched from aircraft as well.
The dividing line between combat surveillance and tactical reconnaissance UAVs, as well as between them and other classes of UAVs, is fuzzy. Some types of UAV may be usable for both missions. The distinction between a combat surveillance UAV and some kinds of "endurance" UAVs, discussed later, and between a tactical reconnaissance and a strategic reconnaissance UAV, as discussed earlier, is also very thin.
In some cases, cheaper UAVs may be used for "expendable" missions. Such expendable missions might involve carrying a jammer payload into an enemy's operational area to disrupt radar and communications, or even being fitted with a radar seeker and a warhead to attack enemy radars. Such an "attack drone" or "harassment UAV" now becomes difficult to logically distinguish from a cruise missile.
* The first operational battlefield UAV developed by the US military was for antisubmarine warfare (ASW). In the early 1960s, the US Navy obtained a small "Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter (DASH)" that could fly off a frigate or destroyer to carry homing torpedoes or nuclear depth charges for attacks on enemy submarines that were out of range of the ship's other weapons. This was a relatively simple requirement, involving a neatly defined mission in a combat environment where presumably nobody would be shooting back at the drone, and it seemed achievable with the technology of the time.
Gyrodyne Company of Long Island, New York, was awarded the contract to build DASH, with the design based on a one-man helicopter the company had already developed, the "YRON-1". The initial DASH demonstration prototype, designated the "DSN-1", was powered by a Porsche flat-four piston engine with 54 kW (72 HP); nine prototypes were built. Initial flights were in the summer of 1961, at first with a pilot on board, leading up to an unpiloted helicopter flight in August 1961.
A second-generation prototype, the "DSN-2", was powered by two Porsche engines, each with 64.5 kW (86 HP). Three such drones were built, leading to the production DASH, the "DSN-3", which was powered by a Boeing T50-BO-8A turboshaft engine with 225 kW (300 SHP). First flight of the DSN-3 was also in the summer of 1961.
* The US military services adopted a common aircraft designation scheme in 1962, and the DASH variants were given new designations. The DSN-1 became the "QH-50A", the DSN-2 became the "QH-50B", and the DSN-3 became the "QH-50C". The general configuration of three variants was similar, though the QH-50C was scaled up, with an empty weight almost twice that of the QH-50A. The QH-50C was an ugly little machine reminiscent of an insect. It had a frame made of steel tubing, with all machinery directly accessible, and stood on twin skids, with one or two homing torpedoes or nuclear depth charges carried between the skids. It had a coaxial rotor system and a dropdown inverted vee tail; it was said to be the only American-built full production coaxial helicopter ever built.
The QH-50C had a height of 2.96 meters (9 feet 8 inches), a rotor diameter of 6.1 meters (20 feet), and an empty weight of 500 kilograms (1,100 pounds). It was guided solely by radio control, and had neither sensors nor autonomous navigation capability. Combat radius was a modest 54 kilometers (33 miles), which was adequate for its mission. Greater range would not have been very useful, since the DASH flew at low altitude and used a line-of-sight communications link, limiting its range in any case.
The US Navy originally ordered 900 QH-50Cs, but the machine suffered from reliability problems and poor operator training, with a quarter of the first batch of 100 lost in crashes. The order was cut to a little over 500, with final production being the "QH-50D" variant, with an uprated engine providing 274 kW (365 SHP), fiberglass rotors, and increased fuel capacity. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force also bought a small batch of 16 DASHes in 1968.
* The career of the DASH was undistinguished, but it was one of the first drones ever used in a strictly tactical environment, and pointed the way to the future. A small number of DASHes were given reconnaissance gear and used for naval gunnery spotting over the Gulf of Tonkin in the late 1960s in a project codenamed SNOOPY.
In the early 1970s the Air Force evaluated the QH-50D for a battlefield drone test program codenamed NITE GAZELLE. NITE GAZELLE experimented with using drones to drop bomblets and carry machine guns, but details are unclear, as are reports that the DASH was used in other evaluations as a countermeasures platform. Surviving DASH drones were used as RC targets and were still operating in that role into the 1990s.
In the 1980s, Aerodyne corporation attempted to sell an updated version of the DASH, designated the "CH-84 Pegasus", with an Allison 250-C20F turboshaft engine and updated electronics. While it appears the Pegasus was not a success, the DASH was resurrected once again in the 1990s by the German Dornier company, now part of DaimlerChrysler, for the "SEAMOS" naval UAV.
SEAMOS owed much to DASH, and in fact a modified QH-50D was used as the SEAMOS demonstrator prototype. Like the original DASH, SEAMOS was a coaxial-rotor drone helicopter with twin landing skids, though it was unsurprisingly a more refined system, and in particular even had a real fuselage. SEAMOS was powered by an Allison 250-C20W turboshaft engine with 315 kW (420 SHP). SEAMOS flight tests were performed with the technology demonstrator in 1991, leading to a production contract in 1996 and flight tests of a true prototype in 1999.
Service introduction was expected in 2005, but the program was cancelled in early 2003, SEAMOS having been judged "overdesigned and too expensive". The German government put out a request for an off-the-shelf solution, sensibly stating specifications in line with a machine that they could afford. The EADS Orka 1200, discussed later, is the prime candidate.
* Despite the early American work on battlefield UAVs such as the DASH, the US was something of a laggard in the adoption of the technology, and were heavily influenced by the Israelis. After the destruction of the US Marines barracks in Beruit, Lebanon, by a car bomb in October 1983, killing 241 American troops, Marine Corps General P.X. Kelley visited Lebanon in secret to investigate the incident. After the visit, Kelley met with Israeli military officials in Tel Aviv.
The Israelis showed Kelley a videotape, taken from an Israeli battlefield UAV, showing him walking outside in Tel Aviv, locked in the crosshairs of the UAV's video camera. Kelley was impressed: "I have to buy myself one of those!" The Israelis had also informed the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vesey JR, of the success of Israeli UAVs and decoys in Lebanon.
The US Navy had also suffered an embarrassment in Lebanon, in a botched airstrike on Syrian air defenses in December 1983 that cost the service two aircraft. US Navy Secretary John Lehman assessed the incident, and concluded that the strike could have actually been performed by the 41 centimeter (16 inch) guns on the battleship USS NEW JERSEY, then off the Lebanon coast, if there had been some way to spot targets for the warship.
A piloted aircraft would have been very vulnerable to anti-aircraft defenses, but a UAV could do the job, and within days the US Navy was trying to obtain an Israeli Mazlat "Mastiff" battlefield UAV. The Israelis jumped at the opportunity. In early 1984, the Marines left Lebanon, but in March of that year the Israelis demonstrated a Mastiff to the US Navy, landing it on the assault helicopter carrier USS GUAM while the vessel was off the coast of Israel. By September 1984, the US Marines were operating a Mastiff at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The deal was put together in such haste that all the operating manuals were still in Hebrew.
Even before this, in August, Navy Secretary Lehman had initiated a competition for fast-track delivery of a UAV to the US Navy. The Navy wanted something fast, but it needed better range and endurance than the Mastiff, as well as a secure datalink. The competition was formally initiated a year later, in August 1985. There were a number of participants, but the winner was the Israeli Mazlat firm, working with their US partner, AAI of Maryland. They proposed the "Pioneer" battlefield UAV, which was an improved version of an existing Israeli UAV, the Mazlat "Scout". Initial deliveries of the Pioneer began in 1986.
Although battlefield UAVs tend to vary a great deal in configuration, the
Pioneer could be considered to be a good representative of the class, with
later battlefield UAVs having many of the same features. The Pioneer
featured fixed tricycle landing gear, a twin-boom tail configuration, and a
pusher propeller. It was fitted with a sensor turret under the fuselage and
was powered by a 19.5 kW (26 HP) two-stroke two-cylinder piston engine.
MAZLAT / AAI RQ-2A PIONEER:
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spec metric english
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wingspan 5.15 meters 16 feet 11 inches
length 4.26 meters 14 feet
height 1 meter 3 feet 3 inches
payload 45 kilograms 100 pounds
launch weight 190 kilograms 419 pounds
maximum speed 185 KPH 115 MPH / 100 KT
service ceiling 4,575 meters 15,000 feet
endurance > 6 hours
launch scheme RATO, pneumatic catapult, or runway.
recovery scheme Net or runway landing with hook.
payload Day / night imager.
guidance system Programmable with radio control backup.
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
The Pioneer received extensive evaluation in military field exercises. It
was operated from ground sites, as well as from naval vessels such as the
battleship USS IOWA. A total of nine UAV systems, each with eight aircraft
and associated ground control facilities, were obtained by the Navy and
Marine Corps. The US Army also obtained a number of Pioneer systems, but
handed their Pioneers over to the US Marines in 1995.
Pioneer performed its first operational missions during the Persian Gulf convoy escort effort in the late 1980s. During the Gulf War, Pioneers proved valuable intelligence assets for the US Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. The Pioneers flew a total of 533 sorties against the Iraqis. Of forty UAVs sent into combat, twelve were lost and many others were damaged. One of the famous stories of the Gulf War is an incident where Iraqi soldiers attempted to surrender to a Pioneer.
The Pioneer has seen service with the Marines in later operations, supporting the ill-fated US intervention in Somalia, as well as peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. The UAV received the formal designation of "RQ-2A" in 1997.
It is unclear if it was used during the American intervention in Afghanistan in 2001:2002, but 16 USMC Pioneer drones were used during the US invasion of Iraq during the spring of 2003 in support of the 1st Marine Division. These Pioneers featured an improved sensor payload with a new FLIR and a color camera, and they saw extensive use in the post-invasion insurgent fighting in and around the town of Faluja. However, by that time the USMC's Pioneer fleet was very elderly, and in early 2007 the service decided to adopt the Shadow 200, used by the US Army and discussed later, to replace the Pioneer.
* During the Gulf War, the US Marines also used about 60 cheap battlefield mini-UAVs, the "BQM-174 Exdrone (Expendable Drone)", that were fitted with simple TV camera payloads for battlefield reconnaissance.
The Exdrone was built by BAI Aerosystems of Maryland. It was mostly made of styrofoam, balsa wood, and plastics, and was powered by a chainsaw engine. It was a "symmetrical delta", meaning it didn't matter if it flew rightside-up or upside-down, allowing it to offer some protection to its payload when necessary. More details on the Exdrone and its descendant, the "Dragon Drone", are discussed later.
* A very small UAV was also tested operationally during the war. The "FQM-151A Pointer", was designed by AeroVironment Incorporated, which is run by Paul McCready, famous for such pioneering aircraft as the human-powered Gossamer Condor and a robotic flying pterodactyl replica. The Pointer was developed with company funds, with the US Army and Marine Corps obtaining a total of about 50 beginning in 1990.
The radio-controlled Pointer was built mostly of high-impact Kevlar. It
resembled a hobbyist's RC sailplane with a small engine added, with the wing
standing up above the fuselage on a pylon and a pusher propeller on the wing
behind the pylon. A lithium battery pack powered the UAV's compact electric
motor to drive the propeller. The little Pointer was hand-launched. It was
recovered simply by putting it into a flat spin, allowing it to flutter down
to the ground.
AEROVIRONMENT POINTER:
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spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 2.74 meters 9 feet
length 1.83 meters 6 feet
max loaded weight 4.1 kilograms 9 pounds
maximum speed 73 KPH 46 MPH / 40 KT
service ceiling 300 meters 1,000 feet
endurance 1 hour
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
The Pointer carried a CCD camera fixed in its nose, meaning it had to be
directly pointed at its target to see it, which is how the machine got its
name. The CCD camera had a resolution of 360 x 380 pixels and a viewing
aperture of 22 x 30 degrees. Video could be fed back to the ground station
by radio or fiber-optic link.
The ground station recorded flight imagery on an eight-millimeter video cassette recorder. Digital compass headings were superimposed on the imagery and the controller could add verbal comments. The imagery could be inspected with normal, freeze-frame, fast, or slow-motion replay. The aircraft system and the ground control station were carried in separate backpacks. It required a pilot and an observer. Pointers in US military service were later upgraded with a GPS-INS capability.
The Pointer remains in use, having seen action during the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001:2002 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Aerovironment has introduced a second-generation Pointer, the "Pointer Upgraded Mission Ability (PUMA)", generally similar in configuration to the original but with twice the endurance, as well as a more sophisticated daylight camera / infrared imager system. It leveraged off the avionics developed for the smaller Aerovironment Raven UAV, discussed later. Aerovironment also developed an "Aqua PUMA", which is basically a watertight Puma that can set down on the water for recovery.
* Although the US Navy and Marines did adopt the Pioneer UAV, the US Army's efforts to develop a battlefield UAV led to a series of embarrassments. The Army is said to have the least effective procurement bureaucracy of all the US armed services, and two decades of fumbling seems to bear that judgement out.
The modern history of the Army's battlefield drone efforts actually began in 1973, when DARPA began a program called PRAERIE, which tested a UAV with a TV camera and a laser target designator. PRAIRIE was able to target a truck and guide a laser-guided bomb onto it. DARPA does not have a charter to build operational systems and passed the concept on to the Army, which decided to proceed with the next phase of development. Ford Aerospace had implemented PRAIRIE, but the Army put the follow-on effort up for bid, and Lockheed was the low bidder.
The "MQM-105 Aquila" was a tailless aircraft, driven by a 17.9 kW (24 HP)
piston engine with a pusher propeller, and carrying a FLIR imager in a turret
in the belly. The Aquila was catapult launched and recovered by flying into
a net, with an emergency parachute backup recovery system. Initial flight of
a demonstrator was in 1975, leading to a full-scale development contract in
1979 and flight of a full prototype in 1982.
LOCKHEED AQUILA (EXTENDED RANGE VARIANT):
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spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 3.88 meters 12 feet 9 inches
length 2.08 meters 6 feet 10 inches
payload 52 kilograms 115 pounds
max loaded weight 150 kilograms 331 pounds
maximum speed 210 KPH 130 MPH / 113 KT
service ceiling 4,500 meters 14,800 feet
endurance 3 hours
launch scheme Hydraulic catapult.
recovery scheme Net or parachute.
payload Day / night imager & laser designator.
guidance system Programmable with radio control backup.
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
Lockheed also considered a variant of the Aquila named the "Altair" for
international sales, but the entire program finally collapsed of its own
weight. Lockheed didn't have Ford's experience in the domain, leading to
development problems and delays. To complicate matters considerably, the UAV
was specified as if it were a piloted aircraft, and new features were added
to the specification in an undisciplined fashion. There was also no clear
organizational owner for the project. Aquila never really met
specifications, and was finally killed off in 1987 after the expenditure of
almost a billion USD. It is said that the program still remains a source of
embarrassment to those who were involved in it.
* While the Army was floundering with the Aquila, the Air Force was going through its own struggles with the tactical UAV concept. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the USAF Flight Dynamics Laboratory, working with Teledyne Ryan, developed a piston-powered tactical UAV designated the "XBQM-26 Teleplane". A total of 23 were built, in 13 different configurations. It is unclear if there was ever any intent to adopt the XBQM-26 for operational service, since the program had a strongly experimental flavor, with the different configurations used to evaluate a wide range of possibilities for tactical UAV operations. The program ended in the mid-1980s.
However, the Air Force did conduct a program to obtain an operational tactical UAV, the "Boeing Robotic Air Vehicle (BRAVE) 200". The BRAVE 200 was intended to be used as an antiradar attack drone, a jamming platform, or for other expendable battlefield missions. The BRAVE 200 was a neat little canard machine, with a span of 2.57 meters (8 feet 5 inches), a length of 2.12 meters (6 feet 11 inches), and a launch weight of 120 kilograms (265 pounds). It was powered by a 21 kW (28 HP) two-stroke, two-cylinder piston engine, driving a pusher propeller. The BRAVE 200 had an interesting launch scheme, with 15 of the UAVs stowed in a transport "box". A drone was shoved out of its cell in the box on an arm, and then launched by a RATO booster. It was recovered by parachute if it wasn't expended on the mission.
The BRAVE 200 effort began in 1983, when the company received a USAF contract to develop an antiradar attack drone, under the designation "YCQM-121A Pave Tiger". 14 prototypes were flown in 1983 and 1984, but the program was cancelled in late 1984.
It didn't stay cancelled. In 1987, the USAF awarded Boeing a contract to develop an improved version of the drone, designated the "YGCM-121B Seek Spinner", as a loitering antiradar attack drone. The YGCM-121B was generally similar to the YCQM but heavier, with a weight of 200 kilograms (440 pounds). The Air Force also evaluated another variant in the series, designated the "CEM-138 Pave Cricket", with a jamming payload.
However, both Air Force programs were axed in 1989. Boeing continued to promote the BRAVE 200 to other customers, and also tried to sell a jet-powered drone, the "BRAVE 3000". The BRAVE 3000 resembled a small cruise missile with boxy fuselage, a straight wing that pivoted into launch configuration, cruciform tailfins, a belly fin forward of the wing, and an engine intake under the belly. The BRAVE 3000 also featured a container launch scheme, and had a launch weight of 285 kilograms (629 pounds) with RATO booster. A few prototypes were flown in the mid-1980s.
Nobody bought either the BRAVE 200 or the BRAVE 3000, and both projects were abandoned. Over a decade later, Boeing would return to the small UAV field by teaming up with the Insitu Group on the ScanEagle UAV, discussed later.
* With UAV efforts faltering, in the late 1980s the US Congress formed the "Joint Program Office (JPO)" to consolidate UAV programs. JPO was a branch of the Naval Air Systems Command, but obtained funding directly from the office of the Secretary of Defense, at the top of the US defense hierarchy. One of the first UAV programs begun by the JPO was the "Short Range UAV" program, which in 1988 selected the Hunter UAV, built by Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) in cooperation with TRW.
The Hunter first flew in 1991. It had a general configuration not much different from the Pioneer, except that it was bigger and had twin engines, consisting of two 45 kW (60 HP) Moto-Guzzi piston engines arranged in on both ends of center fuselage in a "pushme-pullyou" configuration. It had a turret with an EO/IR imager mounted on the belly.
The original plan was to acquire 50 Hunter battlefield observation systems,
with four aircraft and appropriate ground control kit in each system, for a
total of $1.6 billion USD. The aircraft was given the Army designation of
"BQM-155A". Initial evaluation determined that the Hunter's range was
inadequate, its data link was unsatisfactory, and the aircraft was too big to
fit into the transport aircraft defined in the original specification.
IAI / TRW BQM-155A / RQ-5A HUNTER:
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spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 8.9 meters 29 feet 2 inches
length 7 meters 22 feet 11 inches
height 1.7 meters 5 feet 7 inches
empty weight 590 kilograms 1,300 pounds
max loaded weight 725 kilograms 1,600 pounds
maximum speed 200 KPH 125 MPH / 109 KT
service ceiling 4,570 meters 15,000 feet
endurance 12 hours
launch scheme RATO booster or runway takeoff.
recovery scheme Conventional landing with hook.
payload Day / night imager.
guidance system Programmable with radio control backup.
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
Despite these deficiencies, a low rate initial production (LRIP) contract for
seven systems at a price of $171 million USD was placed in 1993. Further
evaluation of the Hunter based on these seven systems demonstrated more
shortcomings in the UAV's software, data link, and engine. As the Hunter's
defects were gradually uncovered, price continued to rise, and by 1996 the
Army was faced with paying over $2 billion USD for 52 Hunter systems. Hunter
was cancelled. By the time of its cancellation, 20 Hunters had been lost in
crashes.
* The cancellation of the Hunter program did not mean that the Hunters in service were discarded, and in fact they proved surprisingly useful and were even sent on operational missions. The Hunters were employed by the US Army, Air Force, and Navy on experimental programs; provided training in the development of operational concepts for the day when a more effective UAV system was available; and evaluated use of UAVs for communications relay and electronic warfare (EW) missions.
In the spring of 1999, eight surviving Hunters, redesignated "RQ-5A", were sent to Albania to support Operation ALLIED FORCE, the NATO air campaign against Serbia. The Hunters were flown out of Macedonia, and were able to provide real-time video to senior officers directing ALLIED FORCE, with the video relayed through a ground station, then through a satellite to the US, and finally distributed to end users. NATO commander Wesley Clark used the video feeds and on a few occasions contacted the Hunter operations team directly. The operations team also could adjust their missions in real time in response to inputs from the ALLIED FORCE air operations headquarters.
The Hunters flew 281 sorties during ALLIED FORCE. They spotted targets such as air defense radars, artillery, and missile launchers, and usually stayed on station during attacks to perform post-strike damage assessment. The Hunters were able to operate much lower than manned aircraft, which were restricted to minimum safe operating altitudes. Two Hunters were damaged and sent back to the US for repair, one flew into a mountain, and five were lost in action, apparently shot down. The operations team received six replacements.
* In fact, the Hunter proved to be an extremely useful asset. In 2002, the Army performed experiments with the Hunter in which it was used to drop "Brilliant Antiarmor Munitions (BATs)", a "smart" antitank glide weapon that features an acoustic / infrared seeker, as an experiment towards introduction of a more formal armed UAV system for the Army. A test drop of four BATs performed in early October 2002 scored three direct hits on armored vehicle targets, with one of the three blowing the turret off the tank it struck.
In late March 2003, a Hunter also performed drops of a BAT derivative named "Viper Strike" that was fitted with a laser seeker, with nine drops resulting in seven hits. The Air Force is supposed to provide fixed-wing battlefield air close support for the Army, but the Army has always wanted to have air close support assets of its own, and apparently sees armed UAVs as a way of skirting around the USAF charter.
Hunters served in the US invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003 and the subsequent occupation of the country. By the summer of 2004, the type had achieved a total of 30,000 flight hours in US Army service, not bad for an aircraft that was formally "canned".
* The Army had also considered another UAV, the McDonnell Douglas "Sky Owl", for the short-range UAV competition. It was part of the "SkyEye" series of UAVs developed by Developmental Sciences Corporation, which was originally apparently part of Lear Astronautics but which is now a component of BAE Systems. In any case, Developmental Sciences was one of the first US companies to investigate battlefield UAVs, flying the first prototype of their "SkyEye" series in 1973, leading to the first flight of the improved R4E variant in 1978. The R4E has been continuously refined since then in a sequence of subvariants.
The R4E SkyEye is in service with a number of countries for battlefield surveillance, and has also been used commercially for pesticide spraying. Apparently a few stock R4Es were also purchased by the US Army's Central Command in Latin America and used for border patrols. As the Sky Owl, McDonnell Douglas leveraged it into the company's proposal for the Army competition, but apparently it proved generally inferior to the Hunter.
The SkyEye has the common pusher-propeller twin-tailboom configuration, but
it has distinctive slightly-swept wings and antennas on top of the
tailplanes. It is powered by a UAV Engines Limited (UEL) 39 kW (52 HP)
rotary engine. The SkyEye can carry two underwing stores along with its
other payload. It lands on a retractable centerline skid or can be recovered
by parachute.
DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCES SKYEYE:
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spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 7.32 meters 24 feet
length 4.1 meters 13 feet 5 inches
payload 82 kilograms 180 pounds
launch weight 567 kilograms 1,250 pounds
maximum speed 200 KPH 125 MPH / 110 KT
service ceiling 4,570 meters 15,000 feet
endurance > 8 hours
launch scheme Catapult or runway takeoff.
recovery scheme Parachute, parasail, or runway landing.
payload Day / night imager or other payload.
guidance system Programmable with radio control backup.
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
BACK_TO_TOP
* Although the Hunter proved very useful almost in spite of itself, the Army still needed a formal operational battlefield UAV system. In 1996, on the cancellation of the Hunter, the Army went through its third attempt to procure a battlefield UAV with the Alliant Techsystems Outrider.
The Outrider was based on the Mission Technologies "Hellfox" UAV, which had
flown the year before. The Outrider was a relatively small battlefield UAV
that featured an unusual "dual wing", meaning it was a biplane with the wings
staggered at the wingroots and joined at the ends. It was powered by a
four-cylinder piston engine driving a pusher propeller, had fixed landing
gear, and a pancake-shaped data link antenna on its back.
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS RQ-6A OUTRIDER:
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spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 3.38 meters 11 feet 1 inch
length 2.84 meters 9 feet 4 inch
empty weight 63.5 kilograms 140 pounds
max loaded weight 193 kilograms 425 pounds
maximum speed 220 KPH 138 MPH / 120 KT
service ceiling 4,570 meters 15,000 feet
endurance 4.5 hours
launch scheme Conventional runway takeoff.
recovery scheme Conventional landing with hook.
payload Day / night imager or other payload.
guidance system Programmable with radio control backup.
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
The Outrider was another fiasco. The military demanded a wide range of major
changes to the Hellfox, such changing airframe construction from composites
to aluminum, and the effort never managed to converge to a solution. After
continuous problems and a failure to meet specifications, the Outrider was
cancelled in 1999, the same year it was formally designated the "RQ-6A".
* While it is hard to understand why the Army had such difficulty obtaining what would seem to be a relatively simple technology, part of the problem seems to be specsmanship. The Israelis were able to make use of battlefield UAVs quickly because they had simple requirements. The weather in the Middle East is generally hot, sunny, and clear, and the Israelis have a relatively fixed set of adversaries who mostly live right on their borders. In contrast, the US Army may be forced to operate almost anywhere and against anyone, meaning that a system that would be satisfactory to the Israelis would not be adequate for the US Army. The US Army necessarily had more demanding specifications. This was unavoidable, but it also opened the door to adding ever more specifications, a bureaucratic process known as "feature creep" or "gold-plating" that can squeeze the life out a project.
Along with over-specification, there seems to have been a degree of bumbling as well. The apparent simplicity of a UAV is misleading. Studies of the difficulties encountered in Army UAV programs indicate that participants tended to underestimate the complexity of a UAV system, starting out thinking that UAVs are little more than glorified RC model airplanes, and then were overwhelmed as problems mounted. On the other hand, some defense engineers approached UAVs with the same mindset as they would use for building a piloted aircraft, causing costs to skyrocket.
There also seems to have been problems from interservice squabbling, the inevitable shifts in funding and priorities, and Congressional micromanagement. After the development contract was awarded, the Pentagon decided that Outrider had to meet both Army and Navy requirements. This meant increasing the UAV's range by a factor of four, to allow ships to see targets over the horizon, and specifying an engine that ran on diesel fuel, not gasoline, which is too flammable to store on a naval vessel except when the need absolutely demands it. The engine effort was a fiasco.
Early US Navy UAV efforts seem to have gone better partly because of high-level interest in the project. The original Navy request that resulted in procurement of the Pioneer UAV was a personal initiative of Navy Undersecretary John Lehman. Not only does having such a prominent patron eliminate obstacles, it also encourages program officials to greater efforts, since they know their actions have high-level visibility. The Army efforts, in contrast, have often lacked patrons or high-level commitment.
However, it should also be noted that the Navy has been criticised for becoming involved with programs like Outrider, changing the requirements drastically to fit their needs, and then walking off. In addition, as discussed later, more recent efforts by the Navy to acquire a UAV haven't gone very well, and the Navy's long and difficult search for an antiship missile target has already been described. All this suggests that the Army has no particular copyright on bumbling. Further consideration of the matter leads into a tangle of bureaucracy best avoided.
